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A B S T R A C T 
CONTROL IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: 
Regulation and Decision-making i n 
a Singapore enterprise. 
Vignehsa Ponnampalam 
This thesis approaches .the study of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s from a very 
basic feature of social and organisational behaviour. Because the various • 
a c t i v i t i e s , relationships and phenomena i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s are essentially 
manifestations of co n t r o l , the concept of c o n t r o l , i t i s argued, has tremendous 
po t e n t i a l f o r substantive theorising. 
At a th e o r e t i c a l l e v e l , the research has developed a d e f i n i t i o n of the 
f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s and proposes the int e g r a t i o n and balance of 
the 'action' and 'environmental' schools of thought, v i a the notion of the 
' i n d u s t r i a l relations s e t t i n g ' . The concept of control developed i n the 
thesis brings together various ideas and theories developed i n i n d u s t r i a l 
relations and the other behavioural areas of the sccial sciences. The 
method proposed f o r research,investigation and practice i s s i t u a t i o n a l , 
i . e . using concepts as they apply to the s i t u a t i o n being considered. 
The primary purpose of the exercise, however, was to investigate a 
p r a c t i c a l issue. The p r a c t i c a l investigation focuses on the nature of 
control i n the Singapore s i t u a t i o n , i n par t i c u l a r , t h e issues r e l a t i n g to 
job control i n Singapore's shipbuilding and repairing industry. The study 
scans the environmental factors and closes i n on the local factors - objectives, 
perceptions, motivation, power and influence, beld by the various actors: 
State, management, union and the workers. 
While at the macro-level the study shows a picture of peace and s t a b i l i t y 
between the powerful e n t i t i e s - State, management and union, the research also 
uncovers the not-so-healthy implications of problems on the shopfloor. The 
thesis concludes with suggestions and points to the challenges of the future. 
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I . A NEW APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
This research i s based upon an important observation. The 
a c t i v i t y , behaviour and phenomena that make up the substance of 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , we f i n d , can be studied i n terms of a basic 
feature of social behaviour. We looked at social behaviour i n general 
and the a c t i v i t i e s that make up the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , 
and were able to observe that the wide va r i e t y of a c t i v i t i e s are 
ultimately manifestations of control. Let us consider the range, of 
a c t i v i t i e s that are commonly referred to i n the study of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . 
Because c o l l e c t i v e bargaining has played a major rol e i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d societies of the West, there has been a tendency to 
study i n d u s t r i a l relations as i f i t was essentially c o l l e c t i v e 
bargaining. . Although c o l l e c t i v e bargaining does play a s i g n i f i c a n t 
part i n these societies, i t has become clear that i n d u s t r i a l relations 
today, i n the West and elsewhere, i s a much wider f i e l d of a c t i v i t y . 
This wide va r i e t y of a c t i v i t i e s includes such important phenomena as 
State intervention, l e g i s l a t i o n , a r b i t r a t i o n , i n d u s t r i a l democracy, 
peace, c o n f l i c t , employer sanctions on workers and vice versa. 
Other writers have seen the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l relr.tions as 
a 'network of rules' or as ' i n s t i t u t i o n s of job regulation'^. And 
yet others have extended the 'rules' discussion to add informal 
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rules (e.g. customs and practice) t o the formal i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Although t h i s extension has attempted t o widen the 'rules' approach 
to theory, i t c l e a r l y cannot embrace the widening v a r i e t y of 
informal interactions and sanctions which, while not creating a r u l e , 
can have profound effects on plant i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . Besides, 
the rules approach has other weaknesses. Because of i t s 
preoccuption with i n s t i t u t i o n s and regulation (as a goal i n i t s e l f ) , 
the various objectives of the parties involved, t h e i r a t t i t u d e s and 
perceptions, the power and influence relationships, problems and 
i n s t a b i l i t i e s tend not to receive due att e n t i o n . I t misses out on 
those v i t a l matters, a good picture of which i s necessary i n order 
to understand any kind of social behaviour. I t s emphasis on 
regulation and s t a b i l i t y concentrates as Hyman noted on 'how ex i s t i n g 
patterns of social r e l a t i o n s are s t a b i l i s e d , rather than the 
significance i n t h e i r own r i g h t of challenges to the pr e v a i l i n g 
3 
social structure'. 
To say that i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i s c o l l e c t i v e bargaining or a 
'system of rules' i s therefore unnecessarily r e s t r i c t i v e . What i s 
important, and i n t e r e s t i n g , i s that each and every one of the 
phenomena i n the f i e l d has a common feature, and a cr u c i a l one too. 
F i r s t of a l l , each phenomena involves the i n t e r a c t i o n or 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n of human or social actors. Secondly, whether i t i s 
co l l e c t i v e bargaining, regulative i n s t i t u t i o n s or informal discussion, 
we are able to recognise t h a t people are p r i m a r i l y i n t e r a c t i n g or, 
made t o p a r t i c i p a t e , i n order t o achieve compliance w i t h some o b j e c t i v e 
or objectives. 
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Thus each a c t i v i t y essentially involves social i n t e r a c t i o n and 
control - a term used to re f e r to strategies, manoevres and 
regulative mechanisms directed at f u l f i l l i n g certain objectives. 
Looking c a r e f u l l y at the whole range of a c t i v i t i e s and phenomena 
which make up the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , we are convinced 
that a l l these a c t i v i t i e s (including 'collective bargaining and 
job r e g u l a t i o n 1 ) are essentially manifestations of control between 
and amongst the social e n t i t i e s or participants involved. Hyman 
aptly pointed out that 'regulation - control by rule * was 'merely 
one of the many forms of control i n industry'. 4 I f we perceived 
i n d u s t r i a l relations as a multi-faced prism, we may say control 
i s at the core and the faces representing the various a c t i v i t i e s / 
phenomena i l l u s t r a t e i t s multi-faceted manifestations. In order 
to understand and analyse the d i f f e r e n t manifestations we should 
discover the core,. 
Apart from being a c r u c i a l commonality i n a f i e l d of wide 
v a r i e t y , the notion of con t r o l , we argue i n our th e o r e t i c a l exposition 
(Chapter Two), also provides the important l i n k s which have been 
found missing i n the various other t h e o r e t i c a l approaches. I t i s 
r e a l l y no wonder that control i s such an important concept to social 
s c i e n t i s t s , l i k e the sociologists, who study social behaviour. 
Having i d e n t i f i e d the key f o r understanding and analysis, we 
can approach the study of any given i n d u s t r i a l relations s i t u a t i o n 
quite systematically. Without having to see the s i t u a t i o n i n such 
r e s t r i c t i v e terms as c o l l e c t i v e bargaining or job regulating 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , we may set out to i d e n t i f y the various a c t i v i t i e s and 
phenomena as they exist i n the s i t u a t i o n . Here we are constrained 
only by what we define as a c t i v i t i e s that can be considered to be i n 
the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . For t h i s purpose, we must 
define the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . I t i s the f i e l d of social 
behaviour circumscribed by the formal and informal decisions, 
a c t i v i t i e s and relationships which are s i g n i f i c a n t l y concerned with 
the human performance or non-performance of work i n industry, both 
private and public. This d e f i n i t i o n , which we s h a l l discuss i n 
greater d e t a i l i n the next chapter, c l e a r l y allows one to i d e n t i f y 
a whole range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , both formal and informal, 
c o l l e c t i v e and i n d i v i d u a l . 
Having i d e n t i f i e d the i n d u s t r i a l relations a c t i v i t i e s -
strategics and mechanisms operating i n the given s i t u a t i o n , we are 
interested i n the social e n t i t i e s or participants involved. We 
are concerned about t h e i r goals and objectives, the power-play, the 
bases of power and influence, motivational forces, the sources of" 
consensus (or s t a b i l i t y and c o n f l i c t , and environmental influences -. 
both from (other factors) inside the s i t u a t i o n and from the outside. 
Most of these factors are exposed i n a control framework, since 
t a l k i n g i n terms of control means ra i s i n g a l l these questions. 
The concept of control that we develop i n the next chapter 
contains a reservoir of ideas and theories. In order to understand 
and analyse a given s i t u a t i o n , we propose that these ideas and 
theories may be s e l e c t i v e l y (or s i t u a t i o n a l l y ) applied to the 
s i t u a t i o n and i t s phenomena under study. 
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The concept of control i s also given methodological rigour. 
Here we give a social action dimension to the well-accepted 'environmental' 
systems approach. In t h i s way, we are able to give due consideration 
to the actors' perceptions, attitudes and motivational needs, as well 
as the environmental pressures. This methodological pattern i s 
introduced i n the s i t u a t i o n a l approach that we propose f o r research 
i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
I I . THE GROWING CONCERN FOR CONTROL 
Control i s today a c r i t i c a l factor of i n d u s t r i a l relations analysis 
i n Western European countries l i k e B r i t a i n , France, and West Germany. 
I t manifests i n a wide spectrum of i n d u s t r i a l relations issues e.g. 
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, shopfloor union organisation, a r b i t r a t i o n , 
labour l e g i s l a t i o n , the philosophy of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and corporate 
ownership - both private and public. 
On the other side of the A t l a n t i c , i n North America, workers 
and unions have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been less s o c i a l i s t i c than t h e i r 
European counterparts. They have been socialised to accept more 
givens: i n terms of i n d i v i d u a l / p r i v a t e ownership of c a p i t a l and 
property, i n terms of freedom f o r private enterprise, and thereby 
i n terms of the prerogatives (or r i g h t s of control) that accrue to the 
owners and managers of such enterprise. These a t t r i b u t e s are 
essentially manifestations of a d i s t i n c t i v e l y c a p i t a l i s t i c or 
•capital-pursuing* ethos pr e v a i l i n g over the people, including workers 
and unions, of North America. Nevertheless, although these workers 
were t r a d i t i o n a l l y socialised i n a system which did not promote desires 
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i n the working masses f o r more control over work, major studies 
conducted by Chamberlain^ and Derber^ reveal that American workers did 
develop a growing i n t e r e s t i n the issues of control, especially a f t e r 
the Second World War. This was" a r e f l e c t i o n of labour's reluctance 
to abandon i t s gains made during the war e f f o r t s . Another American 
i n d u s t r i a l relations s c i e n t i s t , Richard Herding, however, has unveiled 
more recent evidence of a growing concern f o r control i n the American 
system.' 
The more recent signs of desire f o r control could indeed d i r e c t l y 
be related to increasing affluence. As workers, i n general, reach a 
stage where they feel confident that economic rewards are more than 
adequate to s a t i s f y t h e i r m a t e r i a l i s t i c and recreational wants, they 
tend to look around f o r a greater say i n the running of the enterprise. 
Technological development i n industry and the education of workers i t 
engenders i s another factor that opens workers' minds to issues 
r e l a t i n g to the organisation and al l o c a t i o n of work. The American 
system of i n d u s t r i a l relations i s indeed a good example of a s i t u a t i o n 
where, i n spite of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l c a p i t a l i s t i c ethos, workers have 
come to exh i b i t a growing awareness and in t e r e s t i n job con t r o l . 
I I I . INVESTIGATING CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS IN SINGAPORE 
i n the present study we wanted to take a look at the some 
important control developments i n Singapore, where l i k e i n the 
United States, the people have t r a d i t i o n a l l y , been socialised i n 
' c a p i t a l - p u r s u i n g ' concepts l i k e p r i v a t e ownership o f capital and 
property, free enterprise and the 'managerial prerogative'. 
-8-
Singapore has achieved tremendous economic advance i n the l a s t 
twelve to f i f t e e n years. Rapid i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n over the l a s t 
decade has brought about technological developments too. Similar 
f a c t o r s , we saw e a r l i e r , had aroused the American workers' awareness 
and i n t e r e s t f o r a greater scope of control over work. An i n i t i a l 
speculation would therefore be that a s i m i l a r trend should follow 
i n Singapore. The aim of t h i s study i s to test t h i s speculation: 
were there any indications of a desire on the part of the workers 
f o r more job control? We hoped to uncover the primary interests 
of workers, unions, management, government and the public, and hov; 
control was being allocated, and perceived to be allocated, between 
the relevant p a r t i e s . We also wanted to study the influences and 
motivations governing t h e i r relationships. 
I t must be noted, however, that there are a number of 
environmental conditions and circumstances peculiar to Singapore which 
thereby make f o r an i n t e r e s t i n g analysis. F i r s t l y , Singapore i s a 
very small, urbanised c i t y - s t a t e , unlike the large capital-pursuing 
societies of America and Japan. • Secondly, her economic advancement 
has been achieved i n the context of pressures f o r s u r v i v a l , both 
p o l i t i c a l survival - against the threat of external communist 
intervention, and economic survival - with the lack of natural resources 
f o r development. Thirdly and probably most c r u c i a l l y , Singapore i s 
a m u l t i c u l t u r a l complex of communities, whcse t r a d i t i o n a l backgrounds 
not only have f a c i l i t a t e d peaceful co-existence but have socialised 
the people to accept regulative socio-cultural t r a d i t i o n s and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . These conditions have together produced i n the people 
a strong dependence on centralised c o n t r o l , by the State. 
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While Singapore's macro p o l i t i c a l structure i s based on the 
one-man one-vote democratic model, there has, at the same time, 
developed a high degree of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i n the exercise of control 
by the Government. The influence of the State permeates and "pervades 
a l l s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the society. The 
State thereby.holds the key to the balance of control between employers 
and employees and t h e i r respective c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . In order, 
therefore, to t e s t our speculation as to whether there were any 
desires on the part of workers i n Singapore, as i n the United States, 
f o r more job c o n t r o l , the investigation has to be set i n the context 
of the p r e v a i l i n g centralised State control. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g at t h i s point to note that while c a p i t a l i s t 
t r a d i t i o n s i n the U.S.A. are supported by the society's strong 
idealism i n democracy, freedom and thereby decentralisation, c a p i t a l -
pursuing t r a d i t i o n s continue to t h r i v e i n Singapore's system of 
centralised d i r e c t i o n and con t r o l , with the l i m i t a t i o n s they may 
impose. We sh a l l next i d e n t i f y some of the more prominent features 
of the c a p i t a l or wealth-pursuing -ethos that prevails i n Singapore, 
i n r e l a t i o n to the more widely-discussed American c a p i t a l i s t ethos. 
IV. THE CAPITAL OR WEALTH-PURSUING ETHOS 
We use the phrase ca p i t a l or wealth-pursuing to s i g n i f y the 
strong emphasis i n the culture that i s given to the pursuit of money 
and material wealth. Because of the preoccupation with business, 
the most conspicuous achievements have been those centred i n business 
enterprise. 
Money and wealth are valued not only f o r themselves and the 
goods they w i l l buy, but as symbolic evidence of success, and thereby 
of personal worth. They are seen as a measure of social achievement 
and are obvious signs of one's place i n the hierarchy. This indeed 
i s the crux of Singapore's wealth-pursuing ethos, i . e . the central 
concern, i n the cult u r e , f o r money and other e x t r i n s i c rewards from 
work, that serve as a symbol and measure of social achievement. 
This i s indeed very much an important feature of the American 
c a p i t a l i s t ethos. While i n some societies, l i k e Great B r i t a i n , 
wealth has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been measured i n terms of h e r i d i t a r y f i x e d 
estates and status, such symbols have had only a rudimentary development 
i n both Singapore and America - hence the tendency i n these societies 
to emphasise money as a symbol of wealth and success. 
Next we s h a l l see how the wealth-pursuing ethos supports a 
system of work roles, derived from i n d u s t r i a l capitalism practiced 
i n the West. The s t a b i l i t y of the roles assumed by workers, owners; 
employers and middlemen that have thus f a r persisted i n Western 
c a p i t a l i s t communities has i t s basis i n the Puritan work ethic. 
In a system where the value of work was stressed f o r the 'grace of 
God' the occupational p o s i t i o n and wealth accumulation achieved by a 
man, through harder work, was supposed to be ind i c a t i v e of the 
amount of grace he attained. The.powerful Puritan work ethic indeed 
j u s t i f i e d the t r a d i t i o n a l hierarchy of work roles which have persisted 
to a large extent i n Western c a p i t a l i s t industry despite social 
pressure against i t . 
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This hierarchy of roles continues to persist i n 'Western c a p i t a l i s t ' 
communities to t h i s day with the added j u s t i f i c a t i o n , however, that 
comes from the popular pursuit i n these communities, of social 
achievement as a goal i n i t s e l f . In Singapore, the legitimacy f o r 
the p r e v a i l i n g system of work roles, often derived from Western 
c a p i t a l i s t societies, l i e s more i n the 'social-achievement* goal. 
Each man, whether worker, owner, employer or middleman, s t r i v e s f o r 
occupational/business success and material wealth as these are obvious 
signs of one's place i n the social ladder. Thus we see how the 
wealth-pursuing ethos socialises Singaporeans to accept ro l e systems 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y found i n c a p i t a l i s t business enterprise. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that there are mechanisms i n Oriental 
t r a d i t i o n s that also l e g i t i m i s e the Western-capitalistic type 
hierarchy of work roles. I t comes from the people's socio-cultural 
background, and, f o r our purpose, may be seen as a h i s t o r i c a l 'work 
ethic' found i n Oriental t r a d i t i o n s . Both the Chinese and Indian 
t r a d i t i o n s that have met i n Singapore sanctify the p a t e r n a l i s t i c 
and d i f f u s e master-servant relationship. The worker's t r a d i t i o n a l 
socio-economic and psychological dependence on the employer indeed 
legitimised the employer's u n i l a t e r a l control over the running of 
business enterprise. This has provided an ideal base to sustain 
the Western c a p i t a l i s t i c hierarchy of work roles i n an Oriental 
s e t t i n g . The notion, f o r instance, that the employer should be 
held i n great esteem f o r the l i v e l i h o o d he provides workers i s one 
symbol that i s used i n Singapore even today to l e g i t i m i s e , as a 
p r i n c i p l e , the allegiance that the worker should have f o r the 
employer i n t h e i r mutually-benefitting wealth-pursuing endeavour. 
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These legitimations that comprise what we c a l l an 'Oriental (wealth-
pursuing) work ethic' do indeed support the Western-originated 
c a p i t a l i s t enterprise system. 
A f i n a l aspect of the wealth-pursuing ethos concerns i t s 
operation simultaneously both at the in d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e levels. 
Although pursuing wealth at the in d i v i d u a l level emphasises the s e l f -
i n t e r e s t (economic and social achievement) notion, the high degree of 
State intervention i n Singapore's i n d u s t r i a l , p o l i t i c a l and community 
l i f e has evolved i n the people a considerable dependence on the State 
f o r decisions as to how national wealth i s to be created and 
dis t r i b u t e d - thereby stressing concern f o r social or group interests 
as w e l l . As Galbraith recently noted: 'The Singapore Government 
makes pragmatic use of a l l ideas and refuses to be captive of any 
one idea', and while ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t se.rves p r e t t y well as a motivation 
i t i s recognised i n Singapore that i t does not serve a l l 
purposes, and that i t serves best w i t h i n a framework of careful overall 
planning'.** 
V. THE CASE STUDY AND METHOD 
For the purpose of t h i s study, we set out to investigate the 
balance of control i n Singapore's shipbuilding and repairing yards 
at JURONG. The primary interests c f inanagement have been cl e a r l y 
c a p i t a l i s t i c , with the maximisation of p r o f i t as the goal and 
stimulus of enterprise. 
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We wanted to study whether control was becoming a c r i t i c a l or 
contentious issue i n the management's relations with local workers 
and the unions. 
Our hypothesising would lead us to expect i n JURONG what, i n 
the European context, would have been termed 'paternalism'. This 
would derive largely from strong c u l t u r a l influences promoting the 
unitary ideology and i t s i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s implications would be 
a high degree of u n i l a t e r a l control by management and thus l i t t l e 
labour influence on job control. 
We wanted to explore i f there were any signs of pressure i n 
the system f o r increasing labour influence i n workplace decision 
making. Apart from the t r a d i t i o n a l contest f o r higher economic 
rewards, increasing affluence and higher levels of technology, 
could, as we saw i n the American system, lead towards increasing 
awareness and interest,, i n workers and unions, f o r greater control i n 
enterprise decision-making. 
In order to te s t these ideas we set out to conduct our f i e l d 
study at JUROKG. Apart from extensive repairs on crude o i l c a r r i e r s , 
JURONG also does a good deal of shipbuilding. The f i e l d work was 
undertaken, as arranged, during the autumn of 1976. Two approaches 
that were explored were proposed to the shipyard contacts. The 
questionnaire and structured interview approach to investigation was 
thought inappropriate at that time as wide ranging organisational 
changes were taking place - i t was thought to be rather cumbersome 
to arrange specific interview appointments with yard supervisors 
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and union representatives. The shipyard contacts were more 
receptive, however, to the participant-observation approach. They 
were quite happy to allow, a native researcher mingle with the people -
both management, unionised and non-unionised, to learn about the 
balance of control i n the enterprise. 
Questionnaire-surveys would c e r t a i n l y have allowed quantitative 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n which may have provided p o s i t i v e corroboration of the 
researcher's q u a l i t a t i v e findings, or which may have suggested 
correlations which had not previously occurred to the investigator. 
Participant-observation, however, f a c i l i t a t e d f i r s t hand knowledge 
and experience which may not have resulted from questionnaires or 
structured interviews, f o r these can only t e l l the enquirer what 
people think happens, or should happen, or perhaps only what they wish 
him t o think happens. 
The researcher received whatever possible assistance i n the short 
time available,, t h i s included access to some documents and records. 
He had generally t o be around while the system's actors got on with 
t h e i r jobs. The personal contact with the various actors provided 
the enquirer useful insights i n t o the workings of the system. This 
made i t possible f o r him to make his own observations. The 
researcher's own previous working experience indeed f a c i l i t a t e d 
i n vestigation and understanding. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONTROL IN THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Introduction 
Theorising i n i n d u s t r i a l relations has two aspects. One 
concerns theorising about the substance - the a c t i v i t i e s , relationships 
and processes that makes up i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , and the second aspect 
concerns the method of pursuing analysis i n t h i s subject. The major 
part of t h i s chapter deals with substantive theory and we conclude 
with a discussion on methodology. 
Our survey of behaviour i n society and the i n d u s t r i a l organisation 
cl e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s the pervasiveness of control. I t i s not only, 
universal i n character, but i s seen to be an essential and c r u c i a l 
element of the various a c t i v i t i e s and situations that make up the 
f i e l d . This then becomes the springboard f o r our thesis, that i n 
order to understand or analyse e f f e c t i v e l y any social a c t i v i t y or 
si t u a t i o n we must uncover i t s .control content. 
In order to develop substantive theory i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , 
we f i r s t o u t l i n e or attempt to map the l i m i t s of the f i e l d - a 
d e f i n i t i o n i s evolved. Following the d e f i n i t i o n , we i d e n t i f y the 
• l o c a l 1 and 'environmental' features that describe the features about 
the f i e l d which are considered important to describe any given s i t u a t i o n 
i n the f i e l d . Together they make up what we c a l l the i n d u s t r i a l 
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relations s e t t i n g . The features are: 
(a) Local Factors: (i) Social E n t i t i e s 
Cxi) Objectives, values, attitudes-§ 
motivation 
( i i i ) Power and Influence 
(i) A l l i n d u s t r i a l relations a c t i v i t i e s involve social e n t i t i e s -
i n d i v i d u a l / c o l l e c t i v e , each holding some goals. 
( i i ) A l l a c t i v i t i e s involve s t r i v i n g , with varying i n t e n s i t y , to 
f u l f i l l t h e i r objectives. 
( i i i ) Achieving compliance with objectives implies the use of power and 
influence - a l l these being characteristics local to the s i t u a t i o n 
(b) Contextual or Environmental Influences: Organisational and 
External Factors 
A l l activities/processes' i n a given s i t u a t i o n 
are determined by and i n t u r n , a f f e c t the 
environmental factors. 
We also discuss the consensual and c o n f l i c t perspectives of 
change to i l l u s t r a t e that r e a l i t y contains both dynamic equilibrium 
and inherent c o n f l i c t . These are generally resolved not by 'revolution 
but through the evolutionary change. 
The purpose of substantive theory, we suggest i s to be expository, 
explanatory, predictive and, where relevant, p r e s c r i p t i v e . I t i s with 
the convition that the concept of control holds considerable promise 
as a basis f o r substantive theory i n i n d u s t r i a l relations that we 
embark on developing i t . 
r l 9 r 
Control manifests those same features that we said described 
the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s e t t i n g social e n t i t i e s , goals, objectives, 
perceptions, motivation, power and influence. I n developing the 
various aspects we introduce a vide range of concepts that have been 
discussed i n the social sciences. 
Because of the complexity introduced by diverse environmental 
effects.?and l o c a l i n t e r a c t i o n s , students and pr a c t i t i o n e r s of i n d u s t r i a l 
relations have much to benefit, by borrowing relevant and useful theories 
already developed i n the other social science concerns, viz sociology, 
social anthropology, psychology, law, p o l i t i c s , economics and organisation 
studies etc. Each theory might help describe or explain a p a r t i c u l a r 
aspect of control inherent i n the given s i t u a t i o n . This i n t e r -
d i s c i p l i n e borrowing has s i g n i f i c a n t implications f o r methodology. 
We propose a s i t u a t i o n a l approach tc the study of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . For us, t h i s simply means applying ideas and concepts 
as they r e l a t e to the s i t u a t i o n under study. This may c a l l f o r theories 
concerning 'action' (objectives, motivation/perception) and other local 
factors (power-influence). I t may also c a l l f o r concepts r e l a t i n g to 
environmental (both organisational/external) e f f e c t s . While we r e j e c t 
an exclusive reliance either on the 'action' or 'environmental' approach, 
we ask f o r a balance between the two. In order to discover control 
we need to employ not only paradigms perceived by i n d u s t r i a l relations 
s p e c i a l i s t s , but would benefit from relevant studies i n social and 
organisational behaviour drawn from other d i s c i p l i n e s . The contro l -
s i t u a t i o n a l approach to i n d u s t r i a l relations we propose i s essentially 
i n t e r - d i s c i p l i n a r y . 
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I . RECOGNISING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONTROL 
Control has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been of cru c i a l concern to the 
sociologist as a 'solution* t o the 'problem of order'. Order or 
s t a b i l i t y was thought to be the key to surviv a l - a meta goal held by 
social systems and i t s members. Today, however, survival i s seen not 
only to require s t a b i l i t y , but more and more the a b i l i t y t o cope with 
change. Their concern f o r control i s also motivated, t o varying 
extent, by t h e i r quest to understand and, i f possible, influence 
processes of social regulation and relationships between powerful 
e n t i t i e s aiming to achieve compliance from one another. 
Control has always been of immense concern to the powerful 
members or e n t i t i e s of any social system. They are d i r e c t l y involved 
i n the p r a c t i c a l game of i n s t i t u t i n g devices of social regulation and 
are continuously having to comply and achieve compliance. Apart from 
wanting to s a t i s f y t h e i r e g o t i s t i c a l needs f o r power and influence, 
parliamentarians, clergymen, businessmen and trade union leaders are 
a l l c r u c i a l l y concerned about control because t h e i r successful performance 
depends largely on t h e i r a b i l i t y to achieve compliance from others. 
These powerful members or e n t i t i e s of any social system do indeed have 
real stake i n a sound theory and practice of control. 
I t was against t h i s background that we recognised the importance 
of control as a concept f o r understanding social organisation. A 
deeper look at the a c t i v i t i e s , processes and relationships operating i n 
society i n general, and industry i n p a r t i c u l a r , revealed i t s unique 
q u a l i t y . We found that the various processes and relationships i n 
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operation were e s e n t i a l l y manifestations of control. Indeed, control 
pervades social and i n d u s t r i a l behaviour. 
I t would be appropriate, therefore, f o r us t o i l l u s t r a t e the 
pervasiveness of control i n social system. The d e f i n i t i o n of the term 
control i t s e l f points to t h i s q u a l i t y . 
The term ' c o n t r o l 1 , Tannenbaum noted, i s now used i n a broader 
sense synonymously with the notion of power and influence..* Nevertheless, 
i t i s not only power and influence per se. Goldhamer and Shils have 
pointed out that a person may be said to have power to the extent that 
2 
he influences behaviour of others i n accordance with his own intentions. 
Control therefore refers to strategies., manoevres or mechanisms directed 
at f u l f i l l i n g certain objectives. I t i s indeed an imperative f o r the 
accomplishment of objectives. 
About objectives, Edwin Locke once wrote: 
nA cardinal t r i b u t e of the behaviour of 
l i v i n g organisms i s goal-directedness. 
I t may be observed at a l l levels of l i f e ; 
i n the assimilation of food by an amoeba, 
i n the root growth of a tree or p l a n t , 
i n the stalking of prey by a w i l d animal, 
and i n the a c t i v i t i e s of a s c i e n t i s t i n a 
laboratory."3 
Given the multifarious existence of objectives ( r e f l e c t i n g the 
d i v e r s i t y of human values) i n a given social system and the continuous 
tendency that the system and i t s members have f o r working to achieve 
compliance or accomplish t h e i r objectives (thus involving c o n t r o l ) , 
one can expect to see the pervasiveness i n the system of social processes 
bearing the manifestations of control. Peter Berger's observations 
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about the c r u c i a l i t y and pervasiveness of control i n r e a l i t y as we 
sh a l l see, are rather i l l u m i n a t i n g . 
THE PERVASIVENESS OF CONTROL: 
A SPRVEY OF BEHAVIOUR IN SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 
The c r u c i a l i t y of control i n social behaviour could not have been 
better emphasised when, i n his ' I n v i t a t i o n to Sociology', Berger wrote: 
4 
'No society can exist without social control'. He describes the 
pervasiveness of control by perceiving oneself as standing at the 
centre (that i s , at the point of maximum pressure) of a set of concentri 
c i r c l e s , each representing a system of social c o n t r o l . 5 Berger goes 
on t o suggest that the legal and p o l i t i c a l system as the 'cuter c i r c l e 
o f c o n t r o l ' - 'the system t h a t , quite against one's w i l l , w i l l tax one, 
dr a f t one i n t o the m i l i t a r y , make one obey i t s innumerable rules and 
regulations, i f need be put one i n prison, and i n the l a s t resort w i l l 
k i l l one , 6 
The social and c u l t u r a l system of morality, customs and mannerisms 
also exerts control on the s o l i t a r y f i g u r e i n the centre - to ensure 
conformance to prev a i l i n g social and c u l t u r a l norms. 
In addition t o these broad control, systems, there are other less 
expansive c i r c l e s of control imposing themselves on the i n d i v i d u a l . 
His choice of occupation (or, more accurately, the occupation i n which 
he happens to end up) i n e v i t a b l y subordinates the i n d i v i d u a l to a 
variety of controls. Formal controls operate i n the form of licensing 
boards, professional organisations and trade unions, i n addition to 
the formal standards set by his p a r t i c u l a r employers. Equally 
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powerful i s the informal control exerted by colleagues and co-workers. 
The control of the occupational system one belongs to i s indeed 'so 
important because the job decides what one may do i n most of the rest 
of one's l i f e -which voluntary associations cne w i l l be allowed to 
j o i n , who w i l l be one's frie n d s , where one w i l l be able to l i v e ^ 
etc. 
F i n a l l y we come to the c i r c l e most immediately circumscribing 
the i n d i v i d u a l , that i s the c i r c l e of one's family and personal 
friends which also constitutes a control system. As Berger 
i l l u s t r a t e d , i t may be 'economically disastrous i f one's boss f i n a l l y 
concludes that one i s a worthless nobody, but the psychological e f f e c t 
of such a judgement i s incomparably more devastating i f one discovers 
g 
that one's wife has arrived at the same conclusion'. The impact of 
control on social behaviour at t h i s l e v e l , l i k e at the more extensive 
concentric c i r c l e s , can be quite considerable. 
Berger's p o r t r a i t of social control c l e a r l y h i g h l i g h t s i t s 
pervasiveness i n society, and he also emphasises i t s c r u c i a l i t y i n 
each s i t u a t i o n . These q u a l i t i e s of social control also show up i n 
specif i c f i e l d s of social behaviour - here we are concerned about 
social behaviour i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations. 
Social control pervades i n d u s t r i a l organisations i n the form of 
rules. I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , we have noted, has been conceptualised 
as a 'network of rules'. Examples of formal rules are company policy 
and regulations, departmental and work rules, d i s c i p l i n a r y codes, 
grievance procedure and the c o l l e c t i v e agreement. Just as important 
-24-
are the informal rules or customs and practices that operate on the 
shop f l o o r . A l l these rules c r u c i a l l y a f f e c t the behaviour of the 
social e n t i t i e s (management, supervisors, workers, union) involved. 
Rujes are essentially mechanisms of system regulation. A l l 
rules are aimed at certain objectives - either legitimised by the 
system i t s e l f (as i n the case of social conventions, customs, and to 
some extent, l e g i s l a t i o n ) or held by certain authorities i n the system 
e.g. trade union leadership and managers. In the same way, rules are 
applied either with the legitimacy of the system's members, or enforced 
by authorities from positions of power. Thus rules are essentially 
a manifestation of cont r o l . Job regulation, Hyman noted, was j u s t one 
9 
form o f control - 'control by r u l e ' . 
Sanctions are another manifestation of control. As Alan Fox 
noted: 
"Financial rewards, promotion aspects, praise 
and approval, transfer to more desired work, 
and any other form of g r a t i f i c a t i o n are 
p o s i t i v e , but also have a negative aspect i n 
that they embody a conditional clause threatening 
t h e i r withdrawal or withholding i f the required 
hehaviour i s not forthcoming. Conversely, 
negative sanctions such as reprimands, f i n e s , 
suspension, dismissal, demotion or any other 
form of deprivation a l l have a po s i t i v e aspect 
embodied i n a conditional guarantee that they 
. w i l l be l i f t e d or not imposed i f the desired 
behaviour i s followed". 10 
The operation of sanctions, both p o s i t i v e and negative, actually 
form the basis of control i n many other processes of organisational 
regulation. They make budgetary, production, q u a l i t y and other 
management control.processes work, besides obviously being involved 
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i n the manager's issuing of commands and ensuring compliance, and i n 
the administration of rules and regulations throughout the organisation. 
Although i n most instances sanctions are aimed at i n d i v i d u a l response 
from a subordinate, the presence of closely-knit work groups and 
strong unions i n an organisation can bring c o l l e c t i v e pressures to 
bear on such s i t u a t i o n s . Whilst the negative union sanctions can 
be i n the form of denying cooperation to the employer or to c a l l f o r 
a s t r i k e , the employer may resort to the threat of a lock out. Trade 
unions and employers could also use p o s i t i v e sanctions, by giving 
cooperation and confidence, i n order to enjoy benefits which s a t i s f y 
long-term intentions and objectives. A study of the frequency and 
va r i e t y of sanctions used by management, unions and workgroups can be 
quite i l l u s t r a t i v e of the pervasiveness of control i n the i n d u s t r i a l 
organisation. 
Apart from checking the q u a l i t y of work people j u s t i n terms of 
performance, the processes of h i r i n g and f i r i n g are safety valves 
against the employment of people who do not conform i n some way t o 
the company's objectives. The type of technology employed by the 
management also exerts control. Although production-line technology 
may be dysfunctional to the humanisation of work, i t has been highly 
functional t o the improvement of e f f i c i e n c y and p r o d u c t i v i t y - these 
are objectives of management. 
The selective disclosure of information i s yet another control 
process. Managements continue to stress the importance of 
c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y not only as a safeguard against competition, but as a 
means to 'condition' the behaviour of the organisation's members. 
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I t would be appropriate, however, to point out here that since 
there are many actors l i k e management, government agencies, unions 
and groups of workers who p a r t i c i p a t e i n the decisions and a c t i v i t i e s 
o f the organisation, we recognise that control processes can and w i l l 
be i n i t i a t e d by and f o r the f u l f i l m e n t of objectives belonging to the 
various p a r t i e s . I f we, therefore, wished to describe a control 
process i n i t i a t e d by management (as most of these described above), 
we s h a l l r e f e r to i t as management co n t r o l , and s i m i l a r l y trade 
unions: union c o n t r o l , workers: workers' control and government 
agencies: state, c o n t r o l . 
The most s t r i k i n g element about union control i s r e f l e c t e d i n 
the s o l i d a r i t y i t derives from union membership and association with 
other f r a t e r n a l groups. Indeedsympathetic s t r i k e action i l l u s t r a t e s ; 
t h i s feature with utmost vigour. Union control i s also f e l t i n other 
areas - i t i s exerted through the negotiating and consultative 
channels. Examples of workers' control are easily found i n Europe:-
self-management i n Eastern Europe; and various forms of worker 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n schemes i n Western -Europe are cases i n point. State 
control comes i n the form of l e g i s l a t i o n , incomes p o l i c i e s , a r b i t r a t i o n 
committees, and a host of other labour/employment ministry's agencies 
attending to matters ranging from workmen's compensation to equality 
of the sexes. 
This outlin e of concrete phenomena c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s that 
the various situations i n social and organisational, behaviour are 
essentially manifestations of control. As Tannenbaum has 
noted, 'characterising organisations i n terms of i t s 
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pattern of control i s to describe an essential and universal aspect 
of o r g a n i s a t i o n ' A r r i v i n g at t h i s observation i s important f o r i t 
establishes the basis f o r a new approach to the study of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . Unlike the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and 'rules' approaches 
which v;e pointed out i n Chapter One cover l i m i t e d ground i n the 
wide area of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , control i s a universal aspect. 
I t i s a common element i n the whole range of a c t i v i t i e s (formal and 
informal, i n d i v i d u a l and co l l e c t i v e ) that make up the f i e l d . Apart 
from the u n i v e r s a l i t y , control i s also an essential aspect. Because 
the whole range.of a c t i v i t i e s p r i m a r i l y involve s t r i v i n g to f u l f i l l 
some objective (s) (thereby involving c o n t r o l ) , control i s an 
essential and c r u c i a l element. In order therefore, to understand or 
analyse e f f e c t i v e l y any given a c t i v i t y or s i t u a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s , i t makes sense to uncover i t s control content. We do 
cl e a r l y have a good case f o r a control-exposing theory i n i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . 
I I . THE FIELD OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A DEFINITION 
Having expounded the relevance of developing a control theory 
fo r substantive i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , i t would be appropriate f o r us 
now to examine the nature of a c t i v i t i e s and processes that operate i n 
the f i e l d . We must f i r s t define the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l relations 
more s p e c i f i c a l l y than seeing i t simply as a system of social 
behaviour. Without any q u a l i f i c a t i o n , however, t h i s conception i s 
far less specific than any of the conventional d e f i n i t i o n s of the 
subject, whether i t i s ' i n s t i t u t i o n s of job regulation'•or even 
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'social r e l a t i o n s i n industry'. 
I n order t o tighten our d e f i n i t i o n we need to'make two important 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . The f i r s t c r i t e r i o n that distinguishes i n d u s t r i a l 
relations from the various other areas of social behaviour i s whether 
the activity/phenomenon being considered i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y concerned, 
with the human performance or non-performance of work i n industry, 
both p r i v a t e and public. While t h i s t e s t automatically eliminates 
situations where work i s performed outside industry such as i n 
rendering voluntary services f o r c h a r i t y organisations, i t also 
stresses that the phenomenon must be s i g n i f i c a n t l y relevant to the 
work s i t u a t i o n . The essential question behind the significance t e s t 
i s : how f a r does the a c t i v i t y or phenomenon influence or derive from 
the performance or non-performance of work? As Hyman noted, routine 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s l i k e conversation or horseplay during tea 
breaks cannot be considered s i g n i f i c a n t . 1 2 On the other hand, although 
a c t i v i t i e s l i k e opening or closing a workplace, determining levels of 
production and the introduction of new forms of'organisation have 
conventionally been taken to l i e putside the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
f i e l d , we must recognise that they are steadily becoming s i g n i f i c a n t . 
They do now determine much of the character of the actions and 
relationships which make up the work s i t u a t i o n . 
The second q u a l i f i c a t i o n we need to make i s that social 
behaviour, decisions, a c t i v i t i e s . a n d relationships i n i n d u s t r i a l 
re l a t i o n s can be distinguished between the formal and informal. The 
Donovan Commission's Report i n 1968 made t h i s notable d i s t i n c t i o n i n 
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arguing that: 
" B r i t a i n has two systems of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
The one i s the formal system embodied i n the 
o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . The other i s the informal 
system created by the actual behaviour of trade 
unions and employers 1 associations, of managers, 
shop stewards and workers". 13 
The d i s t i n c t i o n was made to h i g h l i g h t that the informal, personal 
and unstructured behaviour and relationships on the shopfloor tended 
t o q u a l i f y , supplement or even contradict the decisions taken w i t h i n 
the o f f i c i a l framework at the national l e v e l . The formal system, as 
Cooper and B a r t l e t t noted, 'presents a t i d y , coherent p i c t u r e 1 : 
" C o l l e c t i v e representatives decide terms and 
conditions. Procedural agreements indicate 
the manner i n which these substantive agreements 
are to be amended, interpreted or applied. 
Disputes procedures may be included i n the 
same agreements, providing f o r the orderly 
and peaceful resolution of grievances, or 
they may be i n separate documents. This 
model of precision, unfortunately, i s marred ^ 
by an awkward r e a l i t y v i z , the informal system". 
Based on the B r i t i s h experience, w r i t i n g about the informal system 
has generally emphasised the problematic gap between national/industry 
wide agreements and the decisions taken at plant l e v e l . The term 
'wage-drift' i s used to r e f e r to the difference between national/industry 
minimum rates «xiid the actual earnings. The increasing number of u n o f f i c i a l 
and unconstitutional s t r i k e s sometimes showed up the contradiction between 
worker decisions at shopfloor level and the e f f o r t s of the national 
union leadership. The growth of shopfloor bargaining between shop 
stewards and managers to cover the numerous situations which are 
impossible to deal at industry level (such as administration or work 
study, incentive schemes, work arrangements, rules and d i s c i p l i n e ) •• 
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has often lead to modification, and sometimes even contradiction of 
principles decided at the higher l e v e l . 
Apart from the contradictory aspects, Hyman noted that the 
informal system was i n part complementary to the formal i n s t i t u t i o n s . * ^ 
Although decisions at the lower levels could controvert higher l e v e l 
agreements, a substantial part of the time spent by managers and 
shop stewards goes on implementing industry-wide agreements. 
By using the term 'systems1 f o r the formal and informal aspects 
of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , the impression created, as Hyman noted, was 
the 'existence of two detached sets of processes and areas of a c t i v i t y * . 
Behrend, however, has conceptualised r e a l i t y : 
" I t i s doubtful whether the d i f f e r e n t 
types of relat i o n s can easily be separated 
from each other, f o r interpersonal human 
relati o n s take place against the background 
of group and c o l l e c t i v e relations and the 
borderline between formal and informal, 
c o l l e c t i v e and personal, relations i s not 
clear cut - there i s a constant i n t e r a c t i o n 
between them. 1 1 17 
Apart from t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n between formal and informal aspects, 
another important point remains' to be made. 
Much w r i t i n g i n the f i e l d has tended to dichotomise formal and. 
informal behaviour between the i n d u s t r i a l / n a t i o n a l and plant levels. 
Certainly, i t i s true to say, that much of the behaviour at shopfloor 
level i s uncodified, unstructured and therefore informal. But to say, 
as Flanders did, that a l l i n d u s t r i a l relations at the higher level are 
formal or i n s t i t u t i o n a l , ignores a l l those inter-peTSonai, o f t e n 
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p r i v a t e , discussions, i n i t i a t i v e s and relationships (cordial or 
otherwise), that go to make up formal agreement or c o n f l i c t . Although 
these processes may be uncodified and unstructured, often they are 
c r u c i a l . 
In r e a l i t y therefore, the l i n e between formal and informal 
behaviour i s not so much horizontal ( i . e . distinguishing between the 
industry and plant l e v e l ( s ) ) as i t i s v e r t i c a l . This i s to say 
that we could have both formal and informal behaviour at a l l levels. 
Just as there are personal and unstructured processes at the higher 
levels, some a c t i v i t i e s (.e.g. recorded workplace agreements, agreed 
d i s c i p l i n a r y procedures, and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d customs and practices) 
at shop f l o o r can be formal. Only, as Behrend noted, the 'dividing 
l i n e ' i s not clear cut. 
I f we consolidated the various points we have discussed so f a r , 
we should be able t o conceptualise at a given time, a l b e i t very 
roughly, the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l relations divided i n t o formal and 
informal processes. The picture that emerges might look something 
l i k e figure I on the following page. We have a ' v e r t i c a l d i v i d i n g l i n e ' 
between formal and informal a c t i v i t i e s running from the national to the 
shop f l o o r l e v e l . At a higher level we might expect formal c o l l e c t i v e 
negotiations between employee unions and employer associations, coming 
on the formal side. At a corresponding level on the informal side we 
might expect private meetings and discussions between union o f f i c i a l s 
and employer representatives. I t i s not d i f f i c u l t to imagine the 
kind of impact that t h i s informal a c t i v i t y could have on the formal 
negotiations. We have also shown i n the diagram the formal and 
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FORMAL AND INFORMAL PROCESSES IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
FORMAL 
Le g i s l a t i o n 
Courts 
A r b i t r a t i o n 
C o n c i l i a t i o n 
Mediation 
Government Controls 
e.g. health 6 safety 
so c i a l s e c u r i t y 
etc. 
Employer organisation functions 
Employee trade union functions 
C o l l e c t i v e bargaining 
Works councils 
Supervisory boards 
Worker d i r e c t o r s 
S t r i k e and lock-outs 
( o f f i c i a l demand/ultimatum not met) 
Formal agreements at plant lev e l 
O f f i c i a l discussions between manager 
and shop steward on matters as they arise 




Inte r v e n t i o n and discussions . 
i n chambers; informal 
p r i v a t e discussions and 
negotiations between representatives 
of the various relevant 
p a r t i e s at the national 
• l e v e l . 
O f f i c i a l advising employer on an 
informal basis 
Trade union o f f i c i a l s advising shop 
stewards 
Information discussions between 
labour representatives and managers/ 
personnel dept. 
Personnel antagonisms or show 
of strength between manager and 
union o f f i c i a l 
Personnel-union o f f i c i a l discussions 
Line-manager •• supervisor - union rep. 
worker i n t e r a c t i o n 
D i s c i p l i n a r y actions by manager/supervisor 
Informal grievance handling 
I n d i v i d u a l worker sanctions -
r e s t r i c t i o n of output, poor timekeeping, 
absenteeism, p i l f e r i n g etc. 
C o l l e c t i v e sanctions -





informal p o s s i b i l i t i e s about o f f i c i a l i n d u s t r i a l action. 
At the bottom end of the scale, i . e . at shop f l o o r , we have shown 
more a c t i v i t y on the informal side. Mere ana more attention i s now 
being focused at t h i s end. Not only are people concerned about 
obvious chop f l o o r a c t i v i t y that contradicts i n s t i t u t i o n s and decisions 
at higher levels, sociologists and behavioural s c i e n t i s t s are looking 
f o r the* less obvious manifestations of shop f l o o r discontent and 
c o n f l i c t . High absenteeism, turnover, sick leaves, and deliberate 
r e s t r i c t i o n of output are some examples of informal,yet important, 
processes on the shop f l o o r . 
Our picture of i n d u s t r i a l relations c l e a r l y represent a wide 
range of a c t i v i t i e s and processes. While the significance of formal 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i s generally recognised, more att e n t i o n needs to be 
given to the obvious and less obvious informal processes as w e l l . 
Having made the two broad q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , we may summarise our 
conception of the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s : i t i s the f i e l d of 
social behaviour circumscribed by the formal and informal decisions, 
a c t i v i t i e s and relationships which are s i g n i f i c a n t l y concerned with 
the human performance or non-performance of v>ork i n industry. 
The perceptive reader would have notices t h a t , so f a r , our 
discussion has constantly referred to a c t i v i t i e s , processes, 
relationships etc. No speci f i c mention has r e a l l y been made about 
the many issues that have emerged and continue to emerge, i n the 
f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . These issues, as we know, are 
wide-ranging: wage claims, claims f o r improved working conditions, 
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improvements i n health and safety measures, some supervisor's handling 
of a subordinate, or conversely, some insubordination, some clause 
f o r a c o l l e c t i v e agreement, a decision about the wage rate or policy 
or even about the c a l l f o r i n d u s t r i a l democracy etc. I t i s pertinent 
that we recognise the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t i v i t y and issue, and, 
explain i t here. 
t o take a simple example, negotiating a.wage claim can be 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d - the a c t i v i t y being the negotiation, and the issue, 
the wage claim. ' I n d u s t r i a l democracy', however, may not be so 
clear cut. As an i n s t i t u t i o n i n operation i t i s a term used to 
describe the a c t i v i t y , but as an ideology or proposal, i t becomes an 
issue. Looking c a r e f u l l y at the d i s t i n c t i o n , we are able t o perceive 
that issues emerge or arise from goals and objectives held by social 
e n t i t i e s . The a c t i v i t i e s , whether they involve persons", groups or 
organisations, as we pointed out e a r l i e r , are the processes used by 
the e n t i t i e s s t r i v i n g to achieve t h e i r goals and objectives. So, j u s t 
as the a c t i v i t i e s are essentially processes of co n t r o l , i n d u s t r i a l 
relations issues are p r i m a r i l y issues of control. 
When we t a l k about the substance of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , seen 
as a f i e l d of social behaviour, we na t u r a l l y think i n terms of a c t i v i t i i 
processes and relationships. But, when we study the f i e l d we must 
recognise the importance of the issues, as they r e f l e c t the objectives. 
I I I . THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SETTING 
Having conceptualised the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , our 
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next step towards a substantive theory i s to i d e n t i f y those key 
characteristics that describe the nature of any given a c t i v i t y , process 
or s i t u a t i o n i n the f i e l d . These characteristics make up what we c a l l 
the i n d u s t r i a l relations s e t t i n g . I t may be perceived at two levels: 
factors local to or d i r e c t l y impinging upon the s i t u a t i o n and the 
contextual or environmental influences a f f e c t i n g i t . Let us consider 
the local factors f i r s t . 
LOCAL FACTORS: SOCIAL ENTITIES, OBJECTIVES 5 PERCEPT-IONS AND POWER 
AND INFLUENCE 
F i r s t of a l l we must recognise the presence of the social e n t i t i e s 
active i n the si t u a t i o n s . I n i t i a l l y t h i s may seem uncontroversial, 
but with the pr e v a i l i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l focus, we are faced with what 
Bain and Clegg saw as ' r e i f i c a t i o n ' . Although i n some si t u a t i o n s , 
organisations may be seen as bodies representing s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s , 
we must be able t o recognise that sometimes, as Hyman notes, 'the 
situations of union leaders d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from those of the 
members they represent; and t h i s leads i n turn t o differences i n 
at t i t u d e s , i n t e r e s t s , objectives, and conceptions of what i s good 
18 
f o r the members as fo r 'the union''. R e i f i c a t i o n , as he pointed out, 
i s 'treating an impersonal abstraction as a social agent, when i t i s 
19 
r e a l l y only people who act'. The treatment of organisational e n t i t i e s , 
therefore, needs careful a t t e n t i o n . 
E a r l i e r we pointed to the significanceof informal and unstructured 
relationships at the higher levels. We must, i n our e f f o r t s t o i d e n t i f y 
social e n t i t i e s active i n a given s i t u a t i o n not j u s t confine ourselves 
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to organisational e n t i t i e s but also seek out individuals/groups who 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t the d i r e c t i o n and regulation of organisational 
a c t i v i t y . Such i n f l u e n t i a l personalities could come from the union, 
management or even some outside t h i r d party (e.g. c o n c i l i a t o r , a r b i t r a t o r , 
government o f f i c i a l , etc.) . 
Objectives and Perceptions and the 'Action 1 Approach 
Because goals are the: most immediate regulators of human or social 
action, we must look out f o r the various objectives held by the d i f f e r e n t 
e n t i t i e s i n a given s i t u a t i o n . 
Beneath the objectives, we have to see the values, needs, perceptions 
and motivational forces. These factors not only determine the emergence 
of p a r t i c u l a r goals but, as Goldthorpe et a l noted, also make up the 
'participants' own d e f i n i t i o n s of the situations i n which they are 
engaged. They may be taken as an i n i t i a l basis f o r the explanation 
20 
f o r t h e i r social behaviour and relationships. Because values, attitudes 
and perceptions vary from person to person, there i s a 'variety of 
meanings' held by the various participants i n the s i t u a t i o n . These 
behavioural influences are given prime importance by w r i t e r s taking the 
'social action' approach. Work done by Goldthorpe et a l on the 
21 
'orientations tc work' i s a well known example. Silverman's 
'action approach' stresses the way i n which man influences the social 
22 
structure and 'makes society'. 1 6 These perspectives have, however, been 
c r i t i c i s e d f o r t h e i r r e s t r i c t i v e outlook. 
Angela Bowey, for instance, has aptly captured Brown's views on 
the 'orientations to work'. These orientations cannot be treated and 
A 
Brown has indeed made the point that ' s o c i a l i s a t i o n at work can affec t 
23 
orientations'. As Bowey goes on to say, 'orientations to work 
should be viewed as both a determinant of, and determined by, behaviour 
24 
and experiences at work 1. 
While recognising the deficiencies, Brown notes that action 
approach need not be abandoned, i n fact he recommends i t s development. 
Recognition, however, must be given to external constraints: 
"Whatever the directions taken, i t i s hoped 
that research w i l l not lose sight of the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s of resources of power and 
authority, and of the physical and technological 
conditions i n industry, which form some of the 
more interactable 'conditions of action' f o r 
those pursuing t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l or shared 
objectives i n work."25 
Banks has suggested that the reciprocal nature of the relationship 
between social action and structure may be seen i n a 'step-by-step^ 
approach of how an individual's action influences and i s influenced by 
his social and physical environment. Although his approach need not 
be assumed i n i t s absolute form, since societal change need not be 
step-by-step,it does i l l u s t r a t e the i n t e r a c t i o n between action and 
structure. 
Seen i n terms of i t s i n t e r a c t i o n with the s t r u c t u r a l constraints, 
the action approach has performed the useful r o l e of h i g h l i g h t i n g the 
importance of the actors' objectives and expectations. Generally, 
the action approach i s associated with the m u l t i p l i c i t y of aspirations 
of i n d u s t r i a l employees. We must recognise, however, the significance 
of the values and b e l i e f s held by the key decision-makers i n the 
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s i t u a t i o n , often they a f f e c t the behaviour of very many people. 
Power and Influence 
Quite apart from the power structure and wider p o l i t i c a l influences, 
power and influence are crucial elements at the local level of acticn , 
Hyman f o r instance, saw the 'unceasing power struggle' as a 'central 
27 
feature of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s ' . For Cooper and B a r t l e t t , there 
not only were differences of power at national l e v e l but saw that the 
28 
power game had moved to the shopfloor. Wherever there i s i n t e r a c t i o n 
between social e n t i t i e s , be they individuals or associations s t r i v i n g 
to achieve compliance with t h e i r goals, there i s bound to be the use 
of power and influence. They are j u s t as important as objectives 
and motivations i n determining the processes operating i n any given 
s i t u a t i o n . 
CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACH 
Having considered the key local forces that operate i n any given 
i n d u s t r i a l relations s i t u a t i o n , we must also recognise the contextual 
influences i n order to get a complete picture of the s e t t i n g . The 
emphasis on contextual influences was heralded i n t o i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
research about twenty years ago, by John Dunlop, who appropriately came 
to be known as an 'environmentalist'. The environmental forces that 
he perceived as s i g n i f i c a n t at the time were: technology, market or 
budgetary constraints, the locus of power and status i n larger society 
29 
and the 'ideology'. 
-39-
The influences of the environment upon i n d u s t r i a l relations i n 
any given s i t u a t i o n i s f a r more complex than i t was twenty years ago. 
The number of i d e n t i f i a b l e contextual factors has m u l t i p l i e d , and they 
can be perceived to operate at d i f f e r e n t levels. Here we s h a l l 
i d e n t i f y the major variables, and make no claim that other factors 
would not become important, i n future. 
At the organisational level we see such organisation a t t r i b u t e s 
as size, structure and demands from the production-technology, 
stocks and inventory, marketing and finance functions. The demands 
made by production levels, methods and technology are known t o have 
tremendous impact on shopfloor i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
Apart from the. abovementioned s t r u c t u r a l f a c t o r s , there are 
social constraints too. I f the s i t u a t i o n being considered involves 
an i n d i v i d u a l or some p a r t i c u l a r group w i t h i n a large organisation, 
there are d e f i n i t e l y going to be values and perceptions held by other 
actors elsewhere i n the organisation which can af f e c t the behaviour 
w i t h i n the case-situation. Here .we are actually t a l k i n g about 
reference norms w i t h i n the organisation and they must be recognised 
as an important contextual influence. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note here that while rules, customs and 
practices do emerge as a product of social i n t e r a c t i o n , they are also 
a contextual influence. Considering that rules i n general are meant 
to influence human a c t i v i t y and behaviour, i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to 
see o r g a n i s a t i o n a l rules and customs as a contextual factor i n i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . 
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Above the organisational l e v e l , we come to the 'external 1 or 
wider environments. This can range from the i n d u s t r i a l - l e v e l 
influences to i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressures. As the number of factors are 
too many to l i s t here, we s h a l l j u s t indicate the major headings under 
which the various variables might.be c l a s s i f i e d . 
The c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l legacies are important elements of 
the wider environment. They not only explain u n i t y but also d i v e r s i t y 
i n values, i n society and p a r t i c u l a r industries. Economic constraints, 
f o r example, factors l i k e the multinational enterprises labour market, 
i n f l a t i o n , resource a v a i l a b i l i t y and a l l o c a t i o n , etc., also make t h e i r 
impact on i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . Changes i n technology and knowledge 
too a f f e c t and create patterns of work and relationships at workplace. 
Legislative controls make an important impact, at a l l levels of 
social i n t e r a c t i o n and are p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n t i a l i n some i n d u s t r i a l 
re l a t i o n s systems e.g. U.S.A., Aus t r a l i a , South A f r i c a and Singapore. 
The p o l i t i c a l system, the locus and d i s t r i b u t i o n of power at industry 
level and i n wider society, have t h e i r effects too. 
While Dunlop's environmental approach has been very i n f l u e n t i a l 
i n research because i t pointed t o a range of variables, his neglect 
of 'human r e l a t i o n s ' or 'action' variables has been c r i t i c i s e d . As 
Bain and Clegg commented: ' I f the purpose i s t o give a f u l l 
explanation of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s behaviour, as Dunlop suggests i t 
i s , then there are several reasons why behavioural variables and 
30 
u n s t r u c t u r e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s cannot be omitted ' An open supporter 
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of Dunlop's approach, Kenneth Walker, recently conceded that ' i t i s 
also Jiecessary to add some e x p l i c i t provision f o r the goals and 
31 
motivation of the actors on which Dunlop i s s i l e n t 1 . 
These c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d at a purely environmental and, as 
e a r l i e r , on a purely action approach have been recorded t o emphasise 
the balance and i n t e r a c t i o n between the two. Although contextual 
forces are often treated as independent, i t i s important t o recognise 
that social e n t i t i e s w i t h i n the s i t u a t i o n can affect the environment. 
Lobbying and pressure-group a c t i v i t i e s i n the p o l i t i c a l system are 
t y p i c a l examples. M i l i t a n t action by workers i n the essential services 
have also led t o change of governments. So, j u s t as the loc a l factors 
that have been discussed e a r l i e r should not be approached the way some 
action sociologists have done, the contextual factors we enumerate 
should not be treated with the narrowness of Dunlop's approach. The 
balance between the local and environmental factors needs be achieved 
through a s i t u a t i o n a l approach, which we discuss l a t e r . 
. There i s yet another important point about analysis i n i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . When we t a l k about local and environmental factors, we 
must recognise that these change over time. Although i t i s usual 
to see s c i e n t i s t s studying the effects of environmental (e.g. 
technological changes i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , the local f a c t o r s , 
(objectives, expectations, e t c . ) , i f they are taken i n t o consideration, 
tend to be assumed t o remain constant - t h a t they do not change w i t h time. 
What we would l i k e t o emphasise here i s that j u s t as change i s recognised 
i n the con t e x t u a l f o r c e s , students must recognise change i n the e n t i t i e s 
local a t t r i b u t e s over time, - i . e . considering the past, present 
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and possible variations i n the future. Motivational theories used i n 
the study of exis t i n g local factors would d e f i n i t e l y be h e l p f u l i n 
tracing the progression i n objectives and expectations over time, 
CHANGE: EQUILIBRIUM AND.CONFLICT 
Following from the above point about change, i t would be useful 
t o c l a r i f y our posit i o n with regard t o what Allen has termed as a 
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'status-quo' approach, and the other, the 'structural change1 approach. 
Generally speaking the 'status-quo' analysis i s associated with the 
'conservative' assumption of normative consensus and equilibrium. 
Because change, challenge or c o n f l i c t i s assumed to be temporary, 
that which can be contained w i t h i n the pr e v a i l i n g equilibrium, the 
social system i s assumed to have self-co r r e c t i n g a t t r i b u t e s -
i n s t i t u t i o n e . l i s a t i o n and s o c i a l i s a t i o n , whereby i t i s able t o sustain 
i t s p r e v a i l i n g structure and i n s t i t u t i o n s . The 'st r u c t u r a l change' 
concept, on the other hand, bases i t s premise on the existence of 
fundamental c o n f l i c t , that which i s capable of disrupting, causing 
permanent disunity and thereby r e s u l t i n g i n the social system undergoing 
revolutionary s t r u c t u r a l change. Because both these approaches have 
chosen to emphasise the very divergent r e a l i t i e s of social l i f e , they 
are often seen as contending schools c f thought v i z . the equilibrium 
and c o n f l i c t models. In actual f a c t , i f we looked at the basic"elements 
of both these 'change' models, we would be able t o see t h e i r c o m p a t i b i l i t y , 
since i n r e a l i t y , society contains a l l the categories - general consensus, 
continuity, temporary disturbances and fundamental c o n f l i c t . Many 
writers have already described the various forms of regulation and/or 
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c o n f l i c t i n industrial r e l a t i o n s . While we do agree with Hyman that 
both s t a b i l i t y and i n s t a b i l i t y must have equal significance as 'system 
33 
outcomes' or products of the system, the differences, as we have pointed 
out above, l i e s i n t h e i r treatment. 
For the Marxists, because the c o n f l i c t between the c a p i t a l i s t 
and labour classes i s so fundamental i n ex i s t i n g social systems, they 
contend chat when the ' c a p i t a l i s t integument* i s broken, revolutionary 
change would follow. I n the ultimate s o c i a l i s t society, argues Hyman, 
" I n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t would not be rooted i n 
an antagonistic social structure: i t would 
not stem from the exercise of control i n the 
interests of a minority class of c a p i t a l i s t s , 
or by an authorian bureaucracy. Industry 
. c o n f l i c t would, therefore, be less 
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e , less pervasive". 34 
I n our view however, although the Marxist argument has highlighted an 
important source of c o n f l i c t , i t i s l i m i t e d i n the sense that i t has 
l e f t unattended the various other sources of c o n f l i c t which are j u s t 
as fundamental or even p o t e n t i a l l y devastating. Apart from class 
c o n f l i c t , society i s fraught with sources of r a c i a l c o n f l i c t , r e l i g i o u s 
c o n f l i c t , i n t e r n a t i o n a l scrambling f o r natural resources, leadership 
competition and, i n some cases, even signs of m i l i t a r y competition. 
Paul Blumberg's book on I n d u s t r i a l Democracy contains some 
int e r e s t i n g evidence about Israel's trade union enterprises. Here 
we see that organisations owned and managed by trade unions i n Israel's 
Histradut, l i k e most i n d u s t r i a l organisations, experienced i n t e r n a l 
c o n f l i c t . According to him, however, the c o n f l i c t (white c o l l a r workers 
clamouring for greater income d i f f e r e n t i a l s between themselves and the 
working class) arose not out of the Histradut's r o l e as employer 
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(or c a p i t a l i s t ) . What i s s i g n i f i c a n t i s that he has l i s t e d various 
other reasons f o r c o n f l i c t which we feel are j u s t as cr u c i a l as 
cla s s - c o n f l i c t that i s perceived i n a c a p i t a l i s t system. His comments 
are self-evincing: 
'•My own view i s that t h i s c o n f l i c t 
arises not out of the Histradut's 
r o l e as employer, but out of other 
q u a l i t i e s and values of the organisation, 
namely; (a) that as a So c i a l i s t 
organisation, Histradut has h i s t o r i c a l l y 
pursued an e g a l i t a r i a n wage policy and 
has resisted the widening of income 
d i f f e r e n t i a l s ; (b) t h i s S o c i a l i s t 
egalitarianism was reinforced by the 
unique ' r e l i g i o n of (manual) labour 1 
that inspired the early Zionist s e t t l e r s 
i n Palestine; (c) f i n a l l y , the Histradut 
has' t r a d i t i o n a l l y been, not only a class 
organisation but a n a t i o n a l i s t (Zionist) 
organisation as w e l l , and has always taken 
. special r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the 
s t a b i l i t y of the national economy and 
opposed i n f l a t i o n a r y pressures to which 
the country i s constantly exposed. In 
these factors, then, and not i n i t s r o l e 
as entrepreneur, l i e s the recurring 
c o n f l i c t of the Histradut with i t s white 
c o l l a r membership". 35 
In f a c t , wherever there i s competition f o r opportunity and power, there 
i s fundamental c o n f l i c t , whether i t i s i n a c a p i t a l i s t system or a 
perfect s o c i a l i s t society. 
• The in t e r e s t i n g point about Marxist theory i s the explanation 
i t has f o r the absence of revolutionary change i n many societies. 
Here we come t o the notion of consciousness. As M i l l s wrote: 
"Thus f o r class consciousness, there 
must be (1) a r a t i o n a l awareness and 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with one's own class 
i n t e r e s t s , (2) an awareness and r e j e c t i o n 
of other class interests as i l l e g i t i m a t e ; 
and (3) an awareness ot" a readiness to use 
co l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l means to the c o l l e c t i v e 
p o l i t i c a l end of r e a l i s i n g one's in t e r e s t s " . 
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The abisence of revolutionary hope i s generally a t t r i b u t e d t o 
the lack of or being i n d i f f e r e n t to t h i s conciousness or even being 
absorbed by a 'false consciousness 1. 'Yet such i n d i f f e r e n c e 1 , M i l l s 
laments, 'is the major sign of the collapse of s o c i a l i s t hopes. 
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I t i s also at the heart of the p o l i t i c a l malaise of our time'. 
Our explanation f o r t h i s absence of (or. false) consciousness i s that 
there are moderating and mediating forces i n society moving the 
consciousness out of focus of the aggrieved class or group. A l l that 
the Marxist argument stresses i s that by taking the consciousness out 
of focus, society has not removed the cause of fundamental c o n f l i c t . 
This p o s i t i o n , we f e e l , can be accommodated w i t h i n an equilibrium 
framework. Since removing the cause of fundamental c o n f l i c t s 
i s not possible and sometimes not even desired, powerful e n t i t i e s 
(individuals or groups) i n any social system ( c a p i t a l i s t or i d e a l l y 
s o c i a l i s t ) wishing to maintain s t a b i l i t y would always be endeavouring 
to create social norms and i n s t i t u t i o n s that help take consciousness 
about contentious issues out of focus. This i s a r e a l i t y of l i f e . 
I t i s precisely because consciousness about such issues"can and""" 
are being kept out of focus, through i t s rewards, sanctions, 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n and s o c i a l i s a t i o n systems, that societies 
are able to claim some kind of equilibrium. This equilibrium, unlike 
the conservative notion however, must acknowledge fundamental c o n f l i c t , 
but s t r i v e s to keep i t out of focus. As Brannen and colleagues noted: 
"This process of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
serves not merely to recognise the 
existence of c o n f l i c t and s t r a i n but 
also to legitimate i t . By developing 
procedures through which compromise parties 
can be reached, the c o n f l i c t i t s e l f tends 
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be modified, and i n the short term l i m i t e d . 
These forms of c o n f l i c t regulation w i t h i n 
the i n d u s t r i a l sphere take the form of 
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, c o n c i l i a t i o n , mediation 
and a r b i t r a t i o n . But another important means 
i s a modification of the i n d u s t r i a l authority 
structure i t s e l f , or the establishment of 
systems of workers' p a r t i c i p a t i o n . In t h i s 
way, changes i n the means of production foster 
a change i n the relationships of production, 
i n an attempt to come to terms with changes 
i n the balance of power and an awareness of 
a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t " . 38 
Keeping the fundamental c o n f l i c t out of focus, however, does not 
mean the analyst or p r a c t i t i o n e r could ignore them. They do s t i l l 
play a part i n the ex i s t i n g framework. Although most societies may 
not experience revolutionary change, they are i n a state of continuous 
evolutionary change - moving from one level of dynamic equilibrium 
to another. I t i s w i t h i n t h i s framework that c o n f l i c t s both, temporary 
and fundamental, a r t i c u l a t e themselves. 
Although the dynamic equilibrium model which involves evolutionary 
changes, i s conventionally seen as maintaining the existing structure, 
r e a l i t y has shown p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r s t r u c t u r a l change. The movement 
from l a i s s e z - f a i r e structures to state intervention i n most societies 
i s c l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t evidence. Structural changes can be caused by 
the environment and they can also be caused by the s h i f t i n values. 
Just as resources become scarce and the environment more d i f f i c u l t 
to cope wi t h , human values tend to move away from the classical to 
the unconventional and, sometimes, imaginative. This i s a l l part of 
the ongoing d i a l e c t i c process showing a s h i f t i n values from the classical 
to the r a d i c a l . Scott," f o r instance, i l l u s t r a t e d value s h i f t s i n 
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t h i s way:-
Radical 
S t a b i l i t y or decay 
Scarcity 
C o n f l i c t 
Individual enterprise «—* Cooperatives or state control 
Oligarchic control <—* Democratic p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
So what we see i n society i s a s h i f t i n g dynamic equilibrium, 
evolving from the cl a s s i c a l positions towards ra d i c a l choices and 
positions.In industry, f o r instance, we have seen the t r a d i t i o n a l 
o l i g a r c h i c , h i e r a r c h i c a l control structures moving towards democratic 
p a r t i c i p a t i v e organisations. This change over the years i s d e f i n i t e l y 
not a sudden revolution. I t i s evolutionary, nevertheless permitting 
r a d i c a l change. The causes'for the change, however, need not be 
confined to fundamental c o n f l i c t , although they may have played t h e i r 
part. Radical changes l i k e temporary disturbances, can be brought about 
by a host of factors - both environmental (e.g. technological, economic 
p o l i t i c a l , c u l t u r a l ) and local (psychological, s i t u a t i o n a l relationships 
etc.) . 
In concluding our discussion about the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
s e t t i n g we would l i k e t o summarise the main features i n the diagram 
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This framework should serve as a useful basis f o r analysis i n 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . The purpose of substantive theory, i n our 
view, i s to be expository, explanatory, p r e d i c t i v e and, where relevant, 
p r e s c r i p t i v e as w e l l . Since the concept of control offers tremendous 
scope f o r understanding and analysing i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s i t u a t i o n s , 
we now move on t o o u t l i n e i t . 
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IV. THE BASIC PROPERTIES OF CONTROL 
In our e a r l i e r reference to the d e f i n i t i o n of control by 
Tannenbaum, Goldhainer and Shi Is we did introduce i t s basic features: 
power, influence, objectives, etc. Looking at Goldhamer's d e f i n i t i o n , 
the process of control has been described from the standpoint of the 
co n t r o l l e r influencing the controlled. From the same d e f i n i t i o n , 
however, we could also perceive the other side of the coin. The 
process of control can be conceptualised as beginning with the 
controller's expectations, on the one hand, and , depending on 
objectives, attitudes and motivations governing the controlled on the 
other. Clearly, the objectives, a t t i t u d e s , expectations and motivations 
held by the various social e n t i t i e s i n a given s i t u a t i o n describe a 
basic aspect of the control process. 
Quite apart from the objectives and motivations, the motive force 
that energises control (or makes i t possible i n the f i r s t place) i s 
influence or power. Indeed Hyman defined power as 'the a b i l i t y - o f 
the i n d i v i d u a l or group t o control- his ( t h e i r ) physical and social 
environment the a b i l i t y to influence the decisions which are and 
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are not taken by others 1. I n addition to the action or motivational 
ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s , therefore, power and influence are also an important 
aspect .of the control process. 
I t i s pertinent to note, as t h i s point, that these are precisely 
the features that are being sought i n the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s e t t i n g -
features required to understand and analyse the local aspects of any 
given s i t u a t i o n . By seeking out the control properties, therefore, 
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one would be able to expose or analyse the s i t u a t i o n . 
I f one looks carefully, these properties - objectives and 
motivation, power and influence have been studied i n the various 
social sciences primarily because of t h e i r role i n the various control 
processes i n industry and society. Numerous ideas, concepts and 
theories have been evolved around these control properties, and so here 
we see them essentially as concepts or theories of control. As these 
ideas and concepts are necessary to uncover the control properties, 
we shall move on to outline them, f i r s t about objectives and motivation, 
then about power and influence. 
CONCEPTS ABOUT OBJECTIVES AND .MOTIVATION 
In order to study about objectives and motivation the social 
s c i e n t i s t has access to various studies i n psychology, sociology and 
organisation theory. Berelson and Steiner have i n fact related 
objectives and motivation i n the following d e f i n i t i o n : 'A motive i s 
an inner state that energises, activates or moves (hence motivation), 
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and that directs or channels behaviour towards goals 1.. 
E f f o r t s have been made to develop various theories of motivation. 
While the dominant theories highlight the content of motivation, ( i . e . 
what motivates people), there are also theories that explain the process 
( i . e . how people are motivated). Let us take a look at the process 
theories f i r s t . The motivation process has been perceived i n two 
d i s t i n c t ways. One i s the drive theory and the other i s expectancy 
theory. 
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The drive theory originated from Thorndike's 'law of e f f e c t 1 . 
According to t h i s law, responses which are accompanied or closely 
followed by s a t i s f a c t i o n w i l l more l i k e l y recur than those that are 
followed.by discomfort. I t emphasises-the connection between previous 
behaviour and rewards. Present behaviour i s determined by past 
associations. However, because experiments used by many drive th e o r i s t s 
were based on animals, they have been largely concerned with 
physiolocial needs. This c l e a r l y was not adequate f o r explaining 
human motivation. Nevertheless, the basic ideas are s t i l l useful 
and, i n f a c t , are r e f l e c t e d i n the development of expectancy theory 
which focuses on human behaviour. 
Victor Vroom formulated the expectancy theory of motivation about 
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human behaviour i n organisations. Such behaviour was, f i r s t of a l l , 
assumed to be voluntary, i . e . that people had a l t e r n a t i v e behaviours 
to choose from. This theory based on Valences and expectancies, has 
been well received because i t highlights a process of cognitive 
variables that r e f l e c t s i n d i v i d u a l differences i n motivation. Recognition 
i s given to the fact that each person could have a d i f f e r e n t combination 
of valences and expectancies. But Vroom's approach lacks description 
about what actually motivates people. i*'or the content of motivation 
we s h a l l soon discuss Maslow's and Heriberg's contributions. Nevertheless, 
as Porter and others have noted: 
"the expectancy model-is j u s t that: a model 
and no more. People r a r e l y actually s i t 
down and l i s t t h e i r expected outcomes f o r 
a completed behaviour, estimated expectancies 
and valences, mul t i p l y , and add up the t o t a l , 
unless, of course, they are asked to do so 
by a researcher. Yet people do consider the 
l i k e l y outcomes of t h e i r outcomes of t h e i r 
actions, do weight and evaluate the attractiveness 
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of various alternatives, and do use these 
estimates i n coining to a decision about what 
they w i l l do". 44 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note at t h i s point that Stagner and Rosen 
have developed a theory of psychological expectancy i n i n d u s t r i a l 
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r e l a t i o n s . 'The expectancy theory formulation of the actor's 
motivation i n an i n d u s t r i a l relations system i s p a r t i c u l a r l y useful, 
as Walker noted, because i t directs attention at the actor's calculation 
of the r e l a t i v e benefits and costs of action by one path rather than 
another towards the same goal, and of the p r o b a b i l i t y of reaching the 
goal. Thus f o r example, i t might be applied to the question of which 
goals workers w i l l seek to achieve through union action and which 
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through other types of action'. 
Now, coming to concepts about what ( i . e . the content) motivates 
people, we have Maslow who i d e n t i f i e d f i v e levels of needs which he 
arranged i n a hierarchical order: the psychological, safety, s o c i a l , 
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ego and s e l f - a c t u a l i s a t i o n or developmental needs. Taking the cue 
from Maslow, Herzberg developed his own two-factor theory of motivation. 
He i d e n t i f i e d two sets of needs. The 'hygiene factors' were concerned 
with conditions f o r which an acceptable standard was necessary to 
prevent d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , or, maintain a good environment f o r work. 
These included supervision, working conditions, salary and company 
pol i c y and administration. By themselves however they did not lead 
to psychological growth and p o s i t i v e motivation work. The second 
set of needs were the growth or 'motivation or growth factors'. These 
were needs f o r achievement, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , challenge, advancement and 
recognition. Work therefore had t o be designed to boost these factors. 
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I t i s relevant f o r us to note here that although we have i d e n t i f i e d 
the Maslow and Herzberg theories to discuss the sources of interests 
and objectives, they are not without deficiency - i n f a c t there are 
wide ranging controversies on t h i s subject. While t h e i r conclusions 
about the way needs operate and are s a t i s f i e d may be questioned, t h e i r 
basic contribution, nevertheless, remains s i g n i f i c a n t . Needs they found 
could be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , and also saw that d i f f e r e n t needs tend to be 
s a t i s f i e d by d i f f e r e n t rewards or responses. 
In addition to his (apart from Brown's) c r i t i c i s m s about Goldthorpe's 
•orientations to work', Daniels also c r i t i c i s e d the Maslovian (assumed 
by McGregor and others) and Herzberg claims to u n i v e r s a l i t y of man's 
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s e l f - a c t u a l i s i n g aspirations. He observed that while 'at the one end 
there may well be workers who attach exclusive importance to e x t r i n s i c 
rewards and at the other to i n t r i n s i c rewards ... what our findings 
demonstrate i s that there are workers i n the middle of the spectrum. 
They seek both e x t r i n s i c and i n t r i n s i c rewards from work, with one 
becoming sal i e n t i n one context and the other i n another'. ^  The 
contexts he was r e f e r r i n g to were the work and c o l l e c t i v e bargaining 
(power) contexts. 
While Daniel's observation-is useful since i t emphasises the 
s i t u a t i o n a l rather than a general or f i x e d set of p r i o r i t i e s (assumed 
by Goldthorpe and the need theorists) he has not, as Bowey notes, taken 
i n t o account 'the p o s s i b i l i t y that objectives and p r i o r i t i e s may be 
changed as a r e s u l t of e x p e r i e n c e ' ( a s highlighted by Brown). 
The need-fullfilment theories we feel must recognise that o r i e n t a t i o n , 
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as Bowey points out: 
"cannot be treated as a homogeneous 
whole which i s one of a number of 
a l t e r n a t i v e states, i t must be broken 
down i n t o i t s constituents, since the 
various interests and objectives are 
l i k e l / to be affected i n d i f f e r e n t 
ways by his experience and to be changing 
at d i f f e r e n t rates". 52 
Notable among the variables influencing orientations, i s the 
problem of 'power and sources of power which any party can use i n a 
s i t u a t i o n and i t i s to the concepts of power and influence that we 
s h a l l i n a moment focus our a t t e n t i o n . Before that we s h a l l note 
some recent developments i n motivation theory. 
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This comes from ' a t t r i b u t i o n theory' and i t s follow-up, 'locus 
of control'. Unlike the e a r l i e r theories, a t t r i b u t i o n theory relates 
perceptions and interpersonal behaviour. Since most causes or 
a t t r i b u t e s are not d i r e c t l y observable, the person depends on cognitions, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y perceptions. I t i s the perceived, not the actual 
determinants, that influence behaviour. This idea has important 
connotations f o r behaviour of a workforce. 
' Work behaviour i s thought to be c r u c i a l l y determined by the 
employees' b e l i e f or perception of whether t h e i r outcomes are controlled 
i n t e r n a l l y (.i.e. with t h e i r own a b i l i t y , s k i l l s or e f f o r t ) or externally 
Ci.e. external forces - people or technology or circumstances). Workers 
who perceive i n t e r n a l control get the feeling they personally can 
influence t h e i r behaviour at work through t h e i r a b i l i t y , s k i l l s , e f f o r t s , 
etc. Workers who perceive external control f e e l that results at work 
are externally determined and so tend not to perceive the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
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f o r i n t e r n a l control. M i t c h e l l and others have tested t h i s locus of 
internal/external control with 900 public u t i l i t y employees and found 
that employees perceiving i n t e r n a l control were s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r 
jobs and with a p a r t i c i p a t o r y management s t y l e than were people who 
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perceived external c o n t r o l . " 
Development of ideas along these lines i s bound t o make a 
s i g n i f i c a n t contribution to the theory of motivation, especially f o r 
workplaces. 
CONCEPTS.ABOUT POWER AND INFLUENCE 
Influence i s a process where one party (known as the agent) 
attempts t o af f e c t the behaviour of another party (known as the t a r g e t ) . 
Although the term power i s generally used synonymously with influence, 
i t may be conceptualised as the capacity to influence or a f f e c t others 
behaviour. I t accrues to the agent because of his resources - strength 
roles or i d e n t i t y etc. The most s i g n i f i c a n t point about power and 
influence i s that the capacity to influence (power) i s not absolute, 
i t i s r e l a t i v e - depending on the relationship between agent and 
target. The greater the agents' resources (bases of power) r e l a t i v e 
to the target, the more his a b i l i t y to influence the target. S i m i l a r l y , 
the greater the target's dependency r e l a t i v e to the agent, the more i s 
he influenceable. These resources which enable an agent to influence 
the target can be c l a s s i f i e d by various bases of power. French and 
Raven have developed a well-known typology.of the main power bases: 
reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power and 
expert power. 5 6 
The various bases of power we must stress, however, are not 
independent of each other, i n f a c t they are i n t e r r e l a t e d . While the 
use of reward or legitimate power can increase referent power, the use 
of coercive power can reduce i t . Expert power appears most d i r e c t l y 
to a f f e c t legitimate power, and referent power probably increases most 
of the other bases. I t i s also important to recognise that the same 
agent may resort to d i f f e r e n t bases of power under d i f f e r e n t circumstances, 
depending on the target and the s i t u a t i o n . 
Although i t i s generally though that the use of expert and 
referent power i n organisations i s more e f f e c t i v e , than r e l y i n g on the 
t r a d i t i o n a l legitimate and coercive power, such generalisations can be 
questioned i n given spe c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s . So a s i t u a t i o n a l model of 
power f o r organisations w i l l be needed. In our view.what i s required 
i s a balance of the various power bases to f i t the demands of the s i t u a t i o n . 
Another w r i t e r about power and influence i s Gamson, who distinguished 
between two perspectives of power: 
"One view takes the vantage point of 
p o t e n t i a l partisans and emphasises 
the process by which such groups attempt 
to influence the choices of authorities 
or the structure w i t h i n which decisions 
occur. The second view takes the 
vantage point of authorities and 
emphasises the process by which they 
attempt to achieve c o l l e c t i v e goals and 
to maintain legitimacy and compliance 
with t h e i r decisions i n a s i t u a t i o n i n 
which s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of potential __ 
partisans are not being f u l l y satisfied!' 
While he confines the use of the term influence to when he sees 
the partisans as agents, and control when the authorities are agents, 
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he has offered a good c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the means of influence and social control 
which operate i n industry. 
I n h i s discussion on power i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , Poole has i d e n t i f i e d 
three forms o f what he c a l l s 'manifest power*: 
(a) Power that i s r e f l e c t e d i n differences 
i n economic strength - due to the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of income and wealth. 
(b) Power that i s i d e n t i f i e d with e l i t e 
groups - higher c i v i l service, industry 
and commerce, m i l i t a r y , etc. 
(c) Power that manifest i t s e l f i n formal 
pattern of control w i t h i n s o c i e t i e s , 
communities and organisations. I n 
t h i s category, he d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between 
power accruing to positions i n the community 
or organisation, power related t o scope 
and range of issues and f i n a l l y power 
related to success i n a given power c o n f l i c t . 58 
Poole also extends his discussion i n t o the bases of power ( l a t e n t 
power) and the question of values and ideologies. 
For a discussion about power influence and control i n i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s *one would also have much to benefit from Goodrich's 'The Frontier 
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of Control'. For a Marxist analysis using the concepts of power and influence 
we could t u r n t o Hyman's recent work discussing the d i a l e c t i c s o f c o n f l i c t and 
regulation. 
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Another useful contribution comes from Somers who has related bargaining 
power to the theory o f exchange. I n some ways i t draws a l i n k between the 
concepts o f power and of motivational expectancies i n an exchange l e l a t i o n s h i p . 
V. CONTROL AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
Having seen the relevance of uncovering the nature of control i n a 
given s i t u a t i o n , one might ask: what about the impact of environmental 
forces? We have not said anything about how, f o r example, 
economic, p o l i t i c a l or technological forces might a f f e c t c o n t r o l , and 
we do have a good reason f o r t h i s . Because co n t r o l , unlike ' c o l l e c t i v e 
bargaining' or 'regulation', manifests i n the whole range of situations 
i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , i t i s almost impossible t o postulate the 
effects of the various environments on a l l the si t u a t i o n s . The 
environmental effects have to be examined as they p e r t a i n t o the 
p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n under consideration. 
I t would be s i g n i f i c a n t , however, to say that ideas and theories 
about environmental effects on p a r t i c u l a r situations are already 
available i n numerous works - some of these are referred to as ' p a r t i a l 
theories'. Examples of subjects (not t i t l e s ) are: p o l i t i c a l forces 
on trade unionism, bargaining and i n d u s t r i a l democracy, social structure 
and i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t , economics and wage determination, technology 
and organisation control. A good number.of these contributions contain 
ideas and concepts as well as empirical evidence. With the help of 
relevant ideas and proof, one has to investigate the environmental 
forces actually operating on the s i t u a t i o n under study. Only then can 
the actual impact of the environment on control (and vice versa) be 
determined. 
In order to conclude our discussion about substantive theory i n 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , i t would be appropriate f o r us to take a closer 
look at the focal issue that t h i s project attempts to investigate. 
This brings us to the perceptions about job con t r o l , covering both 
the employer and employee positions. 
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VI. PERCEPTIONS ABOUT JOB CONTROL 
The term job control has a broad meaning. I t refers to the 
influences that workers have on the decisions about t h e i r jobs and 
the conditions at the workplace. As Herding and Kohler have noted: 
"We do not use the concept of" job 
control i n a narrow sense only as 
access to the job, or to related 
issues of security, but include 
any control over the content and 
operation of the work process 
Further the concept i s used i n a 
r e l a t i v e sense to s i g n i f y the 
degree of power workpeople have 
to influence or d i r e c t work". 62 
The subject of job control may be viewed from-various persepctvies: the 
t r a d i t i o n a l management perspectives, the Marxist perspective, alienation 
technology and the motivation perspectives. 
The T r a d i t i o n a l Perspectives - Consensual and Manipulative 
This perspective simply reinforces the t r a d i t i o n a l formal 
organisation where u n i l a t e r a l decision-making by managers was not to 
be questioned. The hierarchical administrative structure and 
standardised operating procedures are obvious characteristics of t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n . 
Within t h i s framework, management could be perceived either to 
assume that workers shared i t s goals (for the e f f i c i e n t functioning 
of the enterprise) so that a l l w i l l share i n the rewards or, from the 
anti-union standpoint, i t simply asserted i t s prerogative i n decision-maki 
and control. Such ideas as the management had the 'rights of 
management' and that 'there w i l l always be masters and men' remain a 
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s i g n i f i c a n t source of power - against opposition and to i n h i b i t the 
questioning of the status-quo. Whether i t was by stressing common 
goals or by ac t i v e l y i n h i b i t i n g labour challenge, management i n t h i s 
system would see transgressors as aberrants. Discontent about the 
system and working conditions could net have any legitimacy. 
Under the consensual frame of mind, such c o n f l i c t was often 
a t t r i b u t e d t o the f a i l u r e on the part or the worker to understand the 
management's intentions or i t was due t o poor supervision or 
communications. In the anti-union frame, any challenge to management 
decisions was generally a t t r i b u t e d to some 'bad-hats', usually someone 
who had union contacts. 
A l l i n a l l , the t r a d i t i o n a l or classic a l forms of u n i l a t e r a l 
control see no room f o r legitimate worker i n t e r e s t i n job control. 
The Marxist Perspective 
The Marxist perceptive takes the diametrically opposite view of 
the classical c a p i t a l i s t . Marx saw the transfer of power or control 
moving from the c a p i t a l i s t to the hands of labour. He portrayed t h i s 
change as follows: 
"One c a p i t a l i s t always k i l l s many. Hand 
i n hand with t h i s c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , or t h i s 
exproporiation of many c a p i t a l i s t s by few, 
develop on an ever-extending scale, the 
cooperative forms of the labour process, 
the conscious technical application of 
science, the methodological c u l t i v a t i o n 
of the s o i l , the transformation of the 
instruments of labour only usable i n common, 
•the economising of a l l means of production 
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of combined, socialised labour, the 
entanglement of a l l people i n the net 
of the world market, and with t h i s , 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l character.of the 
c a p i t a l i s t i c regime". 63 
He emphasised the contradiction between c a p i t a l i s t theory and 
practice; that while i n theory i t stressed i n d i v i d u a l enterprise the 
practice involved mutual cooperation i n the production process. 
This 'antagonism,' as Avineri noted of Marx's thoughtsbetween c a p i t a l i s t 
theory and practice ul t i m a t e l y causes the mode of production to f e t t e r . 
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i t s own development'. 
This c o n f l i c t perspective approaches the philosophy which Brannen 
and colleagues describe as r e s t i n g upon the view that 'industry i s 
dominated by a c o n f l i c t between the interests of c a p i t a l and labour 
i t attempts to s h i f t dramatically the balance of power, and 
u l t i m a t e l y to change the structure of industry and society more 
generally'.^ 5 
The ultimate aim of ^ restructuring industry i s not a negotiated 
settlement with the c a p i t a l i s t s f o r j o i n t regulation or p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
but control of a d i f f e r e n t kind. Coates and Topham describe t h i s 
pressure f o r workers' control aiming to undo the c a p i t a l i s t system: 
"The w i l l to r u l e , to exercise 'workers' c o n t r o l ' , 
becomes., i n i t s twentieth century forr. a demand, 
f o r a reversal of roles w i t h i n the ex i s t i n g 
class structure. This can only lead i n t o an 
ov e r a l l social reconstruction, challenging a l l 
previous norms of property and co n t r o l " . 66 
Brannen and others, f o r instance, see i n the B r i t i s h s i t u a t i o n , 
a trend leading towards worker directors and p a r t i c i p a t i o n at board l e v e l . 
The s o c i a l i s t ideology has also evolved i n s t i t u t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n other i n d u s t r i a l i s e d nations, e.g. West Germany (codetermination), 
France ( t r i p a r t i t e government, employees, public administration of 
national enterprises) and i n I s r a e l (the histradut or the trade union 
s t r u c t u r e ) . 
The Alienation Perspectives 
I n connection with the c l a s s - c o n f l i c t theory, Marx also discussed 
the problem of alienation. Marx's view could be seen i n his own words 
" I n his work (the worker) does not a f f i r m 
himself but denies himself, does not f e e l content 
but unhappy, does not develop f r e e l y his physical 
and mental energy but m o r t i f i e s his body and ruins 
his mind. The worker i s at home when he i s 
not working, and when he i s working he i s not at 
home. His labor i s therefore not voluntary, 
but coerced; i t i s forced labour. I t i s therefore 
not the s a t i s f a c t i o n of a need; i t i s merely a ineans 
to s a t i s f y needs external to t i . I t s a l i e n 
character emerges clearl y i n the face that as soon 
as no physical or other compulsion e x i s t s , labor 
i s shunned l i k e the plague." 67 
This concept arises from the notion that under Capitalism, 
labour i s bought and used by the c a p i t a l i s t to serve his own needs 
rather than the aspirations of the worker. Marx perceived the 
d i v i s i o n of labour as promoting c a p i t a l i s t domination and r e s t r i c t i n g 
the freedom of the worker. The factory system to him was the most 
calculative method of domination, enabling the control i n great d e t a i l , 
of workers a c t i v i t y . Together with the class c o n f l i c t perspective, 
t h i s argument also encourages the Marxists to advocate the 
restructuring (or even the overthrow) of t r a d i t i o n a l private enterprise 
I n a more recent work, M i l l s has also discussed 
a l i e n a t i o n . To him; 
"Current managerial attempts (the then.'human 
r e l a t i o n s ' interventions) to create job 
enthusiasm, to paraphrase Marx's comment 
on Proudhon, are attempts to conquer work 
ali e n a t i o n w i t h i n the bounds of work al i e n a t i o n . 
In the meantime, whatever s a t i s f a c t i o n alienated 
men (whom, he sees as 'cheerful robots') gain 
from work occurs w i t h i n the framework of " 
ali e n a t i o n " . 68 
In c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to Marx, Durkheim saw the d i v i s i o n of 
labour i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . While accepting that the coordinated 
d i v i s i o n of tasks had benefits f o r society, a l i e n a t i o n t o him was the 
re s u l t of certain 'abnormal' forms of d i v i s i o n of labour. Workers 
i n these abnormal arrangements he f e l t were not able to r e l a t e t h e i r 
tasks t o the function o f the t o t a l productive system. He also 
perceived the growth of unregulated aspirations and expectations w i t h i n 
t h i s framework. Brannen and colleagues see t h i s Durkheimian perspective 
as providing j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 'participatory schemes which emphasise 
communication and job s a t i s f a c t i o n ' . 6 ^ From the job control point of 
view, a l l the ali e n a t i o n perspectives have one thing i n common - a l l 
of them support giving workers more control over t h e i r work. 
Technology and Job Control * 
Taking the discussion about alie n a t i o n f u r t h e r , Blauner has 
linked job freedom with s p e c i f i c types of technology. Blauner saw 
alie n a t i o n as the 'fragmentation i n man's existence and consciousness 
which impedes the wholeness of experience and a c t i v i t y . ^ He 
contrasted four dimensions of t h i s fragmentation as follows: 
Alienated State Non-Alienated State 
Powerlessness vs Control 
Meahinglessness vs Purpose 
I s o l a t i o n vs Social i n t e g r a t i o n 
Se1f-estrangement vs Self/ac t u a l i s a t i o n 
Studying the alienating effects of d i f f e r e n t types of technology 
he observed that c r a f t technology represented a high level of 
freedom f o r the worker, a freedom which decreased sharply i n machine 
tending and l i n e production but which rose again s i g n i f i c a n t l y through 
process technology. Process technology was seen to give the worker 
s i g n i f i c a n t control over the process and thus encouraged better 
i n t e g r a t i o n with the system. 
Because Blainer saw alienation as a deprivation of human need 
rather than as a s t r u c t u r a l c o n f l i c t , he saw hope i n the development 
of technologies which recognised motivational p r i n c i p l e s promoting 
job enrichment. This would tend toward the older ' c r a f t e t h i c ' , 
thus giving the worker a s i g n i f i c a n t degree of control over t h e i r 
assignments. 
When t a l k i n g about technology and the d i v i s i o n of labour, studies 
by T r i s t and others 7* come to mind. They traced the changes i n the 
mining industry to i l l u s t r a t e .'the i n t e r a c t i o n of technological and 
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socio-psychological factors i n i n d u s t r i a l production systems'. 
Changes were traced from the t r a d i t i o n a l group a c t i v i t y (single-placs 
working) t o the conventional longwall system and then to composite 
longwall technology. From the job control point of view, i n the 
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t r a d i t i o n a l system: 
"the miner possesses the necessary range 
of s k i l l s t o undertake a l l facewbrk tasks 
i n a self-contained workplace. . His role 
i s that.of a m u l t i - s k i l l e d , self-supervising 
workman towards whom the deputy stands i n a 
service rather than a supervisory r e l a t i o n . 
Since a l l members do a l l jobs, either 
on the same or d i f f e r e n t s h i f t s , they share 
equally i n the paynote". 73 
"Such a pattern of work organisation', T r i s t found was, 'well adapted 
t o the technological conditions of single place working and to the 
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general hazards of the underground environment.' 
I n sharp contrast to t h i s t r a d i t i o n , the conventional longwall 
system brought i n highly socialised tasks with i t s d i v i s i o n of 
labour. Each group had i t s own customs and practices and also received 
separate paynotes. The researchers also noted that 'since the 
groups do not spontaneously work together, coordination and control 
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have to be provided e n t i r e l y from the outside - (by management)'. 
This system resulted i n a number of problems - worker i s o l a t i o n , c o n f l i c t 
supervisory problems and low pr o d u c t i v i t y . 
F i n a l l y , i n the composite longwall system 'the d i f f e r e n t 
organisational pattern removes the d i f f i c u l t i e s from over-specialised 
work roles, segregated task groups and lack of cohesion i n the face team 
as a whole'1^ I t allowed f o r interchangeable tasks, and f o r a certain 
amount of sel f - r e g u l a t i o n and continuity which prevailed i n single-
place working. Workers perceived more i n t e r n a l control rather than 
external control which predominated i n the conventional longwall. 
This perception encouraged the work groups to aim f o r higher production 
targets. Within the same longwall technology, T r i s t saw that 
•composite organisation was found to possess characteristics more 
conducive to productive effectiveness, low cost, work s a t i s f a c t i o n , 
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good relations and social h e a l t h 1 . 
The main lesson learned from t h i s experience i s that the 
technical requirements ( i n t h i s case to introduce mechanised longwall 
technology) had to be matched with the socio-psychological factors of 
the s i t u a t i o n - i n t h i s case the miners had been socialised i n a more 
or less s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g job control system. The studies thus c l e a r l y 
i l l u s t r a t e the p o s s i b i l i t i e s and advantages of taking the socio-technical 
system approach - balancing the options available i n technology with 
the needs of the human system. 
This relationship between technology and behaviour i s more 
complex than i t may appear. As Reeves, Turner and Woodward have noted, 
apart from technology, the worker i s also ' l i m i t e d by requirements of 
the administration, (covering wide aspects of social system i n the 
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organisation) by the demands of his colleagues and by other f a c t o r s ' . 
While i t i s generally assumed that the i n t e r a c t i o n between the i n d i v i d u a l 
and his technological surroundings i s one way, they have observed the 
opposite p o s s i b i l i t y that 'often he may be able to bring about changes 
i n his immediate technical s i t u a t i o n , over and above the changes he i s 
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expected to carry out as part of his j o b 1 . Pressures f o r job control 
can thus i n i t i a t e d by the worker. 
Motivation and Job Control 
Most motivational schemes are p r i m a r i l y aimed at improving 
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p r o d u c t i v i t y , and thereby greater control over worker performance. 
Unlike the times of Taylor's s c i e n t i f i c management which depended on 
f i n a n c i a l sanctions to control worker behaviour, motivation has since 
been found t o involve other factors. Of significance are the theories 
of Maslow and Herzberg which drew attention t o man's higher level needs 
such as esteem, s e l f - a c t u a l i s a t i o n and development. These theories 
l a i d the basis f o r many well-known contributions from behavioural 
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s c i e n t i s t s l i k e McGregor, L i k e r t , Haire and Miles. Even Chris Argris' 
concept of personality spoke of a basic incongruence between the needs 
of a mature personality and the nature of the formal organisation.81 
From the job control point of view i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note 
that the neo-human relat i o n s contributors recommended that job 
commitment and self-sustaining motivation could be evoked p r i m a r i l y by 
lessening the constraints upon the worker - to give him wider d i s c r e t i o n 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y over his job. This i n fact posed a problem f o r the 
t r a d i t i o n a l managers, since motivational schemes were expected to 
increase p r o d u c t i v i t y - i . e . increase control over worker performance, 
they could not see themselves giving workers greater d i s c r e t i o n and 
influence. Because the motivational theories, were l o g i c a l , the 
schemes were 'adapted' to t h e i r s i t u a t i o n s , with the r e s u l t that the 
t r a d i t i o n a l hierarchy and multiple controls over workers did not change 
The workers seldom saw the opportunity of influencing t h e i r superiors 
over anything, work process or in d i v i d u a l grievances. As a consequence 
of t h e i r reluctance t o enlarge and share influence with the workers, 
these t r a d i t i o n a l managers could not achieve t h e i r p r o d u c t i v i t y goal. 
Tannenbaum captured t h i s i n a b i l i t y on the part of t r a d i t i o n a l managers 
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i n his c r i t i c i s m of the 'fixed-pie 1 or 'zero-sum' assumptions about 
co n t r o l . 'The assumption, he says ......of a f i x e d amount of control 
may., lead to attempts by some members to r e s t r i c t the power of others, 
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thus l i m i t i n g the amount of control w i t h i n the system*. For 
managers who sa* control as a zero-sum concept,.enlarging the share at 
the lower levels could only be seen as a loss i n the managements own 
level of influence and c o n t r o l . Thus we are able to see the job 
control paradox inherent i n the motivational schemes used by managers 
of the classical t r a d i t i o n . 
With the advent of Tannenbaum's pioneering e f f o r t s to demonstrate 
the v a r i a b i l i t y of control and the comparison of actual and desired 
perceptions of control across organisation members, however,, a new • 
normative approach has been evolved. .(The professionalisation of new 
managers to be more achievement than status oriented has d e f i n i t e l y 
helped t h i s process.) Control i s no more perceived to be zero-sum, 
or fixed-pie, but that i t can often be enhanced. In f a c t , Tannenbaum 
cites the contributions .of various behavioural s c i e n t i s t s as means to 
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expand control i n the organisation. To him these same motivational 
schemes f a c i l i t a t e d expansion i n control f o r a l l : workers, supervisors 
and management. Enhancing control and communication would not only 
enhance worker attachment to the organisation but would f a c i l i t a t e 
compliance with major organisational goals. 
Unlike the e a r l i e r human relations interventions, additive-control 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n means workers and management al i k e would actually experience 
increased opportunity to influence one another i n the f u l f i l l m e n t of 
similar'and divergent needs. Because these motivational schemes 
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were 'adapted' by managers who saw control only i n zero-sumterms, 
the e a r l i e r human relations interventions did not a'chive the desired r e s u l t s . 
V I I . ' METHODOLOGY'IN'INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE CONTROL-SITUATIONAL APPROACH 
Besides explaining the basic processes involved, our notion of 
control holds a bank of ideas, concepts and theories r e l a t i n g t o the 
key properties of the co n t r o l . As we pointed out e a r l i e r , these 
properties are also the factors that describe the local aspects of 
any i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s i t u a t i o n . Uncovering the control content 
i n the s i t u a t i o n thereby exposes the basic elements of the s i t u a t i o n . 
As the reader would have seen, we have presented a wide range of ideas 
and theories f o r each of the properties - goals, expectations, 
perception, motivation, power and influence. This i s to emphasise that 
the analysis of any given s i t u a t i o n should be s i t u a t i o n a l , requiring 
one to apply the appropriate concepts. The ideas i n the bank are 
by no means comprehensive, they may be expanded, refined and made more 
operational. 
.We have already i n our discussion about the action and 
environmental perspectives pointed to the significance of the i n t e r a c t i o n 
between the two. The s i t u a t i o n a l approach, asks f o r a balance between 
the actor's interests and attitudes and the objective s t r u c t u r a l 
influences, 
When one enters i n t o a discussion about theorising i n i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s , one i s i n e v i t a b l y drawn i n t o the debate about p a r t i a l and 
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i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y theorising. Writers l i k e Flanders, Bain and 
Clegg 8 5 and, more recently, Walker 8 6 have e x p l i c i t l y rejected the 
usefulness of p a r t i a l , often d i s c i p l i n e - s p e c i f i c , theories. Flanders 
has generally been c i t e d as authority, f o r these comments: 
'The drawback of r e l y i n g on the theory 
of any one of the several di s c i p l i n e s 
that have impinged on i n d u s t r i a l relations 
i s that i t was never intended to o f f e r an 
integrated view of the whole complex of 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t h i s f i e l d . Theoretically 
speaking, these disciplines tear the 
subject apart by concentrating a t t e n t i o n 
on some of i t s aspects to the exclusion 
or comparative neglect of others. And 
a p a r t i a l view of anything, accurate as 
i t may be w i t h i n i t s l i m i t s , must of 
necessity be a d i s t o r t e d one'. 87 
I n our view p a r t i a l theories are p a r t i a l theories, but they have 
a p o s i t i v e r o l e . The knowledge and methodological rigour from the 
t r a d i t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e s can only enhance, not reduce t h e i r contribution. 
As Somers has noted, a certain amount of i n t e g r a t i o n i s possible by a 
blending of p a r t i a l theories. 'By combining economic theories of 
product and labour markets with theories of motivation, s a t i s f a c t i o n , 
personnel psychology and organisational behaviour, we can approach a 
comprehensive model explaining a wide range of i n d u s t r i a l relations 
behaviour'. 8 8 
Although we support s c i e n t i f i c contributions from the specialists 
i n sociology, social-anthropology, psychology, p o l i t i c s , economics, 
law, h i s t o r y , etc., we are not saying that i n d u s t r i a l relations must 
be studied only by blending p a r t i a l theories. A l l we say i s that 
relevant ideas and concept can be usefully drawn from them, for 
application i n i n d u s t r i a l relations analysis. 
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I n d u s t r i a l relations theorising needs int e g r a t i o n and i t i s 
towards t h i s end that our concept of control i s aimed. In order to 
uncover the control content (involving various local and environmental 
factors) i n a given i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s i t u a t i o n , the scholar or 
p r a c t i t i o n e r needs an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y approach which i s receptive to 
the concepts available i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s as well as the various 
other d i s c i p l i n e s , and, at the same "time, selective about the 
appropriateness of variables and concepts. This we c a l l the control-
s i t u a t i o n a l approach. 
The analysis that follows, of the Singapore s i t u a t i o n , begins 
with the scanning of the external environment. We analyse socio-
c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s , economic development, i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , the 
locus of power and trade union influences that operate.in the 
environment. A l l these factors are seen to have a s i g n i f i c a n t impact 
on job cont r o l . 
- We then proceed to analyse the i n s t i t u t i o n s operating at company 
level and close i n on our findings about job control perceptions at 
the various levels of the f i r m . An analysis of the JURONG s i t u a t i o n 
i s followed by suggestions to enhance control f o r a l l the parties 
involved. Based on the circumstances facing Singapore and her industry, 
we raise a few questions, i n our conclusion, about the future - these 
are questions that must be faced by her strategic planners and 
decision-makers today. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CULTURAL BASIS OF STATE CONTROL 
I . SOCIO-CULTURAL EVOLUTION IN SINGAPORE; AN INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to examine the nature of social 
control i n Singapore: i t s evolution from the o r i e n t a l normative 
regulation to centralised State c o n t r o l . 
Singapore's strategic location i n South-east Asia has, since 
the early days, earned her the reputation of being a natural trading 
p o r t - an entrepreneurial gathering point. The B r i t i s h who foresaw 
. t h i s i n the early days set up o f f i c e i n Singapore at the beginning of 
the 19th century. I t was colonization, that brought to Singapore 
the various communities who are resident on the island today. A 
society of immigrants, her main communities are the Chinese, Indians 
and Malays. Although a young nation with l i t t l e indigeneous culture 
as such, she has from the early Chinese and Indians c l e a r l y inherited 
t h e i r well-developed Oriental t r a d i t i o n s . I t i s against t h i s 
t r a d i t i o n a l background t h a t , i n t h i s analysis, we examine the impact 
of the following phases i n Singapore's development: 
(a) Immigration and colonization 
(b) I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and modernisation 
and the concomitant State intervention. 
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , modernisation and State intervention are the 
more recent processes which have taken place since Singapore earned 
self-government and independence. She has, since the early s i x t i e s , 
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iindergone rapid economic and social change. Not. only does she on the 
one hand suffer from a severe lack of natural resources (other than 
human); there have been strong pressures on the other hand f o r socio-
economic progress and modernisation. In a society where values l i k e 
educational q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , s k i l l s and social status play an important 
p a r t , the wealth-pursuing ethos has indeed became a key feature of 
the Singapore people today. In t h i s chapter we trace how t h i s ethos 
has developed over time and today works hand i n hand with a new feature 
centralised State c o n t r o l . The impact of a 'migrant' ethos and 
colonization have also given more colour to the Singaporean's c u l t u r a l 
experience. I t would also be i n t e r e s t i n g f o r us to observe the place 
of Oriental t r a d i t i o n s i n the more recent developments. While 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and modernisation tended to erode c u l t u r a l t r a i t s 
on the one hand, the Government on the other hand quite e f f e c t i v e l y 
employed the peoples' t r a d i t i o n a l social and psychological dependence 
on normative regulation w i t h i n the family and community to reinforce 
the legitimacy of centralised State control. 
I I . THE TRADITIONAL SOCIO-CULTURAL BASE 
A discussion on Singapore's t r a d i t i o n a l socio-cultural 
i n s t i t u t i o n s must be concerned with the background of each of her 
main ethnic groups, namely, the Chinese, Indians and Malays. Whereas 
China and India are well known ancient c i v i l i s a t i o n s , t r a d i t i o n a l 
Malay customs and practices are known to bear a s i g n i f i c a n t resemblance 
to Hindu ways. This i s known to be the res u l t of continued 
dominance by Hindu Kingdoms over .the Malay archipelago f o r about 
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f i f t e e n centuries u n t i l 1400 AD. Although there are ideological 
differences between Hinduism and Islam, which came to South-east Asia 
l a t e r from India, t r a d i t i o n a l Malay custom continues t o be strongly coloured 
with Hindu symbols. Apart from the dominant Chinese t r a d i t i o n s , the 
remaining components of Singapore's t r a d i t i o n a l culture can indeed be 
traced t o the Hindu way of l i f e . We s h a l l f i r s t study the following 
three i n s t i t u t i o n s of Chinese and Indian t r a d i t i o n s , making a comparative 
analysis of the key features involved: 
(a) The t r a d i t i o n a l family i n s t i t u t i o n 
(b) The team and extended grouping, outside the family 
(c) T r a d i t i o n a l employment i n s t i t u t i o n s 
The Family 
The Confucian family organisation that evolved with the Chinese was 
very patriarchal and p a t r i l o c a l . * On the Indian side, we see the j o i n t 
family system which emphasised an 'authoritarian group-oriented caste 
dominated pattern which discounts i n d i v i d u a l i t y , i n i t i a t i v e and free 
i o 
enquiry. Both cultures stressed reverence f o r elders and the importance 
of family unity and cohesiveness. . A table (No. 1) i s given below to 
show the t r a i t s that appear on each side. 
TABLE NO. 1 
TRADITIONAL FAMILY TRAIia 
Chinese Indian 
Confucian family organisation: 
patriarchal and p a t r i l o c a l . 
Joint family system with 
authoritarian leadership. 
Reverence f o r ancestors? Obedience to elders i n the 
j o i n t family system. 4 
Family t i e s _ keystone of 




While not suggesting that a l l t r a i t s exhibited by both cultures 
are i d e n t i c a l , we can, nevertheless, see a s i m i l a r i t y i n t h e i r nature. 
Both systems have well-defined authority structures, and also exhibit 
a strong social and psychological dependence on family t i e s . These 
i n turn stress respect f o r age and s e n i o r i t y which makes t h e i r 
t r a d i t i o n a l form of social control highly normative and regulative. 
The Team and Extended Grouping 
The relationships i n social groups also exhibit a certain 
compatibility between the two Oriental t r a d i t i o n s . The 'group 
7 
s p i r i t ' with the Chinese encouraged strong inter-personal dependence 
amongst community members. On the Indian side we see the caste 
system which r e f l e c t s the h o l i s t i c nature of teamwork and organisation 
The constituents were considered as mutually indispensable holons. 
As Lannoy noted,' rules have been imposed on every minority group ... 
that i t should exist at peace with the corporate e n c i r c l i n g framework' 
Both the Chinese and Indians had well-developed extended 
groupings. While the Chinese had d i a l e c t and r e l i g i o u s groups, 
secret societies and clans, the Indians were organised through the 
caste system. Both cultures emphasised obedience to authority i n 
social organisation. The table (No. 2) that follows i l l u s t r a t e s 
the compatibility i n t h e i r t r a i t s . 
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TABLE NO. 2 
' THE TEAM S EXTENDED GROUPING 
Indian 
Caste system and 
h o l i s t i c nature of 
organisation. 
Extended organisations: 
e.g. ' v i l l a g e 
communities of cr a f t s 
and markets'. 9 
Hierarchical authority, 
and power not questioned. 
Both the Chinese and Indian groupings e x h i b i t a strong 
dependence on team relat i o n s f o r s u r v i v a l . Given the f i r m l y 
established structures of leadership and authority, we may again deduce 
the strong element of normative regulation i n both these Oriental cultures, 
. Employment 
The table (No. 3) that follows shows that i n both the Chinese 
and Indian t r a d i t i o n a l employment situations workers have exhibited 
a very strong dependence on t h e i r employers, f o r work and f o r a 
l i v i n g . The autocratic and p a t e r n a l i s t i c nature of the employers 
cl e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s t h e i r p o s i t i o n as being sole regulators of the 
organisation and execution of a l l available work. 
Chinese 
The 'group s p i r i t ' and 
inter-personal dependence. 
Well-developed extended 
groupings: d i a l e c t / 
r e l i g i o u s and secret 
societies. 
Obedience to authority; 
a Confucian teaching. 
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The t r a d i t i o n a l authority and leadership patterns i n family and 
group organisation, that we examined e a r l i e r , have c l e a r l y created 
an ideal background„for the persistence of t h i s master-servant 
rel a t i o n s h i p . This master-servant ideology has, as we saw i n the 
introductory chapter, indeed provided sanction f o r the wealth-pursuing 
ethos. "The notion f o r instance, that the employer should be held 
i n great esteem f o r the l i v e l i h o o d he provides workers i s even 
today used as a symbol to sanction workers' cooperation with the 
employer i n the wealth-pursuing endeavour. 
TABLE NO. 5 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
Chinese 
•Principle of d i v i s i o n of labour 
and obedience to superiors .... 
was the accepted form'. 10 
Employment governed by the 
• t r a d i t i o n a l ideology of 
paternalism 1. 11 
Indian 
The classes of masters 
and servants defined 
i n the' caste-hierarchical 
system. 
Pa t e r n a l i s t i c leadership: 
employer was 'father' 
to h i s large family of 
workers. 
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Summary of the Traditional Socio-Cultural Base 
Whilst the foregoing discussion i l l u s t r a t e s the common nature 
between these Oriental cultures, we must also acknowledge that there 
can be differences i n r e l i g i o u s ideology, rituals-and practices 
prescribed'by the two systems. I t i s in t e r e s t i n g to note, however, 
that despite differences, both these systems have been able t o 
co-exist i n a r e l a t i v e l y harmonious fashion. This may be a t t r i b u t e d 
12 
to the great measure of tolerance i n both c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s . 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t features about these Oriental t r a d i t i o n s 
that stem from the foregoing analysis may now be summarised as follows: 
both systems prescribed a high degree of dependence on normative 
regulation and control. We have also seen how the master-servant 
t r a d i t i o n at employment has contributed t o the evolution of the 
wealth-pursuing ethos. 
I I I . IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION 
Most of the immigrants who came to Singapore a f t e r the B r i t i s h 
set up o f f i c e on the island had arrived i n forced circumstances. While 
most of the Chinese who came were 'pushed' out from t h e i r homelands by 
13 
conditions of economic adversity, the Indians generally came as 
'coolies' indentured by the B r i t i s h . There were, however, the 
r e l a t i v e l y few Chinese who came as traders and businessmen, and the 
fewer Indians who were attracted by opportunities offered by the B r i t i s h 
i n some white-collar jobs. Indeed, the majority of these early 
immigrants constituted a growing community of 'forced' labour. They 
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were bound to t h e i r employers often f o r t h e i r whole l i f e t i m e , and 
were expected to be loyal and obedient t o t h e i r masters. Indeed 
the B r i t i s h c a p i t a l i s t s u t i l i s e d these features of Oriental t r a d i t i o n 
to t h e i r advantage. These hard-working workers continued to be 
socialised towards creating wealth f o r t h e i r masters i n return f o r 
betterment. Given the circumstances i n which these immigrants were 
•pushed1 out of t h e i r homelands, t h e i r strong concern f o r economic 
achievement was to be expected. The better-placed communities of 
Chinese businessmen and Indian clerks indeed legitimised the 
la i s s e z - f a i r e economy i n t h e i r own s e l f - i n t e r e s t . 
Riaz Hassan, a Singapore so c i o l o g i s t , has suggested that 
• 14 
migration i n t o Singapore was mainly the 'innovative type*. In 
achieving the new, '.the migrant ethos had the e f f e c t of weakening 
the hold of the respective cultures over the migrants•.^ As some 
of the older values were put aside, new values such as the emphasis 
on achievement, adaptation and social m o b i l i t y emerged. 
One i n t e r e s t i n g development of the 'migrant* values i s that they 
sowed the seeds of Singapore's wealth-pursuing ethos. Although i n 
the beginning, the drive f o r economic achievement may have p r i m a r i l y 
been instrumental, as time wore on, economic betterment was sought 
not only f o r the more comfortable l i f e i t earned but was also seen as 
a measure of social achievement. Having t r a d i t i o n a l l y been socialised 
i n what were highly s t r a t i f i e d communities, and then exposed through 
migration to social and economic achievement motivations and r e l a t i v e 
social m o b i l i t y , the new basis of social s t r a t i f i c a t i o n became 
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economic achievement. As jobs and vocations were no longer 'closed-
shops', so to speak, people s t r i v e d f o r occupations that gave the 
best economic rewards. These and other e x t r i n s i c a t t r i b u t e s of 
l i v i n g (e.g. car, property, special f a c i l i t i e s ) soon became means of 
measuring social achievement - the goal that today dominates the 
wealth-.pursuing ethos. Indeed, the beginnings of Singapore's 
wealth-pursuing ethos may thus be traced to the migrant ethos. 
Although the new a t t r i b u t e s of adaptation and social m o b i l i t y 
encouraged deviance from t r a d i t i o n a l r i t u a l s and practices, the 
immigrants' behaviour continued to be strongly influenced by community 
norms and regulations. Nevertheless, these new a t t r i b u t e s , as we 
sh a l l see l a t e r , helped to encourage i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and economic 
growth - the l a t t e r impacts i n Singapore's socio-cultural evolution. 
Next, we sha l l examine the effects and manifestations of two 
other features of colonization: the English system of education,, 
and,the 'social hierarchy with the white men at the top'. The 
English system of education was introduced p r i m a r i l y to t r a i n manpower 
fo r the local c i v i l service and business. One s t r i k i n g e f f e c t of 
t h i s education was the promoting, amongst i t s r e c i p i e n t s , of the l o g i c a l 
and s c i e n t i f i c questioning of t r a d i t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . This 
i n i t i a t e d the breaking down of the people's t r a d i t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , 
f o r com..mnity regulation. Also during colonial r u l e , the r u l e r s , 
as Guy Hunter described 'created a social hierarchy with the white man 
at the top',*** who exercised fi r m authority. For the constituents 
of the various communities, ultimate authority, which previously lay 
with community chiefs, was now assumed by the B r i t i s h chiefs. 
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Being largely i m p a r t i a l , the c o l o n i a l Government f a c i l i t a t e d smoother 
coordination of the 'separate' communities. 
In addition to the new hierarchical system, the introduction of 
English-type l e g i s l a t i o n also had profound effects on the immigrant 
communities, Although many of the English legal i n s t i t u t i o n s were 
at variance with t r a d i t i o n a l customs and legal sense, the s t r i c t and 
impartial enforcement soon f a c i l i t a t e d t h e i r acceptance by the 
immigrants. These modern laws which became a code f o r the regulation 
of wider society slowly overshadowed the various community codes, 
and i n the Confucian t r a d i t i o n , became accepted as the 'established 
order 1. 
We had noted that colonial education promoted the l i b e r a l 
questioning of t r a d i t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , thus eroding the legitimacy 
of community codes. More important, however, was the powerful 
dominance of the English hierarchy and l e g i s l a t i o n over the various 
communities. Except that the new state l e g i s l a t i o n was based on 
ra t i o n a l l e g a l i s t i c - p o l i t i c a l authority and was applied on a wider 
scale, i t continued to provide a sense of regulation that the Oriental 
immigrant had c u l t u r a l l y become so dependent upon. Indeed, 
colonization i n i t i a t e d the evolution of state bureaucracy i n 
Singapore. 
IV.' INDUSTRIALISATION AND MODERNISATION 
In order to study the impact of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and 
modernisation on Singapore's socio-cultural evolution, our e f f o r t s 
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must c e n t r a l l y be concerned with t h e i r key features: 




Peter Chen, a Singapore social s c i e n t i s t , recently wrote that 
'Singapore has made every e f f o r t to introduce modern technology and 
to stimulate i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n with the aim of achieving a higher 
17 
growth rate i n the economy'. Her gross domestic product has grown 
at an average rate.above 25% since 1968 when her i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
programme was a c t i v e l y launched. 
The socio-cultural e f f e c t s of economic growth through 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n may be distinguished i n t o two types - the preconditions 
and the consequences of economic growth. I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and 
economic growth, i n the f i r s t instance, require (as a precondition) 
the r e - o r i e n t a t i o n of ce r t a i n t r a d i t i o n a l practices towards 'economically 
relevant behaviour' - behaviour related to the production and d i s t r i b u t i o n 
18 
of goods and services. Personal t i e s between, master and servant, f o r instanc 
had t o give way to the more impersonal methods of ' s c i e n t i f i c management*. 
While a number of t r a d i t i o n a l practices faded, the pressure f o r 
i 
economically relevant behaviour had the support of migrant ethos, 
which stressed values l i k e achisvement, adaptability and social 
m o b i l i t y , and the economic-social achievement motivation of the 
wealth-pursuing ethos. 'The talents of three races - Chinese, Indians 
and Malays are blended here', summarised Galbraith 'and they work 
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here without the f e t t e r i n g t r a d i t i o n s to which they would very often 
be subject to i n t h e i r home countries. Migrant and t h e i r descendants 
19 
always work better than people who have been too long at home1. 
A major socio-cultural consequence of economic growth has been 
the Singaporean's increased propensity f o r materialistic-consumpticn. 
While i t i s indeed a threat to his t r a d i t i o n a l norm of f r u g a l i t y , 
h i s desire f o r materialistic-consumption participates amicably i n the 
stress f o r wealth and social achievement. 
We have j u s t seen that both the precondition and consequence 
of economic growth have contributed, i n somewhat contradictory ways, 
to the erosion of t r a d i t i o n a l practices. But they both reinforced 
the wealth-pursuing ethos. 
Urbanisation 
Urbanisation i s sometimes said to be the biggest single feature 
o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . Although an urban centre before her 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n began, Singapore's massive urban organisation and 
renewal belong to more recent times. About 50% of her population 
are presently l i v i n g i n public high-rise housing estates. I t i s 
believed that 'public housing i s probably the most v i s i b l e and 
20 
demonstrative project i n the Republic 1. Besides,'public housing 
has not only accelerated urban development and redevelopment, 
but with an ever-increasing proportion of the population drawn int o 
21 
i t s ambit, has become a social barometer of the nation as w e l l ' . 
According to Hassan, demographic, ecological and sociological 
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coriditioris which characterise Singapore as a highly urbanised area 
tend to f a c i l i t a t e the emergence and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of behaviour 
patterns which are characterised by r a t i o n a l i t y , expediency, e f f i c i e n c y , 
22 
f l e x i b i l i t y and to some extent impersonality. These behavioural 
a t t r i b u t e s are indeed clear evidence of the contribution urbanisation 
has made towards supporing the 'social-achievement' goal of the 
wealth-pursuing ethos. They have also 'considerably f a c i l i t a t e d , 
23 
the governmental programmes of modernisation and development'. 
However, the i l l - e f f e c t s of high-density housing on the 
t r a d i t i o n a l family community i n s t i t u t i o n s are m u l t i f a r i o u s . 
From an extended/joint family system, the younger generations 
are moving towards consumerism and greater individualism... As a 
r e s u l t of economic growth, the autonomy offered by nuclear family-
units becomes very a t t r a c t i v e . Although social a l i e n a t i o n and 
i s o l a t i o n are not yet pervasive i n t h i s country, there i s a fear ' i t 
24 
may become an accepted norm i n the future'. According to some 
loca l research findings, the disorganisation of family relationships 
25 
i s r e f l e c t e d i n the increasing delinquency and divorce rates. 
Secondly, while, on the one hand, a dense environment narrowed 
the physical distance between modern f l a t dwellers, i t has, on the 
other hand, widened t h e i r social distance. This has been confirmed 
26 
by research surveys conducted i n t o community t i e s i n dense housing 
estates. 
Despite the disruptive effects these consequences of urbanisation 
have had on Singaporean t r a d i t i o n s thoy had to be contended with, 
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i n consideration of the benefits that urbanisation otherwise brought 
f o r modernisation and economic growth. Nevertheless, although 
urbanisation, as we saw e a r l i e r , pushed f o r change towards 
r a t i o n a l i s t i c and more e f f i c i e n t ways, t h e i r psychological need to 
depend on t r a d i t i o n a l l y regulative i n s t i t u t i o n s did not suddenly 
disappear. Government intervention to ease the problems of 
urbanisation however, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , f a c i l i t a t e d and encouraged 
the people's growing dependence on the State structure. 
Modernisation 
The process of modernisation i n developing countries usually 
involves importing technological, socio-organisational and ideological 
systems from advanced nations. Therefore, Chen continues, 'for 
many newcomers of developing countries, modernisation i n e f f e c t 
27 
means Westernisation 1. 
We may perceive two distinguishable types of effects here: 
F i r s t l y , the i n f l u x of knowledge, techniques and systems which 
are considered b e n e f i c i a l to the State. These are generally expected 
to enhance the s o c i a l , economic and technological l e v e l of the nation. 
This indeed provides a rather favourable background f o r the wealth-
pursuing ethos. 
Secondly, the i n f l u x of foreign systems, values and l i f e styles 
which are thought to be detrimental to economically relevant behaviour. 
These include certain behavioural aspects of Western c i v i l i s a t i o n 
that are l i k e l y to promote a l i b e r a l questioning of regulation and 
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con t r o l , whether of t r a d i t i o n a l community, or modern State codes. 
They are c l e a r l y undesired by the r u l i n g leadership and, i f allowed, 
would be thought t o constitute a heavy cost to the society. 
Summary of the Impacts of I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and Modernisation 
(a) A l l three features, viz economic growth, urbanisation and 
modernisation, reinforced the legitimacy of the wealth-
pursuing ethos. 
(b) On the other hand, they contributed, to d i f f e r i n g 
extents, t o the erosion of t r a d i t i o n a l community codes. 
(c) Some consequences of t h i s erosion have been thought to be 
be n e f i c i a l f o r modernisation and economic growth, and have 
thereby been encouraged by the State. Others have been 
considered as costs t o be contended wi t h , i n consideration 
of the benefits obtained i n the processes of urbanisation and 
modernisation. 
(d) Certain undesired consequences of urbanisation and modernisation 
have become areas that the Government would prefer restrained 
and a c t i v e l y discouraged. This then brings us to the issue 
of State intervention. 
V. STATE INTERVENTION 
The term intervention i s used i n the present context to re f e r 
to the actions taken by the State either to promote or suppress the 
socio-cultural effects of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and modernisation towards 
desired ends. . We s h a l l now study how the evolving State framework 
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asserts i t s e l f over the effects of economic growth, urbanisation and 
modernisation that we examined e a r l i e r . 
State Intervention on the Preconditions and Consequences of Economic Growth 
The State's involvement i n enhancing the preconditions f o r 
economically relevant behaviour has taken three main forms: 
F i r s t l y , the Government encouraged a t t r i b u t e s of the migrant 
ethos such as achievement, o r i e n t a t i o n , a d a p t a b i l i t y and social 
m o b i l i t y (which have found t h e i r way i n t o the wealth-pursuing ethos). 
While young people were d r i l l e d t o recognise that 'achievement was 
concomitant with social and economic wellbeing, the meritocratic-
c a p i t a l i s t emphasis underlying the i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure has indeed 
28 
motivated achievement i n every sphere of l i f e i n Singapore'. The 
Government has also e f f e c t i v e l y u t i l i s e d the adaptation aspect of the 
migrant ethos to promote secularism (whereas t r a d i t i o n emphasised 
s p i r i t u a l i t y and m o r a l i t y ) . 
Secondly, the Government has taken steps to encourage and 
di r e c t the country's human resources'towards the acquisition of 
technical s k i l l s and know-how necessary f o r i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . 
Towards t h i s end, the authorities have expanded technical and vocational 
f a c i l i t i e s i n schools, colleges and u n i v e r s i t i e s . ~ • 
Thi r d l y , the Government has also adopted measures to regulate 
and control workers towards economically relevant behaviour. Amendments 
29 
made to employment law i n the 1960's exemplify the s t r i c t e r control 
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over workers and, i n some ways, over employers. 
While a l l the three above forms of government action i l l u s t r a t e 
an evolving pattern of centralised State c o n t r o l , they also support 
the wealth-pursuing ethos. 
The State, on the other hand, takes steps to discourage the 
growth consequence of m a t e r i a l i s t i c consumerism. The need t o 
generate investment c a p i t a l through domestic savings has promoted the 
Government to discourage excessive private consumption. Aggressive 
p o l i c i e s and a t t r a c t i v e propositions made by the Government through 
the National Savings Bank and other f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s have 
cl e a r l y been aimed at stimulating domestic savings which, i n t u r n , 
boosted c a p i t a l formation. State intervention has thus redirected 
some propensity f o r p r i v a t e consumption i n t o a factor of economic 
production. The effects of voluntary and compulsory savings through 
State i n s t i t u t i o n s also reinforce the people's dependence on State 
regulation. 
State Intervention and Urbanisation 
On an island of about 230 square miles holding two m i l l i o n 
people, land i s a v i t a l resource f o r urban development. The 
constraint of land scarcity seems t o j u s t i f y the Government's 
continued construction of high-density (high r i s e ) housing estates. 
E a r l i e r we saw that some desired aspects of t r a d i t i o n a l family-
community relationships f o r f e i t e d i n the process of urbanisation were 
l i k e l y to become areas f o r Government intervention. 
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As social alienation and i s o l a t i o n develop when people tend towards 
nuclear f a m i l i e s , we are l i k e l y to f i n d 'inward looking dwellings' 
and a strong feeling of insecurity. While high density i n these 
housing estates cannot be avoided, the Government makes an e f f o r t to 
constantly monitor the various special and psychological i l l - e f f e c t s 
that could develop as a r e s u l t . Medical and social services are 
being improved to meet these demands. Where previously family 
problems would have found solutions w i t h i n the extended family or 
community relationships, they now become very much a state 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . An extensive Government network tends to enhance 
the people's dependence on the state structure. 
In addition, the Government has also set up community centres 
i n a l l these housing estates. Although mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n at these 
recreational centres remains l i m i t e d however, they e f f e c t i v e l y 
constitute 'a mechanism of p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i s a t i o n and c o n t r o l ' ^ 
f o r the Government. 
Given the constraints of land scarcity and the need, at the 
same time, to stimulate urbanisation to achieve higher levels of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , the methods used to ameliorate the costs of urban 
housing have indeed strengthened the people's dependence on the 
State structure. 
State Intervention and Modernisation 
We had i n our e a r l i e r analysis distinguished between the i n f l u x 
of socio-cultural effects that either contributed to economic and 
technological progress or otherwise were detrimental to economically 
-98-
relevant behaviour. 
Convening Parliament on February 8th, 1977, the President of 
Singapore acknowledged that the nation 'must learn and acquire 
(Western) science and technology, t h e i r management s k i l l s and marketing 
knowthow'."^ Indeed, a good number c f the Government's i n i t i a t i v e s , 
from the e l i t i s t Junior College to urban housing, are a l l designs that 
have been borrowed from the Western nations. 'Our p o l i c i e s were not 
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novel, innovative or path-breaking' wrote the nation's Deputy Prime 
Minister recently. Being a 'late developer', the State' continues 
to adopt a number of features of Western development i n order to 
achieve a modernised environment i n Singapore. As t r a d i t i o n a l . 
values and a f f i l i a t i o n s are caused to wear away i n the process, 
modernisation creates a common environment f o r the various ethnic 
groups which make up the population. In socio-cultural terms, 
therefore, an environment which transcends t r a d i t i o n a l connections 
tends to f a c i l i t a t e consensus i n the various groups as to the desired 
ends. This i s c r u c i a l f o r centralised State coordination. 
I n contrast, however, effects that are l i k e l y to be detrimental 
to economically relevant behaviour are a c t i v e l y discouraged and even 
prohibited by the Government. While the newspapers do not generally 
support news unfavourable to the Government, the radio and television, 
networks are State-operated. The cinema films which are another 
channel f o r foreign values and fashions are subject to s t r i c t 
censorship. There are also rules and regulations governing personal 
behaviour, especially to keep out 'unhealthy' practices and pastimes 
thought to be fashionable among contemporary Western youth. 
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I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that i n order to combat these . 
undesired e f f e c t s , the State has resorted t o promoting certain 
t r a d i t i o n a l r i t u a l s and practices. While not contradicting economic 
progress, these symbolic practices act to counter those features of 
Western c i v i l i s a t i o n that are deemed inconducive to economically 
relevant behaviour. Singapore's youth 'are therefore exhorted to be 
33 
f a i t h f u l t o the moral precepts of the (Oriental) c u l t u r e 1 . In so 
doing, any tendency to question or challenge authority which are 
believed t o be a t t r i b u t e s o r i g i n a t i n g from Western c i v i l i s a t i o n tends 
to be suppressed by the normative and regulative influence of 
t r a d i t i o n a l symbols. The State has thus even u t i l i s e d t r a d i t i o n to 
reinforce i t s own system of regulation and control. 
V I . TOWARDS STATE CONTROL 
Singapore's socio-cultural development i s best summarised i n a 
schematic diagram, which follows as fig u r e I I I on the next page. 
Beginning with a t r a d i t i o n a l base, we show the stages through 
which the socio-cultural system moves following the three-phase impacts 
migrant ethos and colonisation, i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and modernisation 
and State intervention. We have distinguished State int e r v e n t i o n 
from i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and modernisation f o r reasons of c l a r i t y , 
although a l l these processes have taken place concomitantly. The 
effects and manifestations of each impact phase are also indicated so 
as t o enable a better understanding of the developments that have 
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The early stage begins with t r a d i t i o n a l Oriental norms which 
stress a high degree of dependence on family and community-based 
normative regulation and control. At t h i s point we see the 
significance of the p a t e r n a l i s t i c master-servant relationship 
c o n s t i t u t i n g an important ingredient of Singapore's wealth-pursuing 
ethos. 
The primary impact on the t r a d i t i o n a l base sets i n as a r e s u l t 
of migration and colonization. The impact n a t u r a l l y caused a certain 
amount of wearing away of t r a d i t i o n a l norms. Nevertheless, here we 
see the a t t r i b u t e s of the migrant ethos such as achievement o r i e n t a t i o n , 
a d a p t a b i l i t y and social m o b i l i t y laying the foundations of the wealth-
pursuing ethos. At the same time, because of the s t r i c t and impartial 
administration that the B r i t i s h rulers set up, the Oriental communities 
were drawn i n t o a state bureaucracy. Although t r a d i t i o n a l norms were 
overshadowed, the colonial government and l e g i s l a t i v e framework gave 
the immigrants a sense of regulation they had c u l t u r a l l y become so 
dependent on. 
The secondary impact of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and modernisation also 
caused a certain amount of erosion of t r a d i t i o n a l community codes. 
Socio-culturally t h i s impact has also reinforced the wealth-pursuing 
ethos, since both i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and modernisation provided 
opportunities f o r wealth, social achievement and mo b i l i t y . As the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and modernisation programme i n Singapore was largely 
directed by the Government, t h i s impact phase reinforced the State-
framework. 
-102-
State in t e r v e n t i o n , however, can be considered the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t impact. The picture of Government intervention we saw 
e a r l i e r c l e a r l y points to the evolution of a powerful centralised 
State structure. I n a number of respects, t h i s framework has taken 
over the regulation e a r l i e r maintained by t r a d i t i o n a l community codes. 
We can also see t h a t , while t h i s c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of control could have 
undermined the c a p i t a l i s t i c ( s e l f - i n t e r e s t ) aspect of the wealth-pursuing 
ethos, the Government has, through the need f o r economic progress and 
modernisation, given i t a f i r m place i n society. To remind ourselves 
again of Galbraith's comments: ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t serves p r e t t y well as 
a motivation i t i s recognised that i t does not serve a l l purposes, 
34 
and that i t serves best w i t h i n a framework of careful overall planning'. 
Today t h i s ethos persists harmoniously i n a society f i r m l y committed 
to centralised State control. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BASIS 
OF STATE CONTROL 
I . THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC § POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF INDEPENDENT SINGAPORE 
Independent from Malaysia on 9th August, 1965, the Government of 
Singapore has had since then to demonstrate t h a t , despite the lack of 
natural resources, the c i t y - s t a t e could survive without the t r a d i t i o n a l 
patronage of the Malayan hinterland. • With the escalation of war i n 
Vietnam and the Malaysian-Indonesian confrontation i n the background, 
the p o l i t i c a l s e t t i n g i n the region was f a r from stable. The economic 
and p o l i t i c a l implications of the B r i t i s h announcement t o withdraw t h e i r 
m i l i t a r y commitments East of Suez beginning i n the l a t e s i x t i e s made 
the task even more urgent. Realising the d i f f i c u l t options available, 
the r u l i n g People's Action Party (PAP) embarked on the ' p o l i t i c s of 
sur v i v a l ' . B r i e f l y , i t meant that the sole objective of the new 
enterprise was urgent social and economic progress to which everything 
else was to be subservient. 
Meanwhile the *Barisan Socialis' (the communist-inclined opposition 
to the r u l i n g Party) decided to boycott Parliament towards the end of 
1965. This action was seen as a threat to continue t h e i r anti-Government 
struggle from the underground. While the i n t e r n a l s e c urity network 
kept communist a c t i v i s t s under careful surveillance, the Government 
pursued social and economic strategies aimed at denying them any 
ground i n the masses. The PAP was keen to make sure that the communist-
supporting section of the population was kept to a small minority. Only 
seven seats were contested by the Barisan i n the 1968 general election. 
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Without any open f i g h t from the Barisan the PAP walked over a l l 58 
seats, with 86.7% of the votes cast i n the contested constituences. 
A si m i l a r feat was performed i n the subsequent (1972) election where 
t h i s time 57 of the 65 constituencies were contested. In spite of 
the presence of the Barisan Socialis i n t h i s contest, however, the 
PAP took a l l the seats with 69% of the t o t a l votes cast. This feat 
was repeated i n the l a t e s t general elections i n December 1976. Even 
i f we exclude from consideration the 1968 r e s u l t , since only seven 
constituences were contested, the results of 1972 and 1976 confirm 
the peoples' support f o r the r u l i n g party. As H.C. Chan put i t , 
the present Government's 'legitimacy as rule r s ... strengthened with 
time 1 . * While not discounting the 'charisma' of the r u l i n g leadership 
(r e s u l t i n g from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the a n t i - c o l o n i a l struggle, and the 
continued leadership since 1959), the ' p o l i t i c s of survival' to 
achieve socio-economic progress has been the 'rational' basis f o r the 
Government's legitimacy. 
I I . THE ELEMENTS OF SINGAPORE'S 'POLITICS OF SURVIVAL' 
'Multiracialism' 
Government policy i n Singapore continues to stress that the 
nation's p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and economic v i a b i l i t y i s c r u c i a l l y 
dependent on the peaceful existence of her m u l t i r a c i a l communities. 
In a country of at least four important ethnic communities, the r u l i n g 
leadership has repeatedly stressed equal status f o r the various 
cultures and ethnic i d e n t i t i e s . 
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The Government's emphasis on the Malay language while she was part of 
Malaysia (1963^65) was l a t e r changed to multi-lingualism, where a l l 
school children now have to learn at least two languages at school. 
On t h i s G. Benjamin has said: 
" I n Singapore t h i s ideology has functioned f o r the past 
decade as a powerful force against ethnic discrimination, 
and i t s success i s evident i n the ease and unselfconsciousness 
with which Singaporeans of d i f f e r e n t ethnic backgrounds 
int e r a c t p u b l i c l y Much of the c r e d i t f o r (a place where 
d i f f e r e n t ethnic groups l i v e together without s t r i f e ) must go 
to the Singapore Government's pos i t i v e espousal of a morality 
based on multiracialism". 2 
Socialisation Towards State Objectives 
Another survival scheme adopted by the PAP was mobilisation 
of the masses towards State objectives. The community centres and 
the c i t i z e n consultative committees which were i n i t i a t e d i n 1961 
have since been developed in t o machines of p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i s a t i o n and 
mobilisation. In a recent study on community centres i n Singapore, 
CM. Seah had t h i s to say, 'The centres ... could be viewed as 
3 
forming a mechanism of p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i s a t i o n and control' . In 
addition to community, centres, i t i s true, as Chan claimed, 
'Socialisation through the mass media and schools has successfully 
convinced the bulk of the population that there are no a l t e r n a t i v e 
4 
methods or po l i c i e s workable f o r Singapore's economic survival' . 
P o l i t i c a l Climate Discouraging Confrontation Against the Government 
Apart from s o c i a l i s i n g the masses towards State objectives Singapore 
has also shown the development of a p o l i t i c a l climate which discourages 
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confrontation against the Government. The Government's i n t e r n a l 
security machinery and the r e s t r i c t i v e labour l e g i s l a t i o n are d i s t i n c t 
examples of the State i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s i n g t h i s climate of con t r o l . 
As Chan concludes,.it 'discourages c o n f l i c t , confrontation and 
bargaining, emphasises s t a b i l i t y , low-risk and p e t i t i o n ' . 5 This has 
indeed strengthened the people's dependence on the r u l i n g leadership 
and t h e i r State i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Modernisation and Economic Expansion . 
Modernisation i s a t h i r d survival commitment, and i t s emphasis 
on science and technology has been j u s t i f i e d by the Government thus: 
"Societies which modernise rapidly and smoothly are 
those which accept change as an i n e v i t a b l e , necessary 
and normal part of existence - not as unpleasant deviations 
from the norm to be fought o f f f o r as long as we can. 
Change as a way of l i f e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r developing 
countries the only r a t i o n a l approach to the world modern 
technology and science are creating". 
I t was also argued that: 
" I f we persist i n our task of rapid modernisation and 
i f we are not overawed by the d i f f i c u l t i e s and challenges 
that w i l l confront us then the future w i l l be more 
assured and brighter f o r us " . 6 . 
The other aspects of modernisation that continue to receive constant 
at t e n t i o n &re public housing, employment and improvement i n the 
standards of l i v i n g . K.S. Goh recently wrote: ' i t i s clear that a l l 
these three objectives could be achieved only through continuous and 
rapid economic growth.'7 
Thus, concomitant to modernisation, the most important social 
goal of survival f o r Singapore has continued to be 'continuous and 
rapid economic growth' . Her growth strategy works along two li n e s . 
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While the f i r s t concerns human resource development, the second 
hinges upon accelerating the expansion of the manufacturing industry. 
Goh has summarised the State's economic po l i c i e s as follows: 
"Taking an overall view of Singapore's 
economic po l i c y , we can see how r a d i c a l l y 
i t d i f f e r e d from the lai s s e z f a i r e p o l i c i e s 
of the colonial era .... We had to t r y • •' 1
a more a c t i v i s t and i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t 
approach. Democratic s o c i a l i s t economic 
po l i c i e s ranged from d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n industry to the supply of in f r a s t r u c t u r e 
f a c i l i t i e s by statutory a u t h o r i t i e s , and 
to laying down clear guidelines to the private 
sector as to what they could and should do. 
The successful implementation of these p o l i c i e s 
depended on t h e i r acceptance by the people, 
generally, and on the active co-operation of 
organised labour i n p a r t i c u l a r . A l l these 
conditions were f u l f i l l e d " . 8 
Legislation to r e s t r i c t labour enacted i n 1968 have been very 
instrumental i n the promotion Of investment and thereby i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . 
Mass r a l l i e s , demonstrations, str i k e s and open labour-management 
c o n f l i c t were systematically brought under control. Though i t s e l f 
a pro-labour party i n the 1950's, the PAP included the l a b o u r - r e s t r i c t i v e 
sections i n the 1968 Employment and I n d u s t r i a l Relations (Amendment) 
Acts to meet the 'economic dictates of su r v i v a l 1 . The Acts were 
passed a f t e r the 1968 elections without a dissenting vote i n the 
one-party Parliament and neither was there much a g i t a t i o n outside. 
This may be explained by the fact that most of the workers were eit h e r 
unorganised or were members of a trade union federation that supported 
the Government. Control by the State has thus taken the form of 
l i m i t i n g labour's o r i g i n a l freedoms of action, and has been a prominent 
ingredient of Singapore's economic growth strategy. 
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Meritocracy 
At the opening of Parliament i n February 1977, the President of 
Singapore r e i t e r a t e d the importance of another survival platform; he 
stressed the relevance f o r Singapore of an Asian precept espousing 
meritocracy: 'From each his best, to each his worth'. Economic 
d i s t r i b u t i o n , according to him, had to be based on consistency i n 
g 
high performance f o r better rewards. 
Ideologically t h i s confirms a major s h i f t of the PAP from being 
*a j u n i o r partner of a communist united f r o n t (against colonialism) 
which was ' d i s t i n c t l y Marxist i n f l a v o u r ' , 1 0 i n the m i d - f i f t i e s - to 
a post-independence positi o n that emphasised the wealth-pursuing ethos 
and meritocracy. The stress on meritocracy indeed became evident i n 
p o l i t i c a l speeches and Government po l i c i e s soon after, independence. 
The nation's Prime Minister t o l d a S o c i a l i s t International gathering 
i n 1967 t h a t : 
"The meaning of a s o c i a l i s t democracy ... i s not 
j u s t a simple process of taking from the haves and 
giving to the have-nots so that the majority of the 
population who are have-nots w i l l have something 
more without doing more to get i t " 11. 
A like-minded Power E l i t e and Centralisation of Authority 
The l a s t survival strategy we s h a l l discuss here i s the 
development of the power e l i t e i n Singapore. During the period of 
i n t e r n a l self-government, the power e l i t e consisted of various i n t e r e s t 
and powerful pressure groups. Apart from the powerful opposition 
w i t h i n Parliament, lobbies representing the various interests of business, 
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labour and the ethnic communities were also quite i n f l u e n t i a l . The 
survival of the system as that time depended, to a considerable extent, 
on the s t a b i l i t y guaranteed by the l e g i s l a t i v e and administrative 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n h e r i t e d from the Colonial Raj. Today, a f t e r more than two 
successful one-party Parliaments, the power, structure i s quite 
d i f f e r e n t . According to Chan: 
"Authority i s now enjoyed i n the same way (as 
the Colonial authorities) by the PAP Government 
admitting, when i t wants, the advice of business 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , bankers and local community 
leaders i f i t so wishes". 12 
Perceived t h i s way, the change represents a cycle; thus reverting 
to the monopolistic nature.of authority exercised by the B r i t i s h 
during the colonial period. 
From a more p l u r a l i s t power structure during self-government, 
the dominant Party framework today represents an i d e o l o g i c a l l y homogeneous 
and cohesive e l i t e working w i t h , and under, a strong leadership. 
Apart from the development of t h i s form of e l i t e organisation, the 
survival of the present system has also depended on the st r a t e g i c 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of the members of the Party e l i t e over a wide range of 
State i n s t i t u t i o n s and functions. This guarantees the survival of 
the Party, i t s p o l i c i e s and thereby the system i n i t s current form. 
I t i s worth noting here that the Secretary-General of the National 
Trade Union Congress i s a very important Party man and that a number 
of his trade union colleagues are members of the single-party 
Parliament. While the strategic d i s t r i b u t i o n of the members belonging 
to the e l i t e group has encouraged the spread of unitary ideology, the 
persistence of a one-party Parliament has effected a high degree of 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of authority. 
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The P o l i t i c s of Survival and Social Control 
The ideology of survival and the p o l i c i e s and measures taken 
by the Government towards t h i s end have, as we have seen, proved to 
be a powerful means of social c o n t r o l . By drawing the people's 
at t e n t i o n to the peculiar conditions facing Singapore - scarcity of 
land, the need f o r m u l t i - r a c i a l co-existence and also f o r modernisation 
and economic growth etc., the ideology of survival has indeed helped 
to sustain t h e i r obeisance , and amenability to d i r e c t i o n . 
I I I . SINGAPORE'S SURVIVAL APPROACH TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROGRESS 
The formative years of self-governing Singapore were marked by 
a power e l i t e made up of diverse i n t e r e s t groups. The r u l i n g group 
was at that time openly challenged by a formidable communist 
organisation. This was changed i n t o a unitary structure a f t e r 
independence. The Government's survival p o l i c i e s have indeed played 
an important part i n t h i s process. The anti-Government and communist 
threats today are perceived more from forces outside the island. 
Within i t s borders, the vacuum created i n the communist leadership by 
the i n t e r n a l security mechanism has been f i l l e d by the new s t y l e of 
survival management. Given the sensitive nature of the power 
balance i n the region a f t e r the communist v i c t o r i e s i n Indo-China, 
and the high degree of s e n s i t i v i t y to external fluctuations that the 
country's economy experiences, the Singapore Government continues to 
depend on her survival policies f o r socio-economic progress. 
While the administrative and l e g i s l a t i v e system l e f t behind by 
the Colonial Raj played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n ensuring s t a b i l i t y f o r 
the takeover government, the system has since been further reinforced. 
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This has been achieved through: 
(a) a u n i t a r y ideology of survival ; 
00 the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of authority; and 
CO regulative State l e g i s l a t i o n and machinery. 
The Government's p o l i c i e s and schemes of survival have played 
a v i t a l r o l e i n achieving f o r Singapore social and economic standards 
which are well known to be amongst the highest i n Asia. As re s u l t s 
from her i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n programme have yielded concrete economic 
progress and modernisation, the people continue to l e g i t i m i s e the 
highly centralised p o l i t i c a l structure, and thereby, i t s regulative 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and methods. 
Next, we turn our at t e n t i o n to the important question of State 
control as i t affects workers 1 organisations. Singapore's national 
trade union movement, we s h a l l see, i s a c r u c i a l agent of State c o n t r o l . 
Being so i n a country which operates on democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s 
( i n h e r i t e d from the former B r i t i s h rulers) must indeed provide f o r an 
in t e r e s t i n g analysis. We s h a l l examine the movement's highly 
centralised nature, and the basis of i t s r o l e i n centralised State 
c o n t r o l . 
* 
IV. WORKER ORGANISATION AND STATE CONTROL 
There are today 89 employee trade unions i n Singapore with 
membership t o t a l l i n g more than 200,000 (approx. 30% of the t o t a l labour 
f o r c e ) . This membership f a i l s i n t o two main categories, namely the 
National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) - a f f i l i a t e d and the n o n - a f f i l i a t e d 
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Since more than 90% of the unionised workers are a f f i l i a t e d t o the 
NTUC, n o n - a f f i l i a t e d membership has become i n s i g n i f i c a n t . A 
discussion on current worker organisation i n Singapore must, therefore, 
centre around the NTUC. 
Workers i n Singapore have been encouraged to j o i n NTUC-affiliated 
unions through a v a r i e t y of means. Being strongly socialised i n the 
wealth-pursuing ethos, these workers have tended t o respond most 
e f f e c t i v e l y to money rewards. In order to a t t r a c t workers i n t o the 
State-supporting NTUC, the government has generated economic benefits 
and f a c i l i t i e s that are directed to workers through this.body. One 
important channel f o r these benefits i s the chain of state-financed 
trade union co-operatives which deal i n a wide range of a c t i v i t i e s . 
Some of the better known ones deal i n insurance, supermarkets, t a x i 
and bus services, school books, dental care and t r a v e l . By creating 
opportunities and economic benefits, these operations have indeed 
made the NTUC a s i g n i f i c a n t social i n s t i t u t i o n , beyond j u s t being a 
bargaining agent. 
The Government also channels advantages to NTUC-affiliated 
workers through discretionary judgements made by i t s agencies. 
Reflecting the close party teamworkE. Chalmers wrote: 
'The party and government aid the unions ... i n discretionary judgements 
exercised by government o f f i c i a l s on a wide..range of problems f o r 
13 
which they are responsible under various ordinances' . This has 
tended to enhance NTUC's status viz-a-viz the working population. 
At the p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , the assistance that government agencies give 
the NTUC has important implications both f o r aggrieved employees 
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seeking j u s t i c e , and f o r employers who may be over-exploitative. 
Workers are thus encouraged to r e l y on the NTUC f o r support i n 
grievances, disputes and general labour problems, both w i t h i n and 
without the factory. 
In addition, the NTUC participates i n national-level committees 
(e.g. the National I n d u s t r i a l Relations Committee and the National 
Wages Council) with a power status much enhanced by active support 
from the Government leadership. Workers are thereby made to f e e l 
that t h e i r interests would be adequately voiced at the highest l e v e l . 
Being part of a p o l i t i c a l l y 'like-minded' power-elite, however, the 
NTUC-leadership has been assigned a national r o l e to mobilise and 
dir e c t organised labour towards State objectives. These generally 
surpass the common sectional interests of labour. Nevertheless, 
NTUC's growing importance i n the national context makes i t the primary 
medium of State communication with workers, and a valuable channel f o r 
the p e t i t i o n i n g of Government authority. 
Both the discretionary judgements on i t s behalf and the national 
status assigned to i t may be viewed as f a c i l i t i e s aimed at encouraging 
workers to r e l y upon the NTUC. Besides, as we sha l l see at the end 
of t h i s chapter, the economic benefits and f a c i l i t i e s we have j u s t 
discussed have been directed to the workers as a reward f o r t h e i r 
mobilisation and d i r e c t i o n under centralised- State co n t r o l . The 
NTUC may essentially be viewed as being a cru c i a l agent of t h i s control. 
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V. THE ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL LABOUR MOVEMENT 
In t h i s section we sha l l investigate an important feature of 
NTUC's organisation and structure that has f a c i l i t a t e d the s i g n i f i c a n t 
intervention by the State i n t o the movement. This feature i s the 
high degree of ce n t r a l i s a t i o n of authority i n the: movement. I t i'a 
effected through a National Centre run by key members of the r u l i n g 
Party's e l i t e . Apart from modest p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n electing immediate 
leaders, the involvement i n the movement of the rank and f i l e i s 
li m i t e d to being mobilised f o r specific union or larger State 
objectives. While p o l i c i e s are designed at the top and executed 
by the middle-rung d i s t r i c t union o f f i c e r s , the rank and f i l e i s 
quite f a r removed from the decision-making process. 
'House' Unions and t h e i r A f f i l i a t i o n to the NTUC 
The t y p i c a l union a f f i l i a t e d to the National TUC i s either an 
independent enterprise union or a branch of a d i s t r i c t federation. 
While examples of enterprise unions are found i n the Keppel shipyard 
and the Port Authority, branch unions, being the more common form, 
are found i n the various places of employment. The Singapore 
I n d u s t r i a l Labour Organisation (SILO), the Pioneer Industries Employees* 
Union (PIEU), and the Amalgamated Union of Public Employees (AUPE)" are 
the National Centre's main d i s t r i c t federations, to one of which 
each branch i s attached. Since these enterprise and branch unions 
are generally organised on a 'house' basis few employers are confronted 
with c r a f t or multi-union situations. Thus, the National TUC is also 
free from d i f f i c u l t i e s which otherwise could arise from inter-union 
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competition w i t h i n the enterprise. This has resulted i n easier 
control f o r the National Trade Union leadership - precisely what i s 
not possible i n a context such as found i n B r i t a i n . 
Lines of Control Within the Movement 
A p i c t o r i a l representation of control w i t h i n the labour movement 
i s given i n f i g u r e IV on the next page. 
Authority i n the f i r s t instance i s derived from the membership 
which elects the branch or enterprise union committee, and delegates 
to the d i s t r i c t confederation ( i n the case of the branch type). 
Office holders at the d i s t r i c t headquarters are then elected by these 
delegates who also appoint representatives to the National Centre. 
These representatives f i n a l l y decide among themselves the Centre's 
executive line-up. Thus we see that the dir e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n of 
the rank and f i l e at the lowest l e v e l remains occasional and modest. 
As we proceed up the ladder, we notice leaders electing leaders, r i g h t 
up to the National Centre. From t h i s we may see that the 'upward 
flow of authority' or legitimation takes place more through 'delegation 
14 
and representation rather than d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' of the rank 
and f i l e . 
The downward flow of authority, on the other hand, begins at 
the National Centre. Apart from i t s role i n the national environment 
working together with Party and Government, i t lays.the broad framework 
fo r a l l policy and action w i t h i n the movement. The National Centre 
holds r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for a l l a f f a i r s i n the movement and often makes 
decisions on the running of branch and enterprise union organisations. 
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Sanction f o r a l l major action at the d i s t r i c t or branch levels i s 
usually obtained from the top, The Centre usually employs d i s t r i c t 
o f f i c i a l s to maintain close vigilance over local i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . How this i s done we sh a l l see a l i t t l e l a t e r . The 
National Union leaders are very p a r t i c u l a r about the coordination 
and successful operation of a l l the worker cooperatives. These 
cooperatives, as we.saw e a r l i e r , are an important service to the 
membership and workers i n general. Another key r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
the National leaders remain - to ensure mobilisation of workers f o r 
Party d i r e c t i o n and State regulation. I t i s i n t h i s area we s h a l l 
soon see how the branch representatives play t h e i r part. 
The National Centre continues to be run by a group of trusted 
Party stalwarts who are expected to give the Government, i n Goh's 
words, 'the active cooperation of organised labour' . ^ 
Writing more than a decade ago Chalmers had i d e n t i f i e d 
the movement's ' f i r s t control point, not at the branch l e v e l , but 
above the branch' ^  at the level of the d i s t r i c t headquarters. 
The d i s t r i c t o f f i c i a l s are responsible f o r the union's handling of 
grievances. They engage i n negotiations with employers normally to 
ensure that members received State-prescribed rewards, and also represent 
the branch side at a r b i t r a t i o n hearings. The d i s t r i c t headquarters 
follows up on the expanding union membership and sometimes masterminds 
entry i n t o un^unionised workplaces. Through .the branch representatives, 
d i s t r i c t o f f i c i a l s often organise p o l i t i c a l action - generally to 
support Government and Party programmes. These people also select 
suitable local unionists f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n at the National Centre. 
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Indeed, the various d i s t r i c t headquarters are essent i a l l y 
executors of p o l i c i e s and decisions designed at the National Centre. 
They constitute a c r u c i a l control mechanism. 
A c t i v i t i e s at the branch are generally performed under the 
d i r e c t i o n and guidance of the d i s t r i c t headquarters, which then 
communicates results and findings to the National Centre. I t i s not 
unusual f o r the union side to enterprise-level negotiations to include 
a headquarters appointee, who normally leads the team of branch 
o f f i c i a l s . The handling of disputes and grievances by branch 
o f f i c i a l s , i n most cases, i s also done i n close consultation with 
headquarters executives. The branch men, however, play an important 
rol e i n mobilising t h e i r members f o r p o l i t i c a l action. As the branch 
o f f i c i a l s are generally loyal supporters of the Centre's leadership, 
themselves Party stalwarts, they tend t o p a r t i c i p a t e quite a c t i v e l y 
ia-Earty-and.Governmefitcommunity development programmes. One p o l i t i c a l 
event that demonstrates c l e a r l y the extent of t h e i r party involvement 
i s the parliamentary e l e c t i o n , when they are known to get deeply involved 
organising campaigns t o elect members of the r u l i n g Party. Being 
the f i r s t - l i n e l i n k with the working masses, branch o f f i c i a l s are 
a c r u c i a l instrument i n influencing worker opinion towards endorsing 
the r u l i n g Party's programmes. They are made responsible, f o r 
instance, to convince members that the economic circumstances facing 
Singapore c a l l f o r r e s t r a i n t and control i n the labour movement. 
Indeed, the NTUC played a c r u c i a l role i n mobilising i t s members to 
accept the Employment and I n d u s t r i a l Relations (Amendment) Acts of 
1968 which placed stringent l i m i t s on labour's bargaining p o s i t i o n . 
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Workers are also continuously socialised and regulated to support the 
employers' optimisation of resources to a considerable extent, giving 
them u n i l a t e r a l control w i t h i n the enterprise. Thus, p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
at the branch and membership levels i s concerned mainly with mass 
mobilisation f o r ends prescribed by the Centre. 
Based on our analysis we may summarise the movement's structure 
of p a r t i c i p a t i o n as follows:-
(a) National Centre: Decision-making 
(b) Federation headquarters: Execution 
(c) Branch and rank and f i l e : Mobilisation 
Our diagram (Figure IV) i l l u s t r a t e s the NTUC to be what 
Chalmers thought was 'the r e a l i t y of a highly centralised union 
movement1 .^ 
VI . THE NATIONAL TRADE UNION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
We have thus seen how authority has become centralised i n the 
National Centre, run by members of the State's like-minded e l i t e . 
This c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of authority has, as Chalmers put i t , developed 
a movement where 'in some s i g n i f i c a n t degree party and government 
18 
are able to influence union leadership choices and union p o l i c i e s ' . 
The NTUC has thus continued to perform as an important agent of State 
control. 
While the highly centralised nature of the movement does r e f l e c t 
the unitary nature of Singapore's movement, the s i t u a t i o n i s not 
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governed solely by some unitary ideology such as may be seen i n a 
country l i k e the Soviet.Union. A cr u c i a l basis f o r workers and t h e i r 
leaders i n Singapore to leg i t i m i s e centralised State control l i e s i n 
an important exchange. Being strongly socialised i n the wealth-
pursuing ethos, Singapore workers le g i t i m i s e t h e i r mobilisation and 
regulation under State control i n exchange f o r minimum guarantees 
i n economic rewards and labour conditions. Economic incentives and 
f a c i l i t i e s generated by the State and directed to workers through the 
NTUC not only serve to encourage NTUC-affiliated membership, they have 
also become part of that important exchange package. Although there 
are some important parts of Singapore's labour l e g i s l a t i o n that 
favour the employers, certain minimum guarantees f o r workers have been 
w r i t t e n i n t o other parts of the l e g i s l a t i o n . These guarantees are 
realised by the State through i t s intervention i n wage p o l i c i e s and 
regulation through agencies l i k e the Labour Ministr y and the 
A r b i t r a t i o n Court. Some key aspects of worker-supportive l e g i s l a t i o n , 
regulation and intervention by the State and i t s agencies are to be 
discussed i n the JURONG analysis l a t e r . 
Beyond money rewards, one may trace t h i s acceptance of centralised 
State control by workers to the t r a d i t i o n a l dependence by the people 
(including workers) on normative and regulative socio-cultural 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . The impacts of colonization, i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and 
State intervention have a l l reinforced t h i s dependence on regulation 
and control. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONTROL IN TtiE SINGAPORE ENTERPRISE 
Introduction 
This chapter i s divided i n t o four parts. The f i r s t part i s about 
the nature and impact of social control i n JURONG's i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
system, Here we discuss the interactions between the d i f f e r e n t 
parties and the degree and extent of influence that each exerts i n 
the s i t u a t i o n . While the Government exerts strong influence over 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s even at plant l e v e l , the company's management 
and union also have a role i n what we may c a l l 'downward' control over 
the workforce - with the main e n t i t i e s t e l l i n g the employees what to 
do and what i s good f o r them. There appears to be l i t t l e evidence 
of workers having any influence over the parties above them or 
over the rewards, conditions or environment of the work they do. 
The reasons f o r the amenability of the worker to t h i s downward control 
may be explained i n terms of the environmental ( s o c i o - c u l t u r a l , 
economic and p o l i t i c a l ) factors that we have already discussed i n the 
e a r l i e r chapters. 
The picture that one gets from the f i r s t part gives the impression 
of peace and that a l l i s well i n the i n d u s t r i a l relations system. 
I t would indeed be reasonable to say that JURONG enjoys a reasonable 
amount of s t a b i l i t y - judged by the usual c r i t e r i a such as the 
relationship between the major p a r t i e s , presence of overt c o n f l i c t 
or militancy on the shopfloor or a v i s i b l e threat from outside the 
system. One could also reasonably expect that the 
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exis t i n g pattern of control would be able to maintain i t s e l f f o r some 
time t o come - there i s d e f i n i t e l y no evidence of a trend that the 
workers are working towards an uprising to challenge the downward 
control. I n spite of t h i s 'stable' status-quo, however, one cannot 
go on to conclude that there are no problems or p o t e n t i a l sources of 
i n s t a b i l i t y , or that the prev a i l i n g pattern i s working towards 
eliminating such threats to i t s s t a b i l i t y . These problems are 
discussed i n the second part. 
Following the diagnosis i n the second pa r t , the t h i r d part 
proposes some motivational approaches to promote s t a b i l i t y and higher 
labour p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
I n the f i n a l part we stress the need to balance i n d u s t r i a l 
relations r e s p o n s i b i l i t y between l i n e and personnel management. The 
exi s t i n g system concentrates a l l shopfloor i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the personnel department. We recommend passing 
back substantial r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to l i n e managers f o r more e f f e c t i v e 
control over t h e i r operations. Here we also discuss the long-term 
implications f o r JURONG of the 'job-enrichment', 'worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' 
' i n d u s t r i a l democracy' movements which are growing ra p i d l y i n the 
developed economies. We recommend adopting the job-involvement 
scheme as part of a pr o d u c t i v i t y improvement programme, which would 
lead t o an overall increase i n influence and control i n the 
organisation. Although management may s a c r i f i c e control over some 
workplace decisions, i t would i n comparison, be able to gain much 
more control over the workplace s i t u a t i o n and worker performance. 
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I . Part A SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE SYSTEM 
The f i r s t step i n our investigation of the nature of social 
control i n JURONG was to i d e n t i f y the key people who par t i c i p a t e d i n 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s decisions. The main actors i n the system were: 
labour, management and the personnel department. 
The permanent employees at JURONG number approximately two 
thousand, of whom about ninety percent are union members. One 
important method of recruitment i n t o the union takes place through 
primary groups or friendship cliques. Organised on a 'house' basis 
they form a branch of the Pioneer Industries Employees' Union which 
i s a f f i l i a t e d to Singapore's National TUC. The branch committee, 
elected by di r e c t elections every two years,is composed of three key 
o f f i c i a l s (Chairman, Secretary, Assistant Secretary) who are relieved 
of much of t h e i r work i n the yard to enable them perform union duties. 
The branch Secretary concurrently holds the po s i t i o n of I n d u s t r i a l 
Relations O f f i c e r of the Pioneer Industries Union headquarters. 
Being a d i r e c t or f u l l - t i m e representative of the d i s t r i c t headquarters, 
he wields considerable influence over the branch committee members 
including the Chairman. He i s therefore the main actor on the 
union side. Apart from leading the. branch committee at the c o l l e c t i v e 
bargaining table and other important discussions with the management 
he i s also responsible f o r ensuring regular feedback to the d i s t r i c t 
headquarters. This feedback r o l e i s also supplemented by the Branch 
Chairman and Assistant Secretary. 
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On the management side i t i s pertinent to note that the 
company's Managing Director i s well regarded w i t h i n the r u l i n g Party 
and labour c i r c l e s . This special influence has indeed helped to 
evoke substantial compliance from the branch union leaders. 
Very much involved i n the administration of regulations, 
procedures and agreements, JURONG's personnel department i s mainly 
responsible f o r laying the groundwork f o r c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. 
Following an i n v i t a t i o n to negotiate on i n d u s t r i a l matters f o r 
c o l l e c t i v e agreement, the Personnel executives and the branch union 
committee, normally hold i n i t i a l rounds of o f f i c i a l t a l ks and 
u n o f f i c i a l discussions i n order to conclude on issues that hold 
reasonable chance of consensus. Issues that remain outstanding are 
usually taken back to t h e i r respective bosses f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n , or 
fo r renewed mandate, as the case may be. There are.,however.,somet.imes 
d i f f i c u l t issues. In such s i t u a t i o n s , which are infrequent, the 
personnel department tends to r e l y on the influence of the 
Managing Director over the union o f f i c i a l s . Such issues are usually 
s e t t l e d between J i s t r i c t o f f i c i a l ' and the Managing Director. The personnel 
department appears quite happy with t h i s mechanism as i t sometimes 
removes teething problems from t h e i r o f f i c e s . While such d i f f i c u l t 
s ituations are not common, the personnel department has, over the years, 
successfully developed an i n t e r e s t i n g rapport with the unionists and 
the workers, remaining essentially as representatives of the management. 
We sh a l l l a t e r see how, with the co-operation of t h e . o f f i c i a l s , the 
personnel department has contributed to the management's u n i l a t e r a l 
control w i t h i n the enterprise. 
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THE SYSTEM'S UNITARY IDEOLOGY 
In our investigation at JURONG Shipyard, we wished to inquire 
i n t o the nature and basis of control exerted by the management, union 
and State over enterprise i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . We also wished to 
study the general disposition that the JURONG workers had to the 
various forms of social control. 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of JURONG that s t r i k e s the 
outside observer i s the unitary ideology that pervades i n d u s t r i a l 
relations i n s t i t u t i o n s . Indeed, Singapore's i n d u s t r i a l peace and 
s t a b i l i t y i n much of the l a s t decade and a h a l f can be a t t r i b u t e d to 
the general consensus about the 'rules (both formal and informal) of 
the game1 . There are two main elements to t h i s unitary ideology. 
The f i r s t concerns the nature of control w i t h i n the enterprise. 
There i s a general commitment to the employer's u n i l a t e r a l control over 
the organisation of resources and structure w i t h i n the enterprise. 
This may be a t t r i b u t e d to the wealth-pursuing ethos and i t s widespread 
acceptance i n Singapore. There i s l i t t l e opposition to t h i s ethos 
from the febour organisation and therefore one may say that they do not 
challenge management's u n i l a t e r a l control over organisation structure 
and resources i n p r i n c i p l e . 
. r 
The second concerns the nature of control from outside the 
enterprise, by the operations of the State. Workers accept . 
soc i a l i s a t i o n by the State's leadership (which includes the trade union 
e l i t e ) to co-operate with the employer's optimisation of resources, 
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i n return, f o r increasing money rewards. The State determines planned 
increases - to improve the workers' l o t , at the same time c o n t r o l l i n g 
the cost to employers of such rewards. 
For the State leadership, the self-evident record of economic 
performance achieved by i t s Government, with the help of the National 
Union, has been an e f f e c t i v e way of gaining the workers' confidence. 
This sustained record has indeed enabled the Government to underwrite 
a guarantee to increase money rewards f o r the workers from whom, i n 
return, i s expected an enthusiastic response to the leadership's 
c a l l f o r co-operation with management. This s o c i a l i s a t i o n by the 
State leadership takes place not only through trade union programmes 
and the mass media, but has also entered the curriculum of young 
high school students. The workers' desire f o r increasing money 
rewards may be seen as an essential part of the wealth-pursuing ethos. 
Their acceptance of State intervention i s influenced i n important 
respects by pressures of economic and political"circumstances. 
Further, workers have been .socialised to develop a dependence 
on a unitary labour movement, under the auspices of the Government. 
Workers thus organised are more d i r e c t l y controlled by the State. 
Their enthusiastic response at election campaigns supporting the 
r u l i n g Party i s indeed clear evidence of the r o l e played by the local 
branches of the NTUC i n mobilising them f o r Government-backed p o l i t i c a l 
programmes. 
Workers have been motivated to j o i n a highly centralised labour 
movement through incentives and f a c i l i t i e s provided by the State. 
-134-
While on a national scale the NTUC i s f a s t expanding i n membership 
(currently holding about 30% of the t o t a l labour f o r c e ) , i t s a f f i l i a t e 
at JURONG holds approximately 90% of 2,000 e l i g i b l e workers. The 
National Union thereby becomes an important agent of State control: 
socialising, and regulating workers, cn the one hand, to safeguard 
management's u n i l a t e r a l control w i t h i n the enterprise, and ensuring 
at the work place, on the other hand, that workers actually receive 
State-prescribed rewards and conditions from t h e i r employers. 
Local unions and employers accept the ro l e of the State i n 
maintaining a balance between the interests, of workers, owners and 
the public. Both sides accept State control maintained through 
l e g i s l a t i o n , i t s regulative agencies l i k e the Labour Ministry and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the National Wages Council, and the i n d u s t r i a l 
A r b i t r a t i o n Court. 
Legislation concedes u n i l a t e r a l control of the enterprise 
structure and resources to the employer, while i t also stipulates 
minimum labour conditions f o r workers. In addition to l e g i s l a t i o n , 
State agencies and i n s t i t u t i o n s further assume substantial regulative 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r industry. Apart from determining the quantum of 
ex t r i n s i c rewards fo r workers, they also prescribe procedural rules 
fo r negotiation, grievances and a r b i t r a t i o n . By so doing, they 
decide who may control what. 
The analysis that follows w i l l trace the operational 
significance of each of these ideological constraints as they determine 
the pattern of i n d u s t r i a l relations at JURONG. We begin therefore 
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with the f i r s t element of the unitary ideology - the management's 
u n i l a t e r a l control w i t h i n the enterprise. 
SUPPORT FOR MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
In a recent study''on Singapore's shipyard workers, i t was found 
that they considered four issues more important than others. These 
were earnings., promotion, t r a i n i n g and the kind of mates i n a working 
group. Whilst the f i r s t three can be a t t r i b u t e d to the wealth-pursuing 
ethos prevalent i n Singapore, the fourth issue concerning workmates 
has much to do with technology. The technology of shipbuilding and 
repairing requires group-work, so the workers perceived the kind of 
workmates as c r u c i a l , but f o r c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l reasons the 
workers have never experienced the sectional interests which give 
B r i t i s h shipbuilding i n d u s t r i a l relations t h e i r classic pattern of 
c o n f l i c t . 
While issues l i k e earnings, promotion, t r a i n i n g and 'workmates' 
were important to the JURONG workers, they seemed to perceive that 
they had l i t t l e or no role i n the i n d u s t r i a l relations decision-making 
process - even over these issues. In f a c t , i n the informal discussions 
(usually a f t e r work) with a number of shopfloor workers, responses 
were sought f o r a wide range of issues: 
- • j 
(a) Pay and bonuses 
(b) Promotion procedure 
(c) Transfer of workers 
(d) Training programmes 
(e) Safety matters 
( f ) Discipline 
(g) Fixing work standards and pace of work 
(h) Recruitment of new workers 
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( i ) Financial policy matters 
(j) Access to 'confidential' information 
The general view expressed by the workers was that a l l these 
issues were f o r the 'upper levels' t o decide. 'Upper levels' to 
them were the management, union o f f i c i a l s , the NTUC and State agencies 
l i k e the National Wages Council. The workers were aware that 
questions about, wages and wage increases were decided by the National 
Wages Council (NWC). Some of the employees who f e l t the company 
could afford to give wage increases i n excess of the NWC recommendations 
f e l t t h e i r union o f f i c i a l s would not support such an idea. The 
union o f f i c i a l s would discourage asking f o r better pay terms on the 
ground that i t wouid disturb the norm that the national leaders (of 
Government, unions and management) were t r y i n g to create. Such 
action, they were t o l d , was not i n the long-term i n t e r e s t of i n d u s t r i a l 
progress. Besides the NWC recommendations were decided with the 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the top NTUC leaders whose decisions they f e l t should 
be followed; they knew what was best i n the interests of Singapore's 
workers. 
Workers were continually socialised and educated by the system 
that better economic rewards could be earned only by supporting 
management i r i generating better p r o f i t s . "The State and the NTUC have been 
important agents i n so c i a l i s i n g workers towards higher p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
Recently, the JURONG employees were exhorted both by management 
(especially the personnel department) and union to give away t h e i r 
customary tea breaks i n what the company said was an e f f o r t to 
improve e f f i c i e n c y . The employees were each given a tea-flask so 
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that they could consume the drink at the workplace. This was to 
save labour time on mass work stoppages that used to be incurred at 
each tea/coffee break. While some of the interviewees f e l t 
resentment at t h i s move, a l l of them f e l t compelled t o accept the 
decision supported by the leaders and 'upper levels*. There was 
d e f i n i t e l y no open reaction to the decision which was announced by 
the Personnel department i n a c i r c u l a r to the employees. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t , i n the process of mobilising 
employees towards supporting NTUC's guidelines to co-operate with 
management's optimisation of resources, the local branch o f f i c i a l s 
also assisted management i n discouraging concern amongst shopfloor 
workers over questions r e l a t i n g to sharing control. The JURONG 
employees were aware that Management had legal sanction to solely 
handle most of the issues cited to them - f i n a n c i a l information and 
po l i c y , work standards and schedules, recruitment, t r a i n i n g , 
promotion, transfer and discipline.. When asked whether they had 
or would wish to have influence over matters l i k e recruitment, work 
schedules, s t a r t i n g and f i n i s h i n g times, rest periods, introduction 
of new equipment or technology, the content of work and job security, 
the general reply was that they perceived no ro l e i n these matters. 
These were purely f o r the 'upper levels'. Following t h i s 
negative response to the question concerning control over the job, 
the researcher pressed on to seek a response on the issues which they 
themselves f e l t more d i r e c t l y concerned about - promotion, t r a i n i n g 
and the kind of workmates. Although these factors were important 
to them, they saw neither the opportunity nor the legitimacy to 
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to raise questions about these issues with t h e i r superiors or the 
personnel o f f i c e r . While management exercised t h e i r prerogative 
i n these issues matters without allowing any intervention, union 
o f f i c i a l s were often said to emphasise to the workers that the law 
enshrining the employer's r i g h t s over these areas was essential to 
encourage investment - pertinent f o r the workers' and the nation's 
s u r v i v a l . As f a r as the employees were concerned, they were not • 
supposed to question the law or the authority of the 'upper levels'. 
This could be a t t r i b u t e d to the amenability of Singapore 
workers to control w i t h i n and without the enterprise. Regulation 
often determined t h e i r l i f e and work styles. While t h i s t r a i t may 
be a t t r i b u t e d to the pressures of economic and p o l i t i c a l circumstances 
facing the people, i t has, i n important ways, also evolved from the 
peoples' t r a d i t i o n a l dependence on regulative socio-cultural 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . Workers at JURONG, whether as individuals or even as 
work groups, general exerted l i t t l e influence over the making or 
administration of rules and procedures i n the enterprise. 
Although workers were socialised to support management, arid 
wielded l i t t l e influence over i t s decisions, they were not without 
grievances. Where a grievance was minor the workers had been 
advised to consult t h e i r union representatives, group supervisors 
and the personnel department. Grievances, however, were generally 
s e t t l e d with the d i r e c t involvement of a personnel o f f i c e r . The 
more d i f f i c u l t grievances were also communicated by union 
representatives to the f u l l - t i m e union o f f i c i a l . I f the grievances 
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were thought to be serious the f u l l - t i m e o f f i c i a l then took i t up 
with the personnel department. On most occassions the union was 
able to convince personnel that a p a r t i c u l a r department had been 
grossly u n f a i r i n i t s treatment of a certain worker or group. Action 
was then taken t o ensure that the error, often a t t r i b u t e d to a foreman 
or supervisor, was quickly pointed out and a caution issued. The 
union o f f i c i a l , i n r e t u r n , promises e f f i c i e n t regulation of the 
workforce. The following example i l l u s t r a t e s the point. 
I n the fourteen years of existence, there has only been one 
major dispute i n the company: a company-wide overtime boycott 
that lasted eight days. A diary of t h i s dispute i s presented i n 
Appendix No. l . A foreman was eventually found g u i l t y of provoking 
discontent by a l l o c a t i n g overtime work to subcontract workers, w h i l s t 
his own men were available f o r assignment. Following discussions 
between the f u l l - t i m e union o f f i c i a l and personnel, the company 
apologised on behalf of the foreman f o r his 'unfairness and lack 
of sophistication*. The foreman was suspended f o r three days and 
the union called o f f the boycott.' Work then returned to normal. 
Workers i n JURONG generally enjoy a reasonably good working 
relatio n s h i p with t h e i r personnel o f f i c e r s . Observation showed 
that on a number of occasions workers went s t r a i g h t to Personnel, 
even bypassing t h e i r union representatives. While t h i s may be 
explained by the general lack cf education and experience i n 
shopstewardship on the part of union representatives, i t does seem 
that workers have more confidence i n the judgement of personnel 
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•officers. This close relatio n s h i p has been f u r t h e r enhanced by the 
personnel department's 'open-door' poli c y . Indeed the personnel 
function i s an important mediating and accommodative mechanism. I t 
has helped t o s t i f l e the p o s s i b i l i t y of any challenge t o management's 
authority. The f u l l - t i m e union o f f i c i a l , together with his loyal 
branch representatives, helpsimanagement regulate workers i n the 
more d i f f i c u l t circumstances. 
Thus we see how workers at JURONG are socialised and regulated 
t o support the management's u n i l a t e r a l control over the organisation's 
structure and resources. This s o c i a l i s a t i o n , both by Personnel and 
the union has reinforced the employer-revering aspect of the wealth-
pursuing ethos. 
We now turn t o some formal rules and procedures, governing.the 
enterprise's union-management r e l a t i o n s . We sh a l l soon see that these 
are, t o a large extent, determined by the effects of State c o n t r o l . 
This i s our second element of the system's unitary ideology. 
STATE CONTROL IN ENTERPRISE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
' The c o l l e c t i v e agreeiuen? at JURONG, as i n other companies i n 
Singapore, i s a formal document that l e g a l l y binds the management 
and Union. Ai i n most firms, JURONG1s union side i s composed o f 
o f f i c i a l s from the branch, d i s t r i c t and national centres. The 
influence deriving from the enhanced po s i t i o n of the national centre 
i s thus brought to bear upon negotiations with the JURONG executive. 
The c o l l e c t i v e agreement covers earnings and the conditions of 
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service. The agreement formalises the payment of wages, allowances, 
bonuses and increments. I t also stipulates general conditions of 
service l i k e times of work, s h i f t schedules, and some special work 
situations l i k e s e a - t r i a l s f o r repaired ships, and repairing vessels 
anchored out at sea, etc. 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND LEGISLATION 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that a l l decision areas i n the agreement 
are subjects of State l e g i s l a t i o n and regulation. The t r i p a r t i t e 
National Wages Council (NWC), a government-dominated organisation, 
makes annual wage-increment and bonus recommendations which have 
s t a t u t o r y - l i k e authority. However, an employer i s compelled t o 
consider the recommendation only i f he i s confronted by a union representing 
his employees. Thus i t becomes a matter f o r 'negotiation 1. The 
agreements reached at JURONG on wages and bonuses have so f a r 
refl e c t e d the NWC's recommendations. Thus, while the NWC regulates 
the quantum of earnings, the NTUC ensures that workers get the 
recommended amounts. t 
The minimum conditions of service, on the other hand, are 
7 
cle a r l y recorded i n the Employment," Central Provident Fund and 
Workmen's Compensation Acts. These cover issues l i k e the contract 
of service, rest days, hours of work, leave,retrenchment benefits 
and social security provisions. Since the JURONG management i s 
not one of those young employers (who thereby enjoy l e g i s l a t i v e p r o t e c t i o n ) , 
the union i s l e g a l l y free to negotiate f o r better terms. These are 
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then confirmed i n the c o l l e c t i v e agreement. However, j u s t as the 
NWC regulates the quantum of earnings, the State, through NTUC -
con t r o l , regulates the workforce to accept a level of terms and 
conditions which does not become 'too expensive 1 f o r the employer. 
Nevertheless, while employers are expected t c meet a 'reasonable* 
lev e l ,'high'. levels are not normally encouraged because of the 
anomalous expectations they could create i n both the p r i v a t e and 
public sectors of the economy. 
We have seen i n our analysis the special ro l e of the National 
Union w i t h i n and without the enterprise. The highly centralised 
national trade union movement i s clear evidence of workers being 
socialised and regulated i n unitary s t y l e . This unitary nature of • 
worker organisation i n Singapore i s indeed an important feature of 
State co n t r o l . Workers have been motivated to j o i n the NTUC by 
economic benefits that are generated through State-financed trade 
union co-operatives. These benefits f o r workers are generated outside 
the workplace. The State also gives the NTUC special advantages 
through discretionary judgements made by i t s agencies. In addition, 
the NTUC i s encouraged to take on a national r o l e with a power status 
much enhanced by the active support of the Government leadership. 
I t does, indeed, have many characteristics of a State i n s t i t u t i o n 
and plays an important part i n State control. By organising the 
JURONG workers i n t o an NTUC-affiliate the Government ensures that 
they are socialised and regulated to accept the management's u n i l a t e r a l 
control over enterprise structure and resources. At the same time i t 
i s through the NTUC that the Government checks that workers receive 
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State-prescribed rewards and conditions. 
Whilst e a r l i e r we saw that JURONG's workers exerted l i t t l e 
influence over much of the decision-making w i t h i n the enterprise^ 
we have also noted that matters of formal agreement between 
management and union are r e s t r i c t e d to the more e x t r i n s i c rewards 
f o r work. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the law forbids negotiation 
or even a r b i t r a t i o n on any issue concerning the employer's organisation 
of work or resources. While i n the rare instance of 'unfair dismissal' 
the case may technically be brought before the Minister, t h i s mechanism 
has never been necessary with most companies, including JURONG. 
Issues r e l a t i n g to i n t r i n s i c rewards ref l e c t e d i n t r a i n i n g , 
promotion, transfer or al l o c a t i o n of work are also defined as matters 
of management prerogative. In JURONG, procedural and substantive 
rules covering most of these matters are stipulated i n a highly 
confidential management po l i c y manual^ I t continues to be a book 
of rules u n i l a t e r a l l y determined by the management. 
The ideology of management's u n i l a t e r a l control w i t h i n the 
enterprise has indeed been enshrined i n Singapore's l e g i s l a t i o n . 
Although informal discussions between union and them anagement of 
JURONG may continue on matters r e l a t i n g to promotion, transfer and 
the a l l o c a t i o n of work, the f i n a l decisions always rest with 
management. 
Whilst conceding u n i l a t e r a l control w i t h i n the enterprise to 
m-.magement, state l e g i s l a t i o n , on the other hand, stipulates minimum 
working conditions f o r workers. This i s i n addition to the 
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e x t r i n s i c rewards f o r workers arranged by the State. The minimum 
conditions of work stipulated i n the Employment and Factories Acts 
covers issues l i k e employment of children, health, accommodation and 
safety. The most c r u c i a l of these with respect to JURONG i s safety. 
Having experienced two major accidents i n JURONG over the l a s t 
f i v e years, the Government has pushed f o r elaborate safety organisation 
and procedures i n the yard. The management i s responsible f o r a 
Safety Council through which workers' f i r s t hand observations on 
safety are to be given due consideration. Safety precautions are 
then administered i n the workplaces through a mandatory team of 
safety o f f i c e r s and technicians. More important i n t h i s context, 
however, i s the r o l e of the State. The Government's Labour 
Inspectorate conducts periodic checks to ensure that conditions of 
work i n the yard comply with established standards. The State has 
f u r t h e r arranged, through the NTUC, f o r the deployment of the union's 
safety inspectors. Together with the Labour Inspectorate they 
constitute an important arm of State control over safety procedures 
i n the enterprise. 
The State also determines key procedures governing enterprise 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . These procedural rules cover negotiations, 
grievances, c o n c i l i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n , and are enumerated i n the 
I n d u s t r i a l Relations Actf 
PROCEDURES AND THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 
Both the management and union e n t i t i e s i n JURONG adhere closely 
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t o the negotiation procedure contained i n the Act. I t begins with 
an i n v i t a t i o n to negotiate by one party, and i s followed, w i t h i n a 
specified period, by an acceptance of the i n v i t a t i o n by the other. 
Non-acceptance of an i n v i t a t i o n can lead to a dispute, which then 
becomes subject to c o n c i l i a t i o n and/or a r b i t r a t i o n . This has, however, 
not been a problem at JURONG. Once an i n v i t a t i o n i s accepted, a 
series of meetings are then held between the e n t i t i e s ' representatives. 
I t i s possible that because issues considered at negotiations are 
r e s t r i c t e d to e x t r i n s i c rewards f o r workers and the NTUC-union 
believes i n moderate demands, the bargaining process does not usually 
take very long. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the union and 
management i n JURONG have shown t h e i r commitment t o co-operation f u r t h e r 
by w r i t i n g i n t o t h e i r agreement the terms of such a rela t i o n s h i p . 
The .agreement's co-operation clause appears i n Appendix No. 5. 
Both parties are agreed on mutual consultation.and negotiation on 
matters r e l a t i n g to the terms of the agreement ( i . e . issues r e l a t i n g 
only to e x t r i n s i c rewards and conditions). These consultations are 
carried on both i n a formal and informal basis. Consultations, 
i f any, on, matters l i k e promotion, transfer, a l l o c a t i o n of work and 
dismissal are usually informal. 
An important part of the negotiation procedure, however, l i e s 
at i t s conclusion. A memorandum of the terms of any c o l l e c t i v e 
agreement has to be submitted f o r examination and legal endorsement 
by the I n d u s t r i a l A r b i t r a t i o n Court. Besides assessing the p a r t i e s ' 
decisions concerning rewards, the Court ensures that t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e 
agreement makes provision for a procedure to s e t t l e disputes. This 
i s the enterprise -le v e l grievance procedure. (See Appendix No. 6). 
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The aim of t h i s procedure i s to enable the company and union to 
dispose of any grievance or complaint from employees at the lowest 
possible l e v e l . The procedure contains the steps of grievance handling 
the lowest beginning at the group level and progressively moving 
towards discussions between personnel.department and the d i s t r i c t 
. 4iion. Based on the researcher's observations and evidence documented 
i n e a r l i e r studies, t h i s procedure was seldom adhered t o . I n minor 
grievances, workers often bypassed t h e i r union representatives f o r 
more e f f e c t i v e treatment from Personnel. Major grievances, are 
often brought up to Personnel - d i s t r i c t union l e v e l . 
The r o l e of JURONG's personnel department i n conjunction with 
the d i s t r i c t union has created what appears to be a convenient 
mechanism to regulate workers* routine grievances. This has dulled 
the operational significance of the 'legal' grievance procedure. 
However> on one occasion, when the company's workers went on the 
overtime boycott, the Government's co n c i l i a t o r s came i n t o the p i c t u r e . 
Although sometimes they may not take an active r o l e i n the de t a i l s of 
a dispute, as i n the JURONG case, t h e i r very presence i n the s i t u a t i o n 
urges the parties to speedier settlement. The legislated c o n c i l i a t i o n 
procedure becomes important where major grievances are l i k e l y to 
develop i n t o disputes. The law ensures that the State's c o n c i l i a t i o n 
agency has control over a l l such si t u a t i o n s . 
Another important device used by the State t o control disputes, 
especially those which behold a threat of severe i n d u s t r i a l action, 
i s compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n . Where the p a r t i e s , f o r some reason or 
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other, do not j o i n t l y submit t h e i r dispute to a r b i t r a t i o n , the law 
provides that the Minister or State's President may, i f necessary, 
re f e r the dispute f o r compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n . . The legal provision 
that forbids i n d u s t r i a l action when the Court has congnisance of such 
a dispute then blunts the threat of any severe action. Peaceful 
a r b i t r a t i o n thereby replaces i n d u s t r i a l action as the 'last resort' 
i n anystrade dispute. The pressures of compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n , 
however, have not been pertinent i n the JURONG case, since the parties 
have so f a r not been confronted with the need to go to court (except 
t o r e g i s t e r t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e agreements). Nevertheless, compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n i l l u s t r a t e s the p o t e n t i s l of state control f o r the 
s t a b i l i t y of t h e i r relationship. 
In comparison with the United States of America, another 
capital-pursuing society, i n Singapore the State takes on a very 
substantial regulative r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r industry. Through l e g i s l a t i o n , 
Government agencies (Labour Ministry) and i n s t i t u t i o n s (NWC, IAC, 
NTUC) the State decides who may control what. Three factors s t r i k e 
us as having f a c i l i t a t e d t h i s high degree of State control. The 
f i r s t i s the country's r e l a t i v e l y small size. Secondly, the legal 
p o s i t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e agreements, minimum labour standards and 
i n d u s t r i a l relations procedures. And t h i r d l y , the role assigned 
to national bodies l i k e the NWC and NTUC by the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
system. 
SUMMARY 
To summarise, i n t h i s part of the chapter we have seen u n i l a t e r a l 
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control by .management over personnel a f f a i r s (subject to State 
provisions). There i s a degree of j o i n t management-union control 
on substantive issues. There i s also shared control between State 
and the enterprise on the decisions of management i t s e l f . At t h i s 
l e v e l of i n t e r a c t i o n , we see i n Singapore a substantial measure of 
co-operation between the major e n t i t i e s and the r e l a t i v e absence of 
overt c o n f l i c t points to the s t a b i l i t y i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . But, 
f o r h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l reasons we see a very d i f f e r e n t , almost 
opposite, picture i n the B r i t i s h shipbuilding-repairing industry. 
The Commission of I n d u s t r i a l Relations reporting i n 1971 aptly 
describes the B r i t i s h s i t u a t i o n : 
"The extent of independent control 
probably appears less from inside 
the industry than from without. 
Management would assert that i t i s 
managing the work of the yard and 
the workforce i n i t . Yet, as 
we have shown, many decisions about 
recruitment, demarcation, manning, the 
hours actually worked, overtime and 
so on are actually made independently 
by the union or the work groups 
At the same time management takes 
decisions independently on matters 
which i t believes comes e n t i r e l y 
w i t h i n i t s own competence. But when 
these decisions affe c t t h e i r employees, 
as i n f o r example, a rearrangement of 
work or a d i s c i p l i n a r y action, they 
cannot prevent t h e i r employees showing 
t h e i r displeasure and perhaps facing 
a change of decision".7 
Below the level of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n between the 
a u t h o r i t i e s , we have been interested i n the disposition of the 
workers towards the issues of job control. Our investigation 
c l e a r l y showed that the JURONG workers had l i t t l e influence on job 
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contrpl issues, indeed they exhibited none of the control consciousness 
that i s found prevalent i n the working communities of i n d u s t r i a l i s e d 
societies i n the Western hemisphere. With the socio-economic and 
p o l i t i c a l mechanisms at t h e i r disposal, the Singapore aut h o r i t i e s -
Management, the State and NTUC, have act i v e l y worked towards 
i n h i b i t i n g consciousness i n job control. 
The JURONG case c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s the unitary ideology that 
pervades the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system. The amenability of 
workers to control by the authorites - management, State and union 
may be a t t r i b u t e d to factors we discussed i n our e a r l i e r chapters: 
(a) process of State intervention and 
the highly centralised labour 
movement; 
(b) pressures of economic and p o l i t i c a l 
circumstances facing the people; and 
(c) the people's t r a d i t i o n a l dependence 
on socio-cultural i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
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I I Part B WHITHER INDUSTRIAL PEACE? A DIAGNOSIS OF THE PROBLEMS 
AT JURONG 
Based on the discussion of the findings reported i n the f i r s t 
part of t h i s chapter, one would easily form the opinion that the 
Singapore system'of i n d u s t r i a l relations enjoys a high degree of 
peace. Going by the conventional yardsticks we may say that i t 
does, since i t enjoys an absence of overt c o n f l i c t and shopfloor . 
militancy that i s hard t o f i n d i n most parts of the i n d u s t r i a l 
world. 
Peace i n i n d u s t r i a l relations means a number of things to the 
i n d u s t r i a l organisation. F i r s t of a l l i t implies that i n d u s t r i a l 
relations can be taken to be under control and predictable i n i t s 
f i n a n c i a l p o l icy and investment planning. Secondly, i t means the 
organisation could safely accept feasible contracts and expect t o 
f u l f i l l them with reward. Th i r d l y , i n d u s t r i a l peace implies that 
the organisation would be able to respond to changes, say i n the 
marketing or technological requirements, without the undue r i s k of 
work stoppages. Peaceful i n d u s t r i a l relations also suggests a 
climate that one would associate with high p r o d u c t i v i t y , and f i n a l l y , 
one would expect a high degree of s t a b i l i t y i n the organisation's 
i 
labour force. - 4 * 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to the outside observer to discover at 
JURONG that while peace i n the Singapore system provided most of 
the conditions essential f o r the company to make p r o f i t , there were 
certain conditions at the yard one would not associate with a high 
degree of peace. We were struck i n two areas - one was labour 
f 
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p r o d u c t i v i t y and the other was the s t a b i l i t y of the workforce. From 
the i n d u s t r i a l relations point of view, these two areas are p r i m a r i l y 
related to shopfloor attitudes and relations, and operational management. 
So we asked ourselves i f there was some other side t o the broad 
scenario of i n d u s t r i a l peace that emerged i n the Singapore case. 
Looking c a r e f u l l y at the Singapore system we were able to perceive 
that i n t e r a c t i o n between the major e n t i t i e s at the i n s t i t u t i o n a l level 
was quite d i s t i n c t from the processes at the operational and shopfloor 
levels. Clearly, as the findings reported i n the e a r l i e r part of the 
chapter show, i t was at the level of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n where 
we saw cooperation and s t a b i l i t y , which has created a positio n that 
gives the overall appearance of a high degree of peace and harmony. 
In t h i s part of the chapter we would l i k e to look more closely 
at the nature of i n d u s t r i a l relations at the shopfloor and 
operational levels. I n the e a r l i e r part we said that the JURONG 
workpeople had none of the kind of job control that t h e i r counterparts 
i n the Western i n d u s t r i a l societies were enjoying. We also said that 
consciousness i n job control was i n h i b i t e d by the major e n t i t i e s i n 
the system, and the workers were generally made to fe e l that i t was 
not r i g h t f o r them to question authority. The success reflected i n 
the absence of shopfloor militancy c l e a r l y demonstrates the effectiveness 
of the mechanisms - s o c i a l , economic, p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l , used to 
control the behaviour of the workers. The question that remains i s : 
how ef f e c t i v e was that control? While the mechanisms have been 
eff e c t i v e i n i n h i b i t i n g job control consciousness for the time being, 
the findings to be revealed i n the rest of t h i s part point to 
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ineffectiveness i n the areas of labour p r o d u c t i v i t y and s t a b i l i t y of 
the workforce. Both these factors are cr u c i a l objectives f o r long-term 
survival of the organisation. Let us now proceed to uncover the 
problems and the implications at the shopfloor and operational levels of 
the enterprise. This we may say i s the. less stable side of the 
Singapore system. 
PROBLEMS ON THE SHOPFLOQR 
The most conspicuous source of unrest i n JURONG's i n d u s t r i a l 
relations system emerges from the shopfloor - i n the relationship between 
f i r s t l i n e supervisors and t h e i r subordinates. 
While there was d e f i n i t e l y no threat of an uprising on the 
shopfloor, we did speak of overt employee grievances i n Part A • 
These were the grievances that were processed by the personnel department 
which were generally a t t r i b u t e d to the foremen's inadequacy or 'lack 
of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . 1 The shipyard's foremen, the organisation's f i r s t -
l i n e supervisors did frequently have problems with t h e i r subordinates. 
Workers saw the foremen simply as 'pushers' who continuously 'pushed' 
them around at work without any regard f o r t h e i r welfare or well-being. 
As leaders, they f e l t , the foremen should show some concern about t h e i r 
problems and d i f f i c u l t i e s . Often problems arose because c f the 
foremen's ignorance about some benefit Ce-g. special leaves, allowances 
for special work) accruable to t h e i r subordinates, which were contained 
i n the c o l l e c t i v e agreement. There were j u s t as many problems ar i s i n g 
from the way a foreman issued instructions or challenged the work 
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q u a l i t y of a q u a l i f i e d craftsman. Sometimes he was also perceived as 
showing favouritism to some i n d i v i d u a l , especially some new member of 
the group. Generally, the foreman-rsubordinate relationship was low 
i n understanding, t r u s t and i n t e g r i t y . I t has been quite antagonistic. 
These problems have a number of implications. The supervisors 
were not equipped to f i l l the leadership r o l e . They also lacked 
••'?'< 
o r i e n t a t i o n i n the handling of shopfloor i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s as they 
showed ignorance of the standards evolved between management and .union. 
These factors have resulted i n a shopfloor s i t u a t i o n which cannot be 
described as completely stable. Besides, they have also contributed 
to ineffectiveness i n the foreman's production control function. Often 
workers had to be persuaded by company executives (technical o f f i c e r s ) 
to complete schedules. As a r e s u l t of lacking a social or i n d u s t r i a l 
relations perspective, these supervisors have had t h e i r technical or 
production-oriented functions impeded as w e l l . 
Another major problem on the shopfloor was w o r k - r e s t r i c t i v e 
practices. A number of workers admitted and defended r e s t r i c t i v e 
practices l i k e slowing down in. the night s h i f t , not paying too much 
attention to q u a l i t y and,when opportunities were available ( l i k e 
when the foreman was attending to some other job), they played cards 
and some even took turns to sleep. Other popular t r i c k s were to 
report 'sick' or give some excuse to be away from the workplace. Apart 
from being 'fed-up' with t h e i r foremen, these workers defended t h e i r 
actions on the ground that hard and good work was seldom recognised or 
appreciated. 
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I t i s not possible at t h i s stage, however, to conclude that these 
revelations are representative of a majority or.even a substantial 
proportion of employees. While not a major trend, these tendencies 
do indicate strongly unproductive a t t i t u d e s . What i s important here 
i s that l i t t l e action seemed to have been taken to check these practices 
or the a t t i t u d e s . Left unattended, such practices have good ground 
to grow, and i n the place of productive a c t i v i t y unproductive practices 
could grow to become the norm. 
THE EXISTING CONTROL PATTERN 
Let us now take a look at the management's response to the 
problems. A l l that we saw was a system that dealt only with overt " 
grievances. The exis t i n g control system may more appropriately be 
called a grievance handling system. But shopfloor i n d u s t r i a l 
relations at JURONG, as we have seen, i s much more than overt grievances. 
Given on the next page i s a p i c t o r i a l representation (figure V) of the 
exi s t i n g grievance handling system. 
Having i d e n t i f i e d the essential weakness of the e x i s t i n g control 
system - that i t i s confined only to dealing with overt grievances, l e t 
us see how these were handled. As i s obvious from the diagram there 
was heavy reliance on the personnel department to deal with a l l 
grievances, both big and small. Although the management believed, 
as noted from statements i n the c o l l e c t i v e agreement's 'grievance 
procedure' i n s e t t l i n g problems at the lowest possible levels (between 
supervisor and subordinate), l i t t l e seemed to have been done or 
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simply to bypass the supervisors, allowing the deficiencies of t h e i r 
supervisory function to p e r s i s t . Allowing the foreman-subordinate 
antagonism to f l o u r i s h , however, could only lead to more determined 
orchestration by the workers of t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n , r e s u l t i n g i n more 
deliberate r e s t r i c t i o n of output. 
There are other features about the e x i s t i n g control system which 
deserve a t t e n t i o n . As a consequence of not upgrading the social 
perspectives of the foremen, t h e i r disposition towards subordinates was 
not conducive to encourage any constructive dialogue about the problems 
and needs the parties had. Indeed our discussions with the foremen 
and workers confirmed t h i s point. The foreman was l i t t l e i n a 
p o s i t i o n to appreciate, or do anything, about the aspirations held by 
his workgroup. In t h i s sense the foreman could not act as a feeler 
of shopflooi- a t t i t u d e s . But t h i s i s not to say they were t o t a l l y 
ignorant about what went on on the shopfloor. A number of them were 
aware about what they called 'malpractices*. When asked why they did 
not report these practices to the superiors, one simply said 'we don't 
want the boys to create more grievances and more trouble. I t i s better 
to close one eye to these things so long as we can meet the schedule -
that i s our target'. V i t a l information that could have helped to 
correct r e s t r i c t i v e practices thereby did not get communicated above. 
Thus i n the above ways, the exi s t i n g supervisory role was deprived of 
the 'feeling' or feedback functions. 
The second feature fre take up i s about whether the management 
had alternative measures fo r obtaining feedback from the shopfloor 
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apart from the overt grievances reported by workers. As we pointed 
e a r l i e r , most of these complaints concerned foreman-subordinate 
quarrels. Workers did not (or would not) report about the goings 
on i n the yard and the personnel o f f i c e r s seemed only too keen t o 
dispose of grievances and to get the workers back to t h e i r workplace 
as soon as possible. 
' One might suggest that since the union o f f i c i a l s were very much 
i n a cooperative stance with management, they could supply the 
information (on t h e i r members' a c t i v i t i e s ) that management could not 
obtain by i t s e l f . I n our view, however, the union o f f i c i a l s would not 
r i s k t h e i r re-election by taking on the management-informer image. 
Although we have said that management received l i t t l e information 
through the usual feedback channels, we cannot say that technical 
o f f i c e r s and the personnel o f f i c e r s were t o t a l l y unaware of the 
unproductive tendencies on the shopfloor. Rumours always got around. 
But i t was v i r t u a l l y impossible f o r the technical or personnel o f f i c e r s 
to take action when they got no o f f i c i a l evidence - either from the 
foreman, union representative or the workers themselves. The action 
that a number of the l i n e o f f i c e r s had i n mind were the negative 
sanctions - the d i s c i p l i n a r y code of conduct l i s t e d severe punishments 
such as suspension and termination f o r people caught napping or playing 
cards while on duty. 
Following from t h i s negative approach, the observer noted a 
defeatist a t t i t u d e . Not being able to solve the problem, the 
production executives comforted themselves with the notion that despite 
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the r e s t r i c t i v e practices, schedules were met and p r o f i t s remained 
good. But they acknowledged that schedules were being kept because 
additional labour (sometimes with the help of contractors) was 
deployed during the day s h i f t s . They also appreciated that 'good 
p r o f i t s * remained possible because of the comparatively low cost of 
labour available i n Singapore. When posed questions about the need to 
control and improve worker performance t o compensate f o r i n f l a t i o n i n 
wages and cost of materials, especially with the s t i f f competition i n 
the shipbuilding industry, the production people responded rather 
feebly. Generally they showed l i t t l e enthusiasm about the long-term 
future. Some said 'we'll think about i t when the time r e a l l y comes' -
meaning when things get c r i t i c a l . 
The Personnel people acknowledged a 'vague' knowledge about 
employees neglecting work. Although they had some knowledge, through 
rumours and private discussions, about what went on i n the production 
area, they lacked concrete or o f f i c i a l evidence t o i n i t i a t e any kind of 
action, whether i t was i n the form of negative sanctions or even t o 
bring up questions about motivational or pr o d u c t i v i t y schemes with the 
top Management. Nobody whether technical o f f i c e r , foreman, worker 
or union representative, appeared prepared to lodge a sp e c i f i c 
complaint about the malpractices. In the absence of such a complaint, 
the personnel o f f i c e r saw l i t t l e ground to i n t e r f e r e with a c t i v i t i e s 
which were more d i r e c t l y the concern of the production and technical 
managers. 
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SHOPFLOOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LINE MANAGEMENT 
Having so f a r discussed the problems on the shopfloor l e t us take 
a look at the attitudes of l i n e o f f i c e r s and managers towards i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s and decision-making i n t h i s area. A t y p i c a l response was 
that s t a f f and i n d u s t r i a l relations matters were solely f o r the personnel 
department to handle. Production executives who were generally hired 
f o r t h e i r technical competence perceived t h e i r r o l e confined to 
organising jobs, d e t a i l i n g foremen and t h e i r teams to spec i f i c areas, 
c o n t r o l l i n g production and ensuring completion dates. Departmental 
managers were p r i m a r i l y concerned about contract dates, production, 
repair, costs and the p r o f i t s of his department. The general a t t i t u d e 
was i f an employee f e l t sick he was sent to the doctor, i f "he had a 
question about benefits or had a grievance, he was sent to the personnel 
department. Technical o f f i c e r s were only interested i n the technical 
instructions and orders they gave out and would eagerly respond to 
technical problems that might crop up at the workplace. But they 
seldom wished to get involved i n what they termed were s t r i c t l y 'personnel' 
matters. Generally production and technical executives showed l i t t l e 
i n t e r e s t i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s and perceived t h e i r r o l e to be f a r 
removed from decisions and problems i n t h i s area. One reason given 
f o r t h i s pattern i s h i s t o r i c a l . During the early days of the 
company's operations, the technical people were said to be too busy 
with development and expansion plans to be able to 
deal with personnel matters. A l l such matters were quickly referred 
to the Personnel department and t h i s practice simply stuck. Because 
Personnel was able to handle a l l the shopfloor personnel and i n d u s t r i a l 
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relations matters, the yard o f f i c e r s and managers saw l i t t l e need f o r 
them to straighten out t h e i r foreman-subordinate problems. While 
most o f f i c e r s appreciated that t h e i r sectional performance would 
improve with better supervisor-subordinate communication and c o n t r o l , 
they f e l t that t r a i n i n g , development and improving s t a f f relationships 
and attitudes were the re s p o n s i b i l i t y , of the personnel function. 
As we go higher up the hierarchy i t was i n t e r e s t i n g , however^ to 
see a keener i n t e r e s t i n s t a f f and the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s climate. 
Controller-level managers and senior coordinators stressed the 
importance of a good i n d u s t r i a l relations climate f o r high levels of 
performance and p r o d u c t i v i t y . Most of the top people were aware about 
the supervisory problems because everyone spoke of t h i s as the only or 
major problem f o r the plant's i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . One senior 
management executive was asked what he thought was the biggest problem 
fo r JURONG, as f a r as the workers and i n d u s t r i a l relations were 
concerned. He said that the shipyard operations required much higher 
worker p r o d u c t i v i t y i n order to remain competitive with other shipbuilding 
and repairing nations. The reason f o r low labour p r o d u c t i v i t y at 
JURONG he f e l t was probably due to the i n e f f e c t i v e foreman-subordinate 
relationship. He acknowledged that the existing r o l e f o r the foreman 
lacked a social or i n d u s t r i a l relations perspective, and that developments 
i n t h i s area would be necessary. When asked about the role and 
re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the technical o f f i c e r s and l i n e managers viz-a-viz 
personnel matters i n t h e i r own areas, he said the personnel department 
was looking i n t o the whole matter. 
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A NEED FOR POLICY AND A POSITIVE APPROACH 
In his investigations, the researcher also sought to see the 
company's '.policy manual 1. The highly secret document was seen to 
concentrate on spe c i f i c conditions of service r e l a t i n g to s t a f f who 
were not e l i g i b l e to j o i n trade unions. Procedures and rules were 
also set down f o r recruitment, promotion and transfers. As most of 
the contractual conditions f o r unionised s t a f f was l a i d down i n the 
c o l l e c t i v e agreement, l i t t l e was mentioned about them i n the company's 
p o l i c y manual. Although the company o f f i c i a l s called i t a'policy 
manual', i t was hardly a statement of philosophy, intentions or the 
broad guidelines necessary fo r the consistent practice of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . 
Having seen the 'policy manual' the researcher t r i e d to f i n d 
out i f there was any other document - i n the form of a statement or 
even a memorandum which might have r e f l e c t e d the company's broad 
philosophy or strategy. Apparently there was none. This, of course 
i s not to suggest that the JURONG management did not have i t s own 
approach to labour and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . By and large there was 
a commitment to the unitary ideology also involving state control and 
cooperation with the union. There was also the 'open-door' policy 
of the personnel department, and commitment to the dictum: a f a i r 
day's wage f o r a f a i r day's work. 
Although JURONG's top management appreciated the importance of 
a s t a b l e - i n d u s t r i a l relations climate and labour force f o r i t s operational 
performance, they appeared to relegate much of t h e i r concern for these 
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matters to the personnel department. Because at the operating levels 
production control decisions, material a v a i l a b i l i t y and getting 
contractors to help f i n i s h a job were more important than the needs 
and aspirations of workers, the personnel department acting alone could 
not bring about an e f f e c t i v e i n d u s t r i a l relations control system. In 
our view, the top management has f i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r ensuring that 
the personnel and i n d u s t r i a l relations function i s given proper 
importance at a l l levels both i n i t s own r i g h t and because of the way 
i t i n teracts with company operations generally. I t i s f o r the top 
level t o take a p o s i t i v e stand to ensure that i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
objectives are integrated and reconciled with the other major plans and 
targets of the company. 
One may argue that because extensive l e g i s l a t i o n and i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
control i n Singapore determine the rules f o r the major aspects of 
i n d u s t r i a l relations p o l i c y , such as c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, trade union 
recognition, negotiating machinery, grievance procedures etc. etc., 
there was no need for the company to maintain a manual which sets out 
what i s already well known. .A comprehensive manual policy, however, 
would include many aspects outside the •formal 1 area. In the 
JURONG case we have seen problems for p r o d u c t i v i t y and s t a b i l i t y 
developing i n the 'informal''area. While i n s t i t u t i o n a l relationships 
may be peaceful enough to be taken f o r granted i n planning f o r the 
commercial and operational objectives, the company would do well to 
integrate i n i t s strategic'planning, p o l i c i e s to achieve sound 
i n d u s t r i a l relations practice i n the shopfloor and operational areas. 
Since much of t h i s area i s s t i l l w i t h i n management's control and i t 
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enjoys considerable cooperation from the union, the company, we f e e l , 
does have tremendous opportunity t o achieve control i n those problem 
areas, which appear to lack regulation and d i r e c t i o n . 
We may.now suggest a major i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s objective f o r 
the JURONG management. I t may read as follows: 
In order to achieve high p r o d u c t i v i t y and long-term s t a b i l i t y of 
operations, the enterprise w i l l need to develop sound i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
practice at the shopfloor and operational management lev e l to substantiate 
the peace i t beholds at the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l e v e l . In order to do t h i s 
the top management w i l l need t o be aware of the re a l needs of the 
exist i n g s i t u a t i o n . Here i t could use the personnel department or 
outside consultants to investigate and report on the problems and needs. 
We s h a l l summarise our findings here: 
(a) there i s antagonism i n the forezian-subordinate r e l a t i o n s h i p ; 
(b) there i s an absence of motivational strategies to improve 
relationships, worker performance and a commitment to 
work and the workplace; 
(c) there i s no e f f e c t i v e feedback i n the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
system, and 
(d) the ineffectiveness of control over shopfloor i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s points to a need f o r l i n e management to share 
(with the personnel department) r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h i s area. 
Based on the above-mentioned outline the company w i l l need 
motivational strategies t o improve workplace relationships, performance and 
worker commitment to the workplace. I t w i l l also need to give existing 
control system an i n d u s t r i a l relations dimension i n order to improve i t s 
effectiveness. 
The personnel department i s seen as having an important r o l e i n 
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t h e planning and execution of the project. I t w i l l , of course, 
require support of top management and the cooperation and p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
of l i n e managers and union o f f i c i a l s . In the next ( t h i r d ) part of 
t h i s chapter we propose relevant motivational strategies. I n the 
fourth and f i n a l part we recommend a system to improve the effectiveness 
of c o n t r o l , as i t pertains to the JURONG s i t u a t i o n . 
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I I I . Part C MOTIVATIONAL STRATEGIES: TOWARDS MORE STABILITY AND 
• CONTROL OF PERFORMANCE ON THE SHOPFLOOR 
More than one organisational variable influences worker 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . They may be c l a s s i f i e d as technical, operational, 
or behavioural. While we do appreciate the primary significance of 
technical and operational variables, here we are mainly concerned 
wit h behavioural variables that enhance worker e f f o r t . Apart from 
enhancing p r o d u c t i v i t y , behavioural variables could also contribute 
to a more stable workforce, with better commitment both to work and 
the workplace. In t h i s part of the chapter we propose some ideas 
which the JURONG management could develop i n order t o achieve a more 
stable workforce and higher p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
Among the behavioural variables there are quite a number of 
aspects that contribute t o improvement. The following i s a l i s t of 
some important variables pertinent t o JURONG: 
(a) Training of workmen 
(b) Union recognition/organisation § f a c i l i t i e s 
(c) Reorganisation of work systems 
(d) Group relations 
(e) Leadership 
( f ) Job-design: attachment to job and workplace 
There i s already, at JURONG, substantial a c t i v i t y i n some areas 
e.g. t r a i n i n g of workmen i n the various trades, f a c i l i t i e s f o r union 
representatives and periodic reorganisation of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s at 
management l e v e l . There i s , however, a more urgent need i n one or 
two areas, and i t i s i n these areas we f e e l that a po s i t i v e change woul 
make a s i g n i f i c a n t impact. Leadership and motivating worker attachmen 
towards t h e i r jobs and workplace are cr u c i a l factors. A po s i t i v e 
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change i n supervisory behaviour and the shopfloor working arrangements, 
we feel,would establish a basis f o r workforce s t a b i l i t y and p r o d u c t i v i t y 
improvement. 
What remains important, however, i s the c o n f l i c t i n perceptions 
held by the l i n e and personnel o f f i c e r s about the handling o f change 
i n these areas. I t would be naive f o r the l i n e o f f i c e r s t o think that 
they have l i t t l e or no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r developing a supervisory control 
system which i s sensitive both t o the needs of the organisation and. 
the employees. Any change i n supervisory behaviour or the work control 
system has to be implemented both by the l i n e and personnel o f f i c e r s 
concerned. In f a c t , i t i s the l i n e o f f i c e r s who would be i n a po s i t i o n 
to-monitor and follow-up on the changes implemented. The personnel 
department could coordinate and control the change on a company-wide 
basis, giving s p e c i a l i s t assistance whenever necessary. I t i s 
ult i m a t e l y the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of top management to ensure that the desired 
change i s achieved. 
Whilst we must acknowledge that organisational s c i e n t i s t s and 
pra c t i t i o n e r s have developed a large repertoire of mechanisms and 
techniques (selection, appraisal, t r a i n i n g , T-groups etc.) t o improve 
leadership effectiveness and job design, here we s h a l l o u t l i n e the 
key motivational variables that need att e n t i o n . F i r s t we discuss 
the various aspects of supervisory behaviour and go on to suggest that 
worker attachment can be improved through job and team involvement. 
SUPERVISORY BEHAVIOUR 
The f i r s t l i n e supervisor i s the most dire c t and continuous 
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l i n k between management and employee. He has substantial r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
to see that his subordinates understand and respond p o s i t i v e l y towards 
t h e i r r o l e s . His behaviour i s important i n order t o shape worker 
attitudes and to b u i l d cooperative work-groups with high performance 
goals. 
There i s a d e f i n i t e need t o look at the role of the JURONG 
foremen who got to t h e i r positions p r i m a r i l y through the s e n i o r i t y 
l i n e . They were good as craftsmen and were loyal, employees. What 
they lacked was either the aptitude , or otherwise, the adjustment t o 
perform t h e i r new r o l e . I n implementing the new r o l e , those who 
f a i l or are unable t o adjust t h e i r ways (and probably quite a few w i l l 
have t h i s problem because of t h e i r age) w i l l have to be reassigned to 
more suitable r o l e s . 
Going by need-satisfying theory the supervisor should possess 
need-satisfying power and a b i l i t y , to dispense rewards and recommendations 
f o r promotion and t r a i n i n g (which are much sought a f t e r by the workers) 
on the basis of performance. The output decisions of subordinates 
tend to be influenced i f they desire recognition and support from the 
supervisor,as well as rewards which are controlled by him. The 
supervisor i s thus able to maintain e f f e c t i v e control over the 
subordinates when they perceive that recognition ( f o r promotion, 
t r a i n i n g , etc.) and rewards (e.g. special increments) are contingent 
upon t h e i r own performance. I f the subordinates perceive that the 
supervisor does not (or cannot) make those need-satisfying responses 
contingent upon t h e i r performance, he cannot be expected to have much 
influence. By the same thi n k i n g , the supervisor would be u n l i k e l y t o 
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have influence i f the variables w i t h i n his control are of l i t t l e 
need-satisfying value-to the subordinates. 
Much as the job of the f i r s t - l i n e supervisor contains c o n f l i c t i n g 
r o l e s , the foremen at JURONG lack the support of management and are 
at the same time unable to i d e n t i f y with t h e i r workgroups. The 'new' 
foremen w i l l not only require to be sensitive to the needs and 
grievances of his subordinates, but has also to be aware of the type 
of behaviour he may use i n the varying situations that w i l l be supported 
by his supervisors. I n order to give him a sense of leadership and 
re s p o n s i b i l i t y , the foremen needs to be given some di s c r e t i o n . The 
l i m i t s of such di s c r e t i o n may be determined by cert a i n norms, formal 
or informal, which the management needs to be e x p l i c i t about. 
Supervisory behaviour i s very s i t u a t i o n a l . Appropriate behaviour 
and response i s related t o his personality, the subordinates and t h e i r 
needs, expectations and in t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I t i s important, therefore, 
that he i s able to diagnose s i t u a t i o n a l requirements and act i n a way 
that takes i n t o account a l l appropriate factors. 
To a considerable extent, the success or f a i l u r e of a supervisor 
depends oh his s t y l e . Although i t may be necessary f o r him to be 
f i r m at times, the foreman at JURONG needs to be communicative and 
approachable. Tannenbaum's description of t h i s supervisor-subordinate 
relationship i s very relevant f o r JURONG, He writes: 
"Some of the control-enhancing features of the 
p a r t i c i p a t i v e approach can be seen with respect 
to the supervisors-subordinate'relationship. 
One can easily picture the lais s e z - f a i r e leader 
who exercises l i t t l e control over his subordinates 
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and who at the same time may be i n d i f f e r e n t 
to t h e i r wishes. He neither influences 
nor i s influenced by his men. A second, 
more p a r t i c i p a t i v e supervisor interacts 
and communicates often, welcomes opinions, 
and e l i c i t s influence attempts. Suggestions 
that subordinates o f f e r make a difference 
to him and his subordinates are responsive, 
i n turn, to his requests. To the extent 
that the organisational hierarchy from 
top t o bottom i s characterised i n t h i s way 
we have a highly integrated, t i g h t l y k n i t 
s o c i a l system. We have, i n the terms of 
L i k e r t (1961), a more substantial i n t e r a c t i o n 
influence system - and a greater t o t a l amount 
of control ".8 
Next, we look at job-involvement as an e f f e c t i v e way of enhancing 
and sustaining worker attachment t o t h e i r jobs. 
JOB INVOLVEMENT 
Job involvement contributes d i r e c t l y towards improvement of task:., 
methods, control of wastage and costs. Generally i f i n t r i n s i c 
s a t i s f a c t i o n can be derived from high levels of job accomplishment, 
these levels tend t o be s e l f sustaining. A major problem f o r JURONG 
has been low job involvement. Having seen the pattern operating at 
JURONG, not only d i d the shppfloor workers have l i t t l e influence over 
t h e i r jobs or workplace decisions, the supervisors and management also 
experienced a certain lack of control over performance. 
Based on the author's working experience with a few American 
manufacturing companies using large local workforces, he believes 
that Singaporean workers do f i n d job involvement i n i t i a t i v e s innovative 
. and i n t e r e s t i n g . Employees above a ce r t a i n level of education (trade 
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certificates/secondary education) f i n d the opportunity f o r i n d i v i d u a l 
expression i n t h e i r jobs very rewarding and s a t i s f y i n g . Since job 
involvement enhances attachment and thereby helps t o sustain high 
goals and performance, we must recommend i t to the JURONG a u t h o r i t i e s . 
job involvement, however, need not be seen purely i n terms of 
Herzberg's pri n c i p l e s of job enrichment,or,in terms of models used by 
Scott Meyers or Robert Ford who applied the principles i n large 
g 
American corporations. What we do say i s that i n order to evoke 
greater i n t e r e s t i n t h e i r jobs, generally, work-groups must experience 
a certain amount of i n t e r n a l control - that t h e i r contribution i s a 
s i g n i f i c a n t element of the task or f i n a l product. Involvement i n these, 
terms means creating opportunities f o r workers t o r e a l i s e t h e i r own 
ca p a b i l i t i e s (creative and ind u s t r y ) . Not only do the workers get to 
f e e l more attached and stable i n jobs, i t also enables management 
to maximise human resources. Raymond Miles' human resource approach 
has i n fact said t h a t : 
(a) The managers' basic task i s to make 
use of his 'untapped' human resources. 
(b) He should create an environment i n 
which employees may contribute t o 
the l i m i t s of t h e i r a b i l i t y . 
(c) He should encourage p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
on important matters allowing 
employees to broaden t h e i r s e l f - d i r e c t i o n 
and con t r o l . . 10 
The consequences which Miles rioted are also s i g n i f i c a n t : 
(a) Enhancing or expanding subordinate influence, 
s e l f - d i r e c t i o n and control w i l l lead to d i r e c t 
improvement i n operating e f f i c i e n c y . 
-171-
(b) Work s a t i s f a c t i o n , could also improve 
as a consequence of subordinates making 
f u l l - u s e of t h e i r resources. 11 
Although we c i t e Miles' human resource approach we do not suggest 
that i t can be applied at JTIRONG i n i t s absolute form. In f a c t , 
considering the fact that the local workforce i s c u l t u r a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y 
attuned to substantial external c o n t r o l , attempting t o enhance i n t e r n a l 
control needs care. Certainly not a l l workers (especially those who 
perform menial tasks and have not had any form of formal education) 
w i l l respond favourably or be able to handle challenge and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
e f f e c t i v e l y . Enhancing i n t e r n a l control has to be c a r e f u l l y implemented 
with due regard f o r the l e v e l of education, age, structure of jobs and 
group relationships. The design of jobs and work-groups to enhance 
job involvement, therefore, needs careful planning and expert 
consultation. 
What i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n the Singapore s i t u a t i o n . i s that.the system -
management, union and State control has not created an environment which 
would f a c i l i t a t e or promote job involvement. In some ways job 
involvement might have posed a fear f o r the au t h o r i t i e s i n that i t 
could, lead to aspirations f o r autonomy at workplaces. This could 
then have grave consequences f o r the status-quo of 'downward'control . 
In t h i s , the Singapore authorities may therefore have perceived a 
dilemma. A decision has, however, to be made i n the near f u t u r e . 
Management could either take the i n i t i a t i v e towards job involvement 
i n an overall p r o d u c t i v i t y program, or by ignoring the long-term effects 
of low job involvement, allow the operation to slid e to an uncompetitive 
level of pro d u c t i v i t y . 
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We do see that management might have t o grant autonomy over a 
certain workplace decisions to the work-groups. But there i s one 
major advantage of stimulating job involvement i n an o v e r a l l p r o d u c t i v i t y 
improvement programme. A certain loss of control over workplace 
decisions would be more than compensated f o r by more e f f i c i e n t and 
e f f e c t i v e control of the workers' performance. Higher p r o d u c t i v i t y 
leads to more predictable costs and better opportunities f o r 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y . These, a f t e r a l l , are important objectives f o r the 
enterprise. In the -process of achieving improved labour p r o d u c t i v i t y , 
the i n t r i n s i c s a t i s f a c t i o n that involvement develops helps to create 
i n the worker a commitment to the job and the workplace. This helps 
i n creating s t a b i l i t y i n the workforce which has long-term implications 
f o r investment and development. 
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IV. Part D TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL 
Having outlined the motivational strategies open t o the JURONG 
.jionagement, we s h a l l now examine some fundamental issues that concern 
the effectiveness of the roles and functions of the l i n e managers, 
o f f i c e r s , and supervisors. The exis t i n g roles of these people i n the 
shipyard appears to be lacking i n i n d u s t r i a l relations perspective and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . . Line managers did not perceive any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
any s t a f f or i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s matters i n his own area, t h i s was a l l 
f o r the personnel department. Had they perceived the tremendous 
significance that c o n t r o l l i n g and maintaining sound i n d u s t r i a l relations 
practice would have f o r s t a b i l i t y and a climate f o r high labour performance, 
they might have taken greater i n t e r e s t . Apparently, however, they 
d i d not. 
At the top l e v e l , nevertheless, JURONG's management did recognise 
the value of good i n d u s t r i a l relations practice f o r long-term s t a b i l i t y 
(necessary f o r growth and expansion) and improving worker p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
Our argument here, therefore, i s that since the management of i n d u s t r i a l 
relations has a substantial and d i r e c t consequence f o r the l i n e manager's 
operational performance, i t i s sensible f o r him to take an in t e r e s t i n 
ensuring sound i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s practice i n his area. The 
personnel department did deserve c r e d i t f o r s e t t l i n g grievances since 
t h i s helped t o contain c o n f l i c t , but i t seemed to have f a i l e d to 
c l a r i f y roles and encourage l i n e managers to assume some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r l i n e i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . The personnel department could v 
maintain central accountability f o r factory-wide decisions and 
agreements made with the union. 
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Once the l i n e manager accepts primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r his 
production line's i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , then he has to decide how 
best he can manage and control t h i s aspect, and what resources are 
available t o him Within the organisation to help him to do .so. In pur 
view he has the resources and opportunities r i g h t w i t h i n hiw own 
department or section. By v i r t u e of the di r e c t and continuous contact 
the f i r s t - l i n e supervisors have with the workforce, they are i n an 
ideal p o s i t i o n t o perform a major rol e i n t h i s area. He also has 
assistants who would also be expected to acquire an i n d u s t r i a l relations 
perspective i n order to help him control t h i s aspect of his business -
keeping an eye over the supervisors and the shbpfloor a c t i v i t i e s . 
THE SUPERVISORY CONTROL SYSTEM 
At the f i r s t - l i n e supervisor's l e v e l , the JURONG manager would 
have some problems which we have already discussed. He would have 
to arrange,possibly with the help of Personnel, f o r the foremen to be 
given t r a i n i n g to function more e f f e c t i v e l y as supervisors. Those 
who f a i l e d t o respond to a fresh approach, with the necessary t r a i n i n g 
and counselling, would have to be considered f o r r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n to 
other s p e c i a l i s t tasks. This i s bound to create problems with some 
foremen who, having l o s t t h e i r 'supervisor status' would experience 
humiliation. But l i n e managers would have to think about the long-
term benefits to be derived, both f o r control i n his organisation and 
the foreman himself - being f i t t e d i n more suitable roles. 
I t i s our contention that future selection and t r a i n i n g of 
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foremen should emphasise not only the technical aspects but the social 
and i n d u s t r i a l relations aspect as w e l l . The f i r s t - l i n e supervisors 
r o l e should have the following major dimensions, as shown i n Table 4 
below: 
TABLE 4 
SOCIAL AND TECHNICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE FIRST-LINE 
SUPERVISOR'S ROLE 
Technical Social ( I n d u s t r i a l Relations) 
Performance improvement Ensuring motivation through 
need-satisfaction 
F a c i l i t a t i n g operations -
planning coordination 
and problem solving 
Promoting cooperative 
work relations 
Influencing worker performance Ensuring adherence,to 
organisational rules 
Handling grievances, with 
advice from senior o f f i c e r s 
and personnel 
Ensuring two-way communications 
We have included grievance handling as t h i s would aim towards the 
management's expressed hope to s e t t l e grievances closest to the point 
of o r i g i n . With an e f f e c t i v e supervisory control system most of the 
grievances could be s e t t l e d at that l e v e l . 
In order f o r the supervisor to ensure compliance to organisational 
rules, he has to be conversant with them. These include terms of the 
c o l l e c t i v e agreement which j o i n t decisions with the union, periodic 
decisions made by management and departmental regulations. Often 
-176-
workers look to t h e i r supervisor f o r explanation and c l a r i f i c a t i o n of 
rules. He has to communicate with his superiors and personnel o f f i c e r s 
t o get across the intended message. 
The f i r s t - l i n e supervisor i s a v i t a l communication l i n k i n tho 
l i n e managers control system. In the JURONG s i t u a t i o n there was 
l i t t l e or no feedback about aspirations and tendencies on the shopfloor. 
Giving the foreman an i n d u s t r i a l relations perspective should help create 
*a climate of t r u s t which would allow his subordinates express t h e i r 
feelings or f r u s t r a t i o n s . This information could then be transmitted 
to the manager and personnel department who could then decide whether 
an earlier, decision needed adaptation to p a r t i c u l a r circumstances or 
a fresh decision was required. The foreman could also report deviant • 
behaviour which requires the a t t e n t i o n of higher authority. The 
feedback action of the f i r s t - l i n e supervisor i s thus v i t a l f o r the 
operation to adapt to shopfloor reaction to work situations and 
organisational rules. I t can also account f o r motivational change 
amongst workers. An operation which has the f a c i l i t y t o adapt, 
accommodate and, where necessary, i n i t i a t e changes on the shopfloor 
i s generally able to cope with such change. I t i s thus able t o 
obtain better performance from the workers, which i s an important 
objective f o r any l i n e manager. 
When feedback information from the operating area i s s i g n i f i c a n t 
enough to reach the higher levels of management they could be discussed 
between l i n e , personnel and general managers to see i f old rules needed 
amendment or new decisions were required. Had the foremen at JURONG 
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been equipped with the capacity to f e e l or be sensitive t o t h e i r 
subordinate's needs, spec i f i c information could have been compiled 
about workers.1 dissatisfactions f o r a r t i c u l a t i o n at the top l e v e l . 
Whether or not the decisions that ensue are immediately favourable 
to the workers i s quite a d i f f e r e n t matter but i t i s important f o r 
senior management, to be kept aware of what i s going on - t h i s i s 
crucial*'for long-term s u r v i v a l . 
THE TECHNICAL OFFICERS 
At the executive (technical) o f f i c e r l e v e l , a reo r i e n t a t i o n 
programme which c l a r i f i e s the new i n d u s t r i a l relations r o l e and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i l l be necessary. The o f f i c e r w i l l need to be 
conversant with the organisational rules, able t o support and communicate 
with t h e i r foremen and also counsel workers, allowing them t o a i r 
whatever views and problems they might have. Just l i k e achieving 
targets i n production, the o f f i c e r w i l l have to see that his foremen 
are achieving compliance with the rules. Deviations have to be 
investigated and appropriate corrective action taken. New rules or 
decisions that come from the l i n e manager or personnel department need 
to be transmitted f o r compliance at the shopfloor. 
At the executive l e v e l , there i s a certain amount of planning and 
organising a c t i v i t y . The acquired i n d u s t r i a l relations perspective 
should also demonstrate i t s e l f i n these a c t i v i t i e s . In planning a new 
repair p r o j e c t , the o f f i c e r may need certain s k i l l s (e.g. arc welding) 
which are i n short supply. But he i s aware that there are some workers 
under his foremen who, although categorised as. gas welders, have arc 
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welding c e r t i f i c a t e s . In the current s i t u a t i o n he might simply go 
up to the workers concerned and coerce them t o perform the job. 
Although the workers might comply, they would do i t rather unhappily. 
F i r s t , they would f e e l that they have been made t o do a higher paying 
job w i t h no adjustment i n c l a s s i f i c a t i o n or wage scale. Second, t h e i r 
colleagues might chide them f o r being fooled by the o f f i c e r . T h i r d l y , 
the union o f f i c i a l s would not hear of such a th i n g , f o r the wide 
implications i t would have on the question of s k i l l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and 
d i f f e r e n t i a l s . Fourthly, i n the event of an accident, because the 
worker performed a job f o r which he was not employed, he might lose 
out in a compensation claim! So i t i s under great stress that these 
workers comply. 
In the new s i t u a t i o n , however, the o f f i c e r would be expected t o 
perceive the social and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s implications. The new 
approach should encourage him to seek advice from Personnel on 
al t e r n a t i v e sources of labour o r , i f necessary, arrange t o recategorise 
those p a r t i c u l a r workers since they had the re q u i s i t e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . 
Thus, not only are the workers' feelings taken i n t o account, a sound practice 
i s also created. 
Just as the o f f i c e r s consulted colleagues from the materials 
department, schedules or cost control section, i n t h e i r day-to-day 
organisation of work, the reorie n t a t i o n program should help them 
i d e n t i f y situations when they might c a l l f o r s t a f f or i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s advice. 
Technical o f f i c e r s also have an important feedback function. 
They are expected to make regular reports on the status of production, 
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expenditure, materials required, wastage etc. I n the new role they 
could be expected t o help compile and explain trends i n inconsistent 
or bad timekeeping, absenteeism, l i g h t duties, medical leaves, etc. 
This data would also be transmitted to the personnel department f o r 
fur t h e r analysis and investigation. I f f o r some reason there was 
suddenly an increasing incidence of absenteeism;, the l i n e and personnel 
o f f i c e r s could get together to discuss possible implications - i t might 
we l l be a manifestation of some grievance or c o n f l i c t , that-would 
obviously hamper production. 
Technical or the l i n e o f f i c e r s are i n a unique p o s i t i o n . He i s 
the f i r s t management executive i n the production l i n e hierarchy With 
whom the workers have d i r e c t contact. Because of his executive 
p o s i t i o n , he i s perceived t o have considerable influence on management 
decisions. From the management's point of view, the l i n e o f f i c e r i s 
often the only executive i n the production hierarchy who has a substantial 
measure of d i r e c t contact with the lines workforce. His assessment 
and opinion about shopfloor problems would be valued by management. 
Based on t h i s two-way perception,the technical o f f i c e r at JURONG has 
a key and challenging r o l e . He has got to be seen by the workers.as 
someone who would be able to persuade management to see t h e i r problems 
and make some concessions i n return f o r compliance to rules and 
changes that management may wish to introduce. 
THE LINE MANAGER 
Above the technical o f f i c e r , t h e l i n e manager i s also a 
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communicator of organisational rules and decisions. He i s already 
dealing with feedback from his l i n e hierarchy about production, costs, 
wastage, delays, etc. In the new r o l e he would keep a tab on 
matters l i k e absenteeism, turnover, and looking more deeply i n t o 
causes of delay that may be r e s u l t i n g from worker behaviour. 
I n his present job, the l i n e manager i s involved i n a great deal 
of j o i n t decision-making at inter-departmental meetings which are held 
f o r a v a r i e t y of reasons. I t may be f o r d i v i d i n g contracts between 
production l i n e s , f o r implementing a p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t job or. 
the regular f o r t n i g h t l y review of l i n e operations. The new system 
should encourage more active p a r t i c i p a t i o n of personnel and i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s s p e c i a l i s t s at inter-departmental meetings. Decisions that 
emerge from such meetings would, as a r e s u l t , generally recognise 
i n d u s t r i a l relations rules and constraints. In the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n , 
often new tools and equipment have been introduced, without Personnel 
having any knowledge. This has resulted i n inadequate follow-up on 
t r a i n i n g which has implications f o r performance and accidents as w e l l . 
Also important here i s the question of s k i l l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n f o r the 
handling of the new equipment. Dissatisfaction may be avoided by 
getting the personnel department involved i n planning f o r changes i n 
technology and equipment. 
Personnel p a r t i c i p a t i o n at these planning and review meetings 
provides an ideal feedback mechanism which could r e s u l t i n adaptation 
of standards or creation of new rules. 
Having discussed the roles i n the l i n e management hierarchy l e t 
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us see what r o l e the personnel department has i n the new system. 
Personnel would have to concentrate on int e g r a t i o n and d i r e c t i v i t y 
towards ov e r a l l company objectives. 
.CONTROL AND THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT . 
The personnel department has r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to obtain feedback 
from the operating areas and to investigate and analyse information 
i n order to enable longer-term decisions. They would be involved i n 
negotiation and consultation with union o f f i c i a l s to review e a r l i e r 
decisions or create new rules. Generally these discussions have 
company-wide application and so agreements made at t h i s l e v e l form a 
macro-framework f o r the company's i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
.Creating an i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s control system at JURONG i s not 
going to be without problems or d i f f i c u l t i e s . The reor i e n t a t i o n of 
l i n e supervisors, o f f i c e r s and managers has to be a continuous process 
of discussion and c l a r i f i c a t i o n about roles, extent of authority and 
the means of developing sound i n d u s t r i a l relations practice. Workers 
and union o f f i c i a l s have t o be convinced that the new system i s p r i m a r i l y 
meant to promote stable shopfloor r e l a t i o n s , improved worker s a t i s f a c t i o n 
and effectiveness of l i n e operations. Based on the p o s i t i v e understanding 
at a l l levels of the JURONG management towards the need f o r more 
effectiveness i n shopfloor i n d u s t r i a l relations c o n t r o l , we would expect 
them to see the usefulness of assigning substantial i n d u s t r i a l relations 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to l i n e management, w i t h i n a macro-framework monitored 
and integrated by the personnel department. 
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THE CHALLENGE FOR TOP MANAGEMENT 
There are however very important decisions t o be made at the top. 
This i s the policy-making level where major organisational decisions 
w i l l have t o be made. Apart from the decisions that are use f u l l y 
made based on feedback information from the i n t e r n a l environment, 
t h i s s t r a t e g i c planning level i s exposed to information from outside 
the organisation. Modem managers would seldom ignore the e f f e c t of 
the external environment,they would prefer t o prepare f o r such e f f e c t s . 
There i s an i n t e r e s t i n g example of feedforward (information from 
outside) that must be brought to the attention of the policy-makers 
and strategic planners. The team-involvement,'worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n 1 
and ' i n d u s t r i a l democracy' movements that are growing r a p i d l y i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d world would, i n our opinion, not take long t o reach 
Singapore. One of the major i n d u s t r i a l relations decisions f o r the 
JURONG management, therefore, s t i l l remains. This question i s 
fundamental because job-involvement bears scent of workplace autonomy 
which i s something the authorities i n the Singapore system - state, 
union and management, w i l l f i n d d i f f i c u l t t o accept. I t runs opposite 
to the current system of downward cont r o l . 
Being an open economy and exposed to foreign influences, sealing 
o f f s p e c i f i c trends from the people i s v i r t u a l l y impossible. T o t a l l y 
ignoring the effects can re s u l t i n suddenly having t o face demands for 
r a d i c a l change. The remaining a l t e r n a t i v e i s progressive change 
whereby management i n i t i a t e s and carries out programmed development i n 
the job-involvement area. Ea r l i e r we proposed job-involvement as an 
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approach t o improve worker motivation. Adopting i t as part of a 
programme t o improve labour p r o d u c t i v i t y may thus have the added 
advantage of preparing f o r environmental challenges of the futur e . 
As Somers' noted: 
"Management may have to give up 
autonomy - an element of prestige -
to gain e f f i c i e n c y , p r o f i t s and thereby 
other elements of pres t i g e . " 12 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that with the proposed changes the 
t o t a l amount of influence, at a l l levels, i s increased. While workers 
enjoy new-found influence over t h e i r jobs and workplace conditions, 
supervisors, o f f i c e r s and managers have also opportunity to increase 
co n t r o l . With t h i s positive-sum or expanded-control framework, 
management i s able to achieve more stable workforce, better control 
over t h e i r performance and also more e f f e c t i v e control over i t s 
operations i n the long term. 
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( CHAPTER SIX 
C O N C L U S I O N 
"Let us look c a r e f u l l y and t r y to understand. 
And to do so l e t us probe beneath the surface 
and t r y to decipher the p a r t i c u l a r form of mind 
which i s coming to b i r t h i n the womb of the 
earth today. Beneath a change of age l i e s 
a change of thought". 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin 
I CONTROL IN THE SINGAPORE SITUATION: A REVIEW OF THE CASE ANALYSIS 
The primary purpose of t h i s research project was to explore the 
major manifestations of control and how they were being expressed i n 
the Singapore s i t u a t i o n . The i l l u s t r a t i o n i n f i g u r e VICon following page) 
outlines the main features v i z "management, State and union co n t r o l . 
Our exploration at JURONG revealed that control over decisions w i t h i n 
the enterprise remained quite f i r m l y with the management. What i s 
more i n t e r e s t i n g i n the Singapore case, however, i s the balance to 
management control provided by the State from outside the enterprise. 
Being the most powerful actor i n the system, the Government guarantees 
minimum labour conditions and-rewards f o r the workers, c o n t r o l l i n g , 
on the other side, the costs involved f o r the employers. At the same 
time, i n order to 'please' employers and to f a c i l i t a t e high organisational 
p r o d u c t i v i t y , the State supports management's u n i l a t e r a l control w i t h i n 
the enterprise - a substantial managerial prerogative has even been 
enshrined i n labour l e g i s l a t i o n . We have also seen how the NTUC 
performs f o r the State a cru c i a l part of t h i s dual r o l e - of 
soc i a l i s i n g and regulating workers, on the one hand, to support 
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management's u n i l a t e r a l control w i t h i n the enterprise and, on the 
other hand, ensuring f o r the workers that they receive from t h e i r 
employers State-prescribed rewards and working conditions. 
There was c l e a r l y no evidence i n the case study of job control 
by the workers. They had no influence i n decision-making even about 
issues d i r e c t l y related to t h e i r jobs, while consciousness i n job 
control appeared t o be a c t i v e l y i n h i b i t e d by the a u t h o r i t i e s . While 
economic, p o l i t i c a l and administrative strategies employed by the 
authorities helped to condition the behaviour of the workers, t h e i r 
amenability to control can to a considerable degree be a t t r i b u t e d to 
the pressures of the environment and t r a d i t i o n . Centralised State 
control has d e f i n i t e l y been f a c i l i t a t e d by the peoples' strong 
'survival* response to the pressures of the socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l 
circumstances facing the nation. The systems' unitary ideology i s 
also supported by the people's t r a d i t i o n a l dependence on authority 
f o r social control. 
In our investigation we found that the f i n a l product of the 
system had two sides. The dominant side portrays cooperation amongst 
the au t h o r i t i e s and t h e i r a b i l i t y to sustain 'downward' control over 
the workers - i n h i b i t i n g job control consciousness and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
workplace decisions. This side shows l i t t l e overt c o n f l i c t and an 
absence of shopfloor militancy. This stable or peaceful side has 
indeed created an i n d u s t r i a l relations climate which has permitted 
the enterprise growth and expansion i n investment, production and 
p r o f i t s . Behind t h i s macro view, however, there i s another side. 
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Our enquiries exposed problems i n shopfloor r e l a t i o n s especially 
between foremen and t h e i r subordinates. This had d i r e c t consequences 
f o r s t a b i l i t y i n the workforce and f o r labour p r o d u c t i v i t y too. There 
were also signs of employees losing commitment to t h e i r jobs. To 
cap i t a l l , the approach of l i n e management to shopfloor i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s was not at a l l conducive to sound practice. The only 
mechanism that the organisation had to deal with shopfloor i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s appeared to be the 'expedient' centralised grievance handling : 
system. Clearly, t h i s was not adequate. 
Although we have not seen evidence that these problems at the 
production area are threatening to disturb the system, i n the near 
future they must remain a p o t e n t i a l source of i n s t a b i l i t y . One has 
9 n l y t o look at the pattern of c o n f l i c t i n i n d u s t r i a l societies to 
recognise that a good majority of i n d u s t r i a l actions resulted from 
i n s t a b i l i t i e s at the informal l e v e l . While some e f f o r t has been made 
i n the area of t r a i n i n g and education, important steps to tackle the 
problems have been refrained" from. We have outlined some remedial 
programmes which to the Singapore employer would appear quite r a d i c a l , 
since they suggest strategies which are d i s t i n c t from the p r e v a i l i n g 
norms. The job-involvement scheme i s ' a case i n point- -
Because the norms i n Singapore society are to a considerable extent 
shaped by the State, there appears to be a lack of i n i t i a t i v e at the 
organisational l e v e l . Under the e x i s t i n g system i t appears therefore, 
the Organisational authorities (management and union) would 
rather wait f o r the State to i n i t i a t e responses and solutions tc the 
problems and i n s t a b i l i t i e s at the.shopfloorlevel Oust as i t has 
created norms and i n s t i t u t i o n s for stable i n t e r a c t i o n at the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
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l e v e l ) . This, i n our view, i s quite an unreasonable expectation. 
Management has the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (and the advantages too) t o 
solve i t s own human problems j u s t l i k e i t deals with the challenges i n 
materials procurement, production, technology and marketing. ....Even i f 
i t must' be t h a t State sanction i s necessary, u l t i m a t e l y , i t i s f o r management 
t o detect, i d e n t i f y and diagnose problems and i n s t a b i l i t i e s w i t h i n i t s 
enterprise and propose strategies f o r discussion and consultation. 
At a time when organisations are subject to rapid evolution and 
change from the outside and inside (operational, f i n a n c i a l , marketing, 
production, materials, etc., and human motivational and value 
expectations) environments, e f f e c t i v e organisational c o n t r o l -is more 
l i k e l y t o be achieved by continuous self-examination and change. The 
fundamental need at JURONG i s f o r the enterprise to i n i t i a t e s e l f -
examination and change. Change strategies could be reactive (as 
suggested i n the p r e s c r i p t i o n to the problems), or they could be 
...pro-active i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of future challenges. 
I I JOB CONTROL IN SINGAPORE: THE CHALLENGE AHEAD 
Singapore's per-capita income i s well-known to be amongst the 
highest i n the whole of Asia, indeed second only to Japan. Although 
not an indigeneous developer l i k e England or France, she i s , from 
the s o c i a l and technological points of view, easily the most modem 
state i n geographical South-east Asia. Being a l a t e developer much 
of her modernisation has taken place through s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic 
inputs froa the i n d u s t r i a l democracies of the West. Just as 
increasing affluence and higher levels of technology have created a 
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greater desire f o r c o n t r o l , these factors must remain pressures i n 
the Singapore system f o r increasing labour influence over management 
decisions. The general shortage of labour i n Singapore, especially 
of s k i l l e d workers, i s yet another pressure i n the system. Indeed, 
as a leading American unionist I . Bluestone recently put i t : 
"Through t h e i r unions the (American) workers 
have already d r a s t i c a l l y reduced the t r a d i t i o n a l , 
autocratic type of managerial control over the 
worker and the workplace. The concept of 
workers' r i g h t s i n the decision-making process 
has taken root. I t w i l l , flower". 1. 
E a r l i e r we saw the positi o n of the Singapore worker viz a viz 
management, union and State control and the status of job-control 
consciousness. Although Singapore Society l i k e America i s wealth-
pursuing and growing i n affluence and technological content, Singaporean 
workers have not responded to the questions of control i n an i d e n t i c a l 
fashion. For a moment, one could have wondered i f the lack of 
expression by the workers with the enterprise was because they had 
adequate opportunity to express themselves i n the wider p o l i t i c a l 
system that f i n a l l y took the form of State control. This we have 
seen i s not the case. F i r s t l y , the National Union i s not only a 
centralised body but has also been assigned the rol e of mobilising 
i t s members to the Government's larger p o l i t i c a l objectives. Secondly, 
we also know that Singapore has a highly centralised p o l i t i c a l structure, 
with massive power and influence vested i n the o f f i c e of the r u l i n g 
R i r t y . 
The difference between the Singapore and American developments, 
however, i s not without good explanation. One may a t t r i b u t e i t t o the 
time-scale f o r development - giving Singaporean workers more time 
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to reach a point where t h e i r affluence w i l l surpass t h e i r material 
wants, would increase t h e i r awareness of control. On the other side 
of the scale, having experienced near full-employment and a r i s i n g 
standard of l i v i n g over the past decade, a turn i n the economic t i d e 
leading to high unemployment, substantial decrease i n l i v i n g standards, 
and pressure f o r more p r o d u c t i v i t y could f o r c e f u l l y push workers 
(American, German or Singaporean) to challenge any i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
arrangement?; 'countervailing power', codetermination, cooperation between 
management and union. Job control issues would then surface i n the 
•mutiny 1. 
As things are, however, there i s one major difference between 
America and Singapore. This i s i n the government of the State. 
American democracy, as Bluestone put i t , has given her c i t i z e n s 
•broad r i g h t s of decision' outside the factory - so that they p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n innumerable decisions a f f e c t i n g the l i f e and wellbeing of themselves, 
t h e i r f a m i l i e s , t h e i r fellov: c i t i z e n s and neighbours^.- Given t h i s 
contrast of r i g h t s available w i t h i n and without the enterprise, the 
p o l i t i c a l awareness generated i n -the worker outside the factory has 
led to demands f o r control w i t h i n . Being a small urbanised c i t y -
state subject to pressures from local economic and p o l i t i c a l 
circumstances, the people i n Singapore, have on the other hand, f o r 
the l a s t 20 years, been successfully socialised i n a system of 
centralised State control. This has provided no control-conscious 
experience f o r the workers as such. Also w e must not forget the 
Singaporeans c u l t u r a l dependence on authority f o r social c o n t r o l . 
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Having e a r l i e r said that Singapore workers may need more time f o r 
comparable achievements i n affluence and technology, we should also 
recognise the significance of the inflow, overtime, of values (such 
as ' i n d u s t r i a l democracy' 'workers p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' disclosure of 
information, etc.) from the world of free labour. I t remains 
possible, therefore, that these ideas from the external environment, 
may stimulate Singapore workers towards active p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
enterprise decision-making at some future date.. Another possible 
motivator, however, may be management- i t s e l f . 
Recent developments i n management thought seem to show a marked 
preference f o r p a r t i c i p a t i v e management. While the obvious and 
objective purpose seems to be improvement i n labour p r o d u c t i v i t y 
and job commitment, there i s yet another i n t e r e s t i n g aspect. This 
i s the r i s i n g concern f o r a normative approach - that quite apart from 
'objective' p o s s i b i l i t i e s , management should, i n the organisations 
long term i n t e r e s t , be concerned with human choice and values. 
Besides, there i s also a recognition that control i n organisations i s 
an expandable commodity and not a fi x e d pie notion as t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
believed. P a r t i c i p a t i v e management i s thus seen as an e f f e c t i v e 
way of expanding control at a l l levels of the organisation - both 
f o r management and the workers. By subscribing to the b e l i e f that 
a viabls future cannot be achieved merely by reacting and adapting 
to present environmental circumstances, the modern approach recognises 
the need fo r what may appear to be a radical strategy t o accommodate 
the choices and changing values of organisation members. In t h i s 
sense, the p a r t i c i p a t i v e approach may be considered as f u t u r i s t i c too. 
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Some giant multinational corporations (especially of American 
o r i g i n ) stationed i n Singapore have already i n i t i a t e d modest worker 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n shopfloor decisions. This, i n t u r n , can lead to a 
spread of awareness i n the issues of control.. 
The ultimate i n the American cycle i s aptly described by Bluestone 
" I n the United States the thrust to improve 
the q u a l i t y of working l i f e w i l l manifest 
i t s e l f i n d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n by workers 
i n managing t h e i r jobs. Perhaps, i n l a t e r 
years, i t w i l l spread to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
managing the enterprise. The incontrovertible 
f a c t i s that the democratic values of society -
based on p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the decision-making , 
process w i l l be extended to the place of work. 
Democratising work i s an idea whose time has 
come". 3 • 
The present study, however, does not substantiate nor dispel our 
i n i t i a l speculation regarding the development i n Singapore of the 
American trend. There i s c e r t a i n l y no evidence that there i s a 
desire f o r job control i n the Singapore case. A s i t u a t i o n of t h i s 
nature i s best followed over a period of time and therefore needs 
te s t i n g every few years. We do hope that i n some point i n the 
future somebody w i l l pick up the work and get additional data to te s t 
our speculations and assumptions. 
Nevertheless, i f we are r i g h t about multinational corporations 
and our general analysis of the hierarchy of expectations from work, 
the. t e s t f o r Singapore i n the years t o come w i l l be whether the 
Government can relinquish some of i t s central control f o r more 
decentralisation i n the decision-making processes. I f one looks at a 
number of states, however, the track record has not been too good -
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most governments are not prepared to share decision-making. Although, 
on the one hand, t h i s has advantages, the problems, on the other hand, 
are also quite obvious. 
Managements and unions have a t e s t too. Not only have they a 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to maintain peaceful i n s t i t u t i o n a l relationships and 
structures, they w i l l need to back these up with s t a b i l i t y and control 
i n the informal area. And t h i s i s a global problem, even i n 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y stable systems l i k e Germany. Conclusions drawn by 
Herding and Kohler about job control i n Germany's system of 
'codetermination' are indeed very pertinent: 
"This cooperative character of trade unions 
also manifested i t s e l f i n t h e i r p o l i c i e s 
with respect to job control issues. I f 
once can say that control over items such 
as production standards, noise levels and 
plant d i s c i p l i n e was f o r a long time of 
no p a r t i c u l a r importance i n the demands 
of the rank and f i l e , then t h i s was even 
more true of trade unions and labour 
representatives i n the plant: e f f e c t i v e 
job control from the workers' point of 
view implies s h i f t i n g the focus of 
decision-making not only from the 
national or regional organisation, but 
-also from works councils themselves. ;_ 
I t means stressing the ro l e of the work 
group and the shopfloor union representatives, 
and i s bound to involve opening up some avenues 
f o r t h e i r pressure t a c t i c s : developments 
that one can see i n B r i t a i n and America 
which are plaguing t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l relations 
systems...... With deepending problems of 
economic i n s t a b i l i t y , with unemployment 
and the development of trade union opposition, 
the t r a d i t i o n a l cooperative codetermination 
practice i s increasingly being challenged. 
Changes i n practice of both the works councils 
and trade unions towards a greater importance . 
of job-control issues are responses to t h i s 
challenge.n 4 
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Within the broad context of decentralisation that we have 
proposed, managements and unions i n Singapore could be expected to 
exercise greater i n i t i a t i v e . I f industry i s to have a viable future 
they w i l l have to i n i t i a t e and control change. For t h i s , as we 
pointed out e a r l i e r , they, w i l l need to develop strategies which are 
not only reactive to both the external and i n t e r n a l environments, but 
also which are anticipatory. 
I l l THE CONTROL-SITUATIONAL APPROACH: A USEFUL APPROACH FOR THE THEORY 
" AND PRACTICE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ' 
In asserting the value of the concept, of control f o r the study 
of i n d u s t r i a l relations i t would be appropriate f o r us to remind 
ourselves of i t s unique q u a l i t y i n the f i e l d of social behaviour. 
Milton Derber has outlined the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l relations 
thus: 
" I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s - the inter p l a y among 
owners, managers, employees, union and 
employer association o f f i c i a l s , government 
personnel, and others concerned with the 
functioning of productive labour f o r pay -
may be studied and interpreted i n numerous 
ways. To c i t e a few examples: Attention . 
may be directed p r i m a r i l y to i t s economic 
aspects - Kow economic investments i n human 
resources are allocated and compensated ..... 
. as a system of r u l e making., with emphasis on 
ru l e makers and the web of rules as a 
struggle f o r power, among either classes.or 
in t e r e s t groups i n terms of motivations, 
needs, desires, and perceptions of the people 
involved and t h e i r a b i l i t i e s to s a t i s f y them. 
I t may be seen as a process of administration 
or management i n which diverse interests at 
various levels of organisation must be 
coordinated." .5. 
Derber's outlin e can be added with a l i s t of specific a c t i v i t i e s e.g. 
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pea'ce, c o n f l i c t , i n d u s t r i a l democracy, workers p a r t i c i p a t i o n , disclosure 
of information, p r o d u c t i v i t y bargaining etc: etc. 
Because control i s a basic and cr u c i a l element of each of the 
various s i t u a t i o n s , i t i s able to a r t i c u l a t e as a powerful conceptual 
t o o l . 
In our study, the concept of control has been very useful i n 
di r e c t i n g a ttention to the key aspects of the s i t u a t i o n - the people 
and e n t i t i e s involved, t h e i r goals and objectives, the bases of power, 
questions of legitimacy, s o l i d a r i t y and motivation. I t has also 
helped t o uncover the major mechanisms of influence and the relevant 
manifestations of control that make up i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the 
s i t u a t i o n - management, union a n d State c o n t r o l , l e g i s l a t i o n , 
regulative agencies, c o l l e c t i v e agreement, grievance handling 
arrangements and status of job c o n t r o l . 
The s i t u a t i o n a l approach directed a t t e n t i o n to pertinent aspects 
i n the external and i n t e r n a l environments and stressed the application 
of ideas and concepts relevant to the s i t u a t i o n . I n our approach we 
have not r e s t r i c t e d ourselves to reactive strategies and have injected 
a creative element too. 
As f a r as the s p e c i f i c objectives of t h i s research project are 
concerned, we are s a t i s f i e d that the c o n t r c l - s i t u a t i o n a l approach has 
been very useful f o r our understanding, analysing and forecasting of 
developments. I t has also helped us i n our attempt at some 
prescription for the authorities - to anticipate, i n i t i a t e and 
control change, and thereby, the future course of i n d u s t r i a l 
relations i n Singapore. 
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APPENDIX NO. .1 
DIARY OF EVENTS LEADING TO AND CULMINATING IN THE 
OVERTIME BOYCOTT BY JURONG SHIPYARD'S WORKERS 
BETWEEN 22ND OCTOBER and 1ST NOVEM3ER, 1974 
20th October, 1974. SUNDAY 
Fifteen workers of the Hull Prefabrication Section who.reported f o r 
work during, the day were not asked to stay f o r the f i n a n c i a l l y a t t r a c t i v e 
overnight overtime, while the 'opportunity' was instead granted by t h e i r 
foremen to-some subcontract workers (who were supposed t o be taken on a 
given job only when 'regular* labour was not s u f f i c i e n t ) . 
22nd October, 1974. TUESDAY 
In the morning, the Union approached the Personnel Division, and informed 
Personnel of the complaint and reminded that such practice was contrary 
to the understanding with the Union, as -well as contrary to the Company's 
pol i c y that where there was overtime/overnight work to be done, Jurong's 
regular workers should be given f i r s t preference. • Personnel informed the 
Union that the grievance procedure should be followed and that the matter 
should be dealt with at Sectional level f i r s t . Union asked Personnel to 
convey the complaint to the Section Chief and t o l e t them know the outcome 
of the matter. 
23rd October, 1974. WEDNESDAY 
The "STOP AT 5.00 P.M." a f f a i r spread to other sections i n the Yard. 
Personnel had t r i e d to contact the Union on t h i s matter but was unable 
to as phone c a l l s to the Union o f f i c e were not received and the Union 
o f f i c e was locked. At about 4.30 p.m., the Personnel Offi c e r (PO) 
went to the Union Office and managed to see some o f f i c e r s . They again 
denied knowing anything of the spreading boycott and r e p l i e d that i f 
Management wanted the Union's co-operaticn t o get the workers to work 
overtime, i t could be arranged provided i t was "worthwhile". The PO 
informed the Union that since the matter i s affecting other sections 
too, a meeting should be arranged. I t was arranged f o r 2.00 p.m. the 
next day. 
24th October, 1974,- THURSDAY 
During the Meeting, the Union made the following allegations:-
1. That our workers were deprived of additional earnings when they 
were not given preference t o do overnight work. 
2. That the Management had breached the agreement with the Union 
to give preference of working overnight to our workers. 
3w That the Foreman's a t t i t u d e towards and relations with his 
subordinates was unbecoming of a supervisor. 
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The Union said that the matter cannot be resolved unless the following 
conditions were f u l f i l l e d : 
1. Foreman to apologise t o Branch Union. 
2. The Chief of Hull Prefabrication to personally give the Union an 
assurance that the p o l i c y on overtime a l l o c a t i o n be adhered t o . 
3. Management must reprimand anyone breaching t h i s p o l i c y i n fut u r e . 
4. To compensate those workers who were affected on Sunday, 20.10.74. 
The Meeting was adjourned, when Management repli e d that these conditions 
could not be f u l f i l l e d . Management re p l i e d that an assurance could 
however be given to the Union that the p o l i c y w i l l be upheld. 
25th October, 1974. FRIDAY 
In the morning, at 8.10 a.m., the Chief of the E l e c t r i c a l F i t t i n g Section 
called Personnel to inform that a l l his workers had gone to the Union 
house f o r a meeting. The Chief and Foreman were both"not informed by the 
Union Branch O f f i c i a l s of any such meeting. When Personnel enquired, the 
Union O f f i c i a l s denied c a l l i n g a meeting, but explained that the workers 
were unhappy and went to consult the Union on t h e i r own. ..The, workers 
reported back to t h e i r workplaces 40 minutes l a t e r . 
Later, at 12.00 noon, on the same day, while a docking operation was on 
ir. Dock No. 1, 7 workers who were performing the operation stopped work 
f o r lunch despite the senior dock o f f i c e r ' s request to carry on. The 
Company's Collective Agreement provides f o r staggered lunch depending on 
work exigencies, while the work stoppage was considered as gross negligence 
of duty, i t was also a strong i n d i c a t i o n of the worker's feelings on the 
overtime a l l o c a t i o n problem. 
The majority of workers i n the yard stopped work at 5.00 p.m., thus 
confirming a boycott of the overtime scheduled f o r them. A small number, 
however, stayed to work overtime. 
26th October, 1974. SATURDAY 
A l e t t e r was received from the Union, served under Section 17 of the 
I n d u s t r i a l Relations Act i n v i t i n g Management to negotiate on i n d u s t r i a l 
matters. E a r l i e r , a notice was received from the Union informing an 
emergency mesting at the Canteen at 5.00 p.m. on 29th October, 1974. 
27th October, 1974. SUNDAY 
Branch Union O f f i c i a l s were seen at the time clock centre i n the morning 
"talking to the workers who reported f o r work. I t i s understood from 
some workers that the Union was discouraging the workers from coming to 
work, i t being Sunday overtime. 
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28th October, 1974. MONDAY 
Following private negotiations between the f u l l - t i m e Union O f f i c i a l and 
Personnel) the Union was prepared to compromise a l i t t l e on the conditions 
l a i d down e a r l i e r . The Union resuggested the following:-
1. The Foreman should apologise to the Branch Union and the 
workers involved on 20th October, 1974. 
2. Management should assure the Union that the policy w i l l be 
followed and that anyone breaching the policy w i l l be reprimanded. 
29th October, 1974. TUESDAY 
The Union held t h e i r Emergency General Meeting at 5.00 p.m. i n the 
Canteen and the agenda according to the notices put up by the Union 
included:-
1. Address by the Full-time Union O f f i c i a l 
2. Address by Branch leaders 
3. Ballot to empower the Union t o take action 
on any outstanding grievances 
I t i s understood from informed sources that during the meeting, the 
Union brought up the following points:-
1. Management had committed a breach of understanding 
and agreement reached with the Union on the practice 
of granting overtime. 
2. That Hull Prefabrication Foreman had adopted a' 
very arrogant and ungentlemanly a t t i t u d e towards 
his subordinates. 
The Union's stand now was: 
1. The Company should punish the Foreman f o r the way 
• he conducted himself with his subordinates. 
2. The Company must honour the understanding and 
agreements reached with the Union. 
A b a l l o t was then held t o empower the Executive Committee to take any 
action, including i n d u s t r i a l action to e f f e c t a f a i r and j u s t settlement 
of the dispute. 
Approximately 1090 votes were cast; 10 against, 30 s p o i l t , and thereby 
a clear majority f o r the Union. 
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Meanwhile the s i t u a t i o n on shopfloor remained unchanged except that,a 
number of workers expressed that though they would l i k e t o do overtime' 
work they were a f r a i d of repurcussions from the Union. They regretted, 
however, that t h e i r take home income would be d r a s t i c a l l y reduced i f they 
continued to boycott overtime work. 
30th October, 1974." WEDNESDAY 
The Union's l e t t e r served under Section 17 of the I n d u s t r i a l Relations 
Act was r e p l i e d and handed to the f u l l - t i m e Union.Official and the 
d i s t r i c t representative of the Ministry of Labour. The date of 
negotiations, was f i x e d f o r the next day. I t was l a t e r confirmed with 
the Union that the time of the meeting would be 2.00 p.m. 
31st October, 1974. THURSDAY 
A meeting was called by the Labour Ministry Conciliation O f f i c e r at hi s . 
o f f i c e at Taman Jurong. A f t e r much discussion, the following Was f i n a l l y 
agreed upon:-
1. Management would apologise t o the Union f o r the occurrence 
of the incident. 
2. Management would reprimand anyone who breached the understanding 
i n future, subject to exigencies, c o n t i n u i t y , etc. 
3. Management w i l l ensure that a l l Foremen and/Engineers w i l l be 
briefed of t h i s agreement to prevent s i m i l a r future occurrences. 
The Management also took t h i s opportunity to punish the foreman f o r his 
ungentlemanly and sometimes 'bullying' behaviour towards his subordinates 
which had made him a notorious foreman even before the overtime incident. 
I t was, however, generally seen as a punishment f o r provoking discontent 
amongst the workers. While the workers' t r u s t i n Personnel was 
restored, the Union called o f f the boycott. 
The Union thus promised that they would t r y t h e i r best to get the workers 
to work overtime now that the issue was s e t t l e d . 
1st November, 1974. FRIDAY 
At lunch time, some workers i n the yard continued to refuse t o work, and 
when the Union was called, they said they would see to the matter. I t 
appeared that the message had not got around the whole yard yet. However 
i n the evening the response to doing overtime work increased. 
On 2nd November, 1974, the workers resumed overtime work as per normal. 
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APPENDIX NO. 2 
MATTERS COVERED IN THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 
1. Introduction 
T i t l e 
Scope of Agreement 





Salary/Wage Incermental Date 
Pay Day 
Rates of Payment for Extra Work 
Chargehand Allowance 
Incentives (e.g. Attendance Bonus 
Suggestion Rewards) 
3. Conditions of Service 
Probation 
Hours of Work 
S h i f t Work 
Rest Day 
Paid Public Holidays 
Outstation Work 








Medical F a c i l i t i e s 
H o spitalisation 
Tuberculosis Insurance 
Tuberculosis Leave 
Paid Compassionate Leave 









APPENDIX NO. 3 
MATTERS COVERED BY LABOUR LEGISLATION 
I . THE EMPLOYMENT ACT 
Contracts of Service 
I l l e g a l terms of contract of se r v i c e 
Termination of contracts 
Notice of termination of contract 
Termination of contract without notice 
Contractual age 
When contract deemed to be broken by employer and employee 
Misconduct of the employee 
Termination by employee threatened by danger 
L i a b i l i t y of breach of contract \-;\: 
Contract of serv i c e not to r e s t r i c t r i g h t s of employees 
to j o i n , p a r t i c i p a t e i n or organise trade unions 
Change of employer 
Offence 
Payment of Salary 
F i x a t i o n of s a l a r y period 
Time of payment 
Payment on dismissal or termination by employer 
Payment on termination by employee 
Income tax clearance 
Payment to be made during working hours 
No unauthorised deductions to be made 
Authorised deductions 
Deductions for absence 
Deductions for damages or loss 
Deductions for accommodation 
Recovery of advances and loans 
Deductions not to exceed f i f t y per cent of sal a r y 
P r i o r i t y of sal a r y to other debts 
Offence 
Rest Days, Hours of Work, Holidays and Other Conditions of Service 
Application of Part IV 
Rest day 
Work on r e s t day 
Hours of work 
Task work 





Rest Days etc. (Cont'd) 
Payment of retrenchment benefit 
Retirement benefit 
P r i o r i t y of retirement benefits, etc. ! 
Payment of annual wage supplement, bonus or annual wage increases 
Variation of c o l l e c t i v e agreement or reward. 
Interpretation 
R e s t r i c t i o n s on night work 
Hours of work of children and young persons 
. Children and young persons not to be employed on r e s t days 
Power to suspend application of Part IV 
Offences 
The Truck System 
Agreements to pay s a l a r y otherwise than i n legal tender 
Agreement as to place and manner, etc., of spending s a l a r y 
Salary to be paid e n t i r e l y i n legal tender 
Recovery of s a l a r y not paid i n legal tender 
I n t e r e s t on advances forbidden 
Remuneration other than s a l a r y 
Shops and canteens 
Penalties 
Proceedings may be taken against actual offender 
Payment of s a l a r y through bank 
Limitations on application of t h i s part 
Contractors and Contracting 
L i a b i l i t y of p r i n c i p a l s , contractors and subcontractors for s a l a r y 
of workmen 
Registration of contractors and subcontractors 
Domestic Servants 
Minister may apply Act to domestic servants 
Employment of Children and Young Persons 
Employment on completion of twelfth year 
Employment i n i n d u s t r i a l undertaking 
Conditions of employment 
Employment i n i n d u s t r i a l undertaking 
Employment on machinery 
Employment on e l e c t r i c a l apparatus 
Employment underground 
Minimum rates of salary may be prescribed 
Approved employment 
Regulations regulating employment 
Offences 
Power of Juvenile Court i n respect of children or young persons 
requiring care or protection 
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Registration of Young Persons Employed i n I n d u s t r i a l Undertakings 
. C e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n 
Application for c e r t i f i c a t e 
Enquiries by Commissioner 
Issue of c e r t i f i c a t e 
Medical examination 
V a l i d i t y of c e r t i f i c a t e s 
Calculation of age 
Cancellation and a l t e r a t i o n of c e r t i f i c a t e . .. 
C e r t i f i c a t e of age . 
Offences 
Employer to keop c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n 
Employer to give token to young person 
Penalty for f a i l u r e to keep c e r t i f i c a t e 
C e r t i f i c a t e to be returned to young person leaving employment 
Commissioner to keep r e g i s t e r 
Fees. 
Employment of Women 
Length of benefit period 
Payments to include r e s t days 
When payment i s made 
Payment of benefit on death of female employee before confinement 
Notice of confinement 
Dismissal during absence prohibited 
Employment a f t e r confinement 
Forfeiture of payment 
Right to benefit unaffected by notice of dismissal i n s p e c i f i e d 
circumstances 






Only c i t i z e n s to be registered 
Penalty 
Control of employment 
Health, Accommodation and Medical Care 
Duty to provide proper quarters and sanitary arrangements 
Buildings to conform with requirements of law 
Insanitary quarters 
Water supply 
Weekly inspection of quarters 
F i r s t aid equipment 
Employer to maintain c l i n i c or dispensary 
Offences 
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Registers, Returns and, other Documentary Requirements 
Register of employees 
Record of workmen 
Display of notice board showing designation of employer 
Display of notice of working hours arid days 
Returns 
Commissioner may c a l l for further returns 
Power to c a l l for returns, books, etc. 
Service of r e q u i s i t i o n s 
Penalties 
Compounding of offences 
Returns not to be published or disclosed 
Inspection 
Inspections by the State 
Notice to employer of presence of inspecting o f f i c e r 
Powers of inspecting o f f i c e r 
.Inspection report book 
Inspecting o f f i c e r not to reveal secrets . 
Offences 
General 
Wrongful detention of employee 
Employee not answerable for debt, default or miscarriage of another 
Obstruction of employee by employer 
Seats for employees engaged i n r e t a i l trade or business 
Punishment, for obstruction 
Penalties 
Penalty for fraudulently inducing employee to emigrate 
Power to compound offences 
Claims, Complaints and Investigations'into Offences 
Commissioner's power to inquire into complaints 
Prohibiting order by Commissioner to t h i r d party 
Right of appeal 
Fees and enforcement of orders 
Procedure for making and hearing claims 
Representation before Commissioner 
Joining of claims 
J u r i s d i c t i o n of courts not affected 
• Employee's remedy when employer about to abscond 
Investigations of complaints and offences. 
Procedure a f t e r inquiry 
Costs of proceedings 
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Procedure and Regulations 
O f f i c e r s to be public servants 
Place of employment deemed to be a public place 
J u r i s d i c t i o n of Magistrates' and D i s t r i c t Courts 
Right to hearing 
Onus of proof 
C i v i l proceedings not barred 
Power to deal with evidence taken down by another o f f i c e r 
Application of fines 
Imprisonment to be i n discharge of f i n e , compensation, e t c. 
Recovery of money as fines 
Service of summons 
Power to make rec i p r o c a l provisions between Singapore and 
Malaysia for the s e r v i c e , execution and enforcement 
of summonses, warrants and orders 
Power of Minister to make regulations 
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I I THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 
An Act to provide for the regulation of the re l a t i o n s of employers and 
employees and the prevention and settlement of trade disputes by 
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and c o n c i l i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n . 
I n d u s t r i a l A r b i t r a t i o n Courts 
Courts 
President and Deputy President 
Acting President 
Panels 
E l i g i b i l i t y ' f o r membership of panels 
Duration of appointment 
Removal from panels 
Vacancies i n panels 
Constitution of Courts 
Continuation of hearing 
Protection and immunity of members of Courts 
Allowances 
Registrar and o f f i c e r s of the Courts 
C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining 
Recognition of trade union of employees 
I n v i t a t i o n to negotiate 
Acceptance of i n v i t a t i o n to negotiate 
C o n c i l i a t i o n 
N o t i f i c a t i o n of trade disputes 
Compulsory conferences 
Procedure as to n o t i f i c a t i o n s 
C o l l e c t i v e agreements 
Re s t r i c t i o n s on c o l l e c t i v e agreements i n c e r t a i n new undertakings 
C o l l e c t i v e agreement deemed to be an award 
Representation i n negotiations 
C o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r s 
Interpretation 
Negotiations otherwise than under t h i s Part 
Arbi t r a t i o n 
Court to have cognizance of trade disputes 
Court to a r b i t r a t e 
Dispute as to employment i n Government s e r v i c e 
Court to have regard to c e r t a i n matters 
Power to make awards 
Awards 
Form of awards 
Operation of award 
Commencement and continuance of awards 
On whom awards binding 
Minister may extend operation of award 
Contents of awards 
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Awards (Cont'd) 
Award to provide for referee 
Interpretation of awards 
Setting aside and v a r i a t i o n of awards 
Variation of agreement to conform with award . •. 
Award to be f i n a l 
Awards to be avai l a b l e at office, of Registrar 
Evidence of awards 
Exhibition of awards 
Contracts contrary to awards 
Penalties for breach of awards 
Recovery of wages under awards 
Commissioner's power to inquire into complaints. 
Inspection 
Powers of the Courts 
Contempt of court 
Suspension or ca n c e l l a t i o n of award 
Exercise of j u r i s d i c t i o n under c e r t a i n sections 
Procedure and Powers of the Courts 
Procedure of the Courts 
P a r t i c u l a r powers of the Courts 
Exclusion of evidence as to c e r t a i n matters 
Intervention 
Representation before the Courts 
Questions of Law 
Orders to take evidence 
Powers of inspection 
Decisions of the Courts 
Offences i n r e l a t i o n to the Courts 
Contempt of Penal Code 
Trade s e c r e t s , etc. tendered i n evidence 
Inspection of books, etc. 
Boards of Inquiry 
Appointment of boards of inquiry 
Constitution of board of inquiry 
Procedure and powers of boards 
Reports 
Miscellaneous 
Penalties imposed upon persons observing awards 
Inducing persons not to j o i n trade unions 
Employers not to discriminate against members of trade unions 
Leave on trade union business 
Injuring employee on account of i n d u s t r i a l action 
Onus of proof and prosecution 
Penalties for offences for which no express penalty provided 
Power of Minister to make regulations 
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APPENDIX NO.4 
SOME MATTERS GOVERNED BY THE JURONG SHIPYARD'S MANAGEMENT POLICY 
1. Structure and Organisation of the Company 
The grading of jobs 
The standards of job appointment 
2. Description of jobs, functions and powers 
General description and requirements for workers 
Job description 
Regulation of foremen functions and powers 
3. Employment 
Rules and Regulations for recruitment 
Reinstatement following National Service 
4. Training and Development 
Training and development i n general for: 
Managers, supervisors and yard workers 
5. Appraisal 
Managerial Personnel Appraisal 
Employee Personnel Appraisal 
Merit increments 
Incentive Schemes 
6. Transfers and Promotion 
7. Wage rates and allowances for non-bargaiiiable employees 
(including managerial, confidential and se c u r i t y o f f i c e r s ) 
8. Conditions of service and work 
Normal working hours 
Leaves for managerial and confidential s t a f f 
Safety helmet design 
Car loan scheme 
Vehicles for top management s t a f f 
H o s p i t a l i s a t i o n benefits 




COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT CLAUSE ON CO-OPERATION 
The Company and the Union hereby undertake to f u l l y co-operate 
i n maintaining harmonious r e l a t i o n s and i n providing circumstances 
that are conducive for e f f e c t i v e work towards the advancement of 
the Company's image and business which are i n the i n t e r e s t of a l l 
employees; and i n t h i s s p i r i t ; 
a) the Company recognises the Union as the sole C o l l e c t i v e 
negotiating body r e l a t i v e to terms and conditions of 
employment for its members who are employees of the 
Company; 
b) the Company undertake to advise and consult the. Union 
before effecting changes i n the general terms and 
conditions of employment as contained herein; and 
the Union undertakes to advise the Company before i t 
takes action on behalf of i t s members . 
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APPENDIX NO. 6 
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT. CLAUSE ON THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
a) Recognising the value and the importance of f u l l discussions 
i n c l e a r i n g up misunderstandings and preserving harmonious 
r e l a t i o n s , every possible e f f o r t s h a l l be made by both the 
Company and the Union to dispose of any grievance or complaint 
from employees at the lowest possible l e v e l and as expeditiously 
as possible. 
b) Any employee having a grievance and/or complaint s h a l l under 
normal circumstances f i r s t r e f e r the matter within three working 
days of i t s a r i s i n g to the attention of h i s immediate superior 
who s h a l l give his. decision on the matter within one working day 
from the date of n o t i f i c a t i o n to him. 
c) I f the employee concerned f e e l s aggrieved by the decision 
given at (b) above, he may within two working days of the date 
of the decision given, r e f e r the matter to h i s Branch Union 
which s h a l l appoint representatives who may approach the Chief 
of Section or h i s representatives for further discussions on 
the matter. 
d) I f the employee i s s t i l l aggrieved by the decision given at 
( c ) , he may within three working days of the date of the 
decision given, r e f e r the matter to the Branch Union who may 
approach the Personnel Manager or h i s representative for 
further discussions on the matter. 
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e) I f the matter cannot be amicably resolved a f t e r discussions 
at (d) above have taken place, the matter s h a l l be dealt 
with at the Management and Union (HQ) l e v e l . 
f ) F a i l i n g a settlement under (e) above the matter s h a l l be 
referred to a referee under the clause below. 
Referee 
Any dispute between the p a r t i e s i n t h i s Agreement while i t i s i n 
force and arising.out of the operation thereof s h a l l be referred 
by both p a r t i e s to the President of the I n d u s t r i a l A r b i t r a t i o n 
Court who may s e l e c t a referee appointed i n accordance with 
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